631 research outputs found
Hermeneutyka i nauki kognitywne
Philosophical hermeneutics, understood as the theory of nterpretation, investigates some questions that are also asked in the cognitive sciences. The nature of human understanding, the way that we gain and organize knowledge, the role played by language and memory in these considerations, the relations between conscious and unconscious knowledge, and how we understand other persons, are all good examples of issues that form the intersection of hermeneutics and the cognitive sciences. Although hermeneutics is most often contrasted with the natural sciences, there are some clear ways in which hermeneutics can contribute to the cognitive sciences and vice versa
LâINTENTIONNALITĂ ET LâACTIVITĂ INTENTIONNELLE
Those who argue that free will is an illusion are wrong. They base their argument on scientific evidence that tests the wrong level of description for intentional action. Free will is not about subpersonal neuronal processes, muscular activation, or basic bodily movements, but about contextualized actions in a system that is larger than many contemporary philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists consider. In this paper, I describe the kind of intentionality that goes with the exercise of free will.Diejenigen, die behaupten, der freie Wille sei Illusion, sind im Unrecht. Sie begrĂŒnden ihre Behauptung auf einem wissenschaftlichen Beweis, der die falsche Ebene der Deskription des intentionalen Handelns testet. Der freie Wille bezieht sich nicht auf subpersonale neuronale Prozesse, Muskelaktivierung oder grundlegende Körperbewegungen, sondern auf kontextualisierte Handlungen in einem System, das gröĂer ist als viele zeitgenössische Geistesphilosophen, Psychologen und Neurowissenschaftler annehmen. In diesem Artikel beschreibe ich die Art von IntentionalitĂ€t, die mit der AusĂŒbung des freien Willens einhergeht.Ceux qui affirment que le libre arbitre est une illusion nâont pas raison. Ils fondent leur affirmation sur une preuve scientifique Ă©tablie Ă un niveau impropre de description de lâactivitĂ© intentionnelle. Le libre arbitre ne sâexerce pas sur les processus neuronaux sub-personnels, lâactivation musculaire ou les mouvements Ă©lĂ©mentaires du corps, mais sur des activitĂ©s contextualisĂ©es au sein dâun systĂšme qui est nettement plus grand que ne le pensent bon nombre de philosophes de lâesprit, de psychologues et de neuroscientifiques contemporains. Dan cet article, je dĂ©crit ce genre dâintentionnalitĂ© qui va avec lâexercice du libre arbitre
Self-defense: Deflecting Deflationary and Eliminativist Critiques of the Sense of Ownership
I defend a phenomenological account of the sense of ownership as part of a minimal sense of self from those critics who propose either a deflationary or eliminativist critique. Specifically, I block the deflationary critique by showing that in fact the phenomenological account is itself a deflationary account insofar as it takes the sense of ownership to be implicit or intrinsic to experience and bodily action. I address the eliminativist view by considering empirical evidence that supports the concept of pre-reflective self-awareness, which underpins the sense of ownership. Finally, I respond to claims that phenomenology does not offer a positive account of the sense of ownership by showing the role it plays in an enactivist (action-oriented) view of embodied cognition
Joint attention, joint action, and participatory sense making
Developmentally, joint attention is located at the intersection of a complex set of capacities that serve our cognitive, emotional and action-oriented relations with others. It forms a bridge between primary intersubjectivity and secondary intersubjectivity consists in a set of sensory-motor abilities that allow us to understand the meaning of another person\u27s movements, gestures, facial expressions, eye direction, and intentional actions, in the context of face-to-face interactions. These are the abilities that we first require in order to enter into joint-attentional situations. Once we are in situations of joint attention we are then able to further enhance our understanding of others, in secondary intersubjectivity, by seeing how they use things and how our shared world forms a context for their actions
Bodily self-awareness and object perception
In this paper I would like to argue that proprioceptive awareness (including both somatic and ecological proprioception) is primarily a form of non-perceptual awareness. This might seem to be an obscure point, but it turns out to be philosophically significant in regard to what Shoemaker calls âimmunity to error through misidentificationâ. Although it is possible to make a mistake in identifying oneâs body via sense-perceptual modalities such as vision, some philosophers argue that one is immune to error through misidentification in regard to knowing oneâs own body by means of proprioception (Cassam, 1995; Evans, 1982). If proprioception were a form of perception then it would be possible for one to proprioceptively misidentify oneself in referring to oneâs body. In arguing that proprioception is not a form of perception I am defending the immunity principle in this regard
Culture in Mind - An Enactivist Account: Not Cognitive Penetration But Cultural Permeation
Advancing a radically enactive account of cognition, we provide arguments in favour of the possibility that cultural factors permeate rather than penetrate cognition, such that cognition extensively and transactionally incorporates cultural factors rather than there being any question of cultural factors having to break into the restricted confines of cognition. The paper reviews the limitations of two classical cognitivist, modularist accounts of cognition and a revisionary, new order variant of cognitivism â a Predictive Processing account of Cognition, or PPC. It argues that the cognitivist interpretation of PPC is conservatively and problematically attached to the idea of inner models and stored knowledge. In abandoning that way of understanding PPC, it offers a radically enactive alternative account of how cultural factors matter to cognition â one that abandons all vestiges of the idea that cultural factors might contentfully communicate with basic forms of cognition. In place of that idea, the possibility that culture permeates cognition is promoted
Evidence for Partial Taylor Relaxation from Changes in Magnetic Geometry and Energy during a Solar Flare
Solar flares are powered by energy stored in the coronal magnetic field, a
portion of which is released when the field reconfigures into a lower energy
state. Investigation of sunspot magnetic field topology during flare activity
is useful to improve our understanding of flaring processes. Here we
investigate the deviation of the non-linear field configuration from that of
the linear and potential configurations, and study the free energy available
leading up to and after a flare. The evolution of the magnetic field in NOAA
region 10953 was examined using data from Hinode/SOT-SP, over a period of 12
hours leading up to and after a GOES B1.0 flare. Previous work on this region
found pre- and post-flare changes in photospheric vector magnetic field
parameters of flux elements outside the primary sunspot. 3D geometry was thus
investigated using potential, linear force-free, and non-linear force-free
field extrapolations in order to fully understand the evolution of the field
lines. Traced field line geometrical and footpoint orientation differences show
that the field does not completely relax to a fully potential or linear
force-free state after the flare. Magnetic and free magnetic energies increase
significantly ~ 6.5-2.5 hours before the flare by ~ 10^31 erg. After the flare,
the non-linear force-free magnetic energy and free magnetic energies decrease
but do not return to pre-flare 'quiet' values. The post-flare non-linear
force-free field configuration is closer (but not equal) to that of the linear
force-free field configuration than a potential one. However, the small degree
of similarity suggests that partial Taylor relaxation has occurred over a time
scale of ~ 3-4 hours.Comment: Accepted for Publication in Astronomy & Astrophysics. 11 pages, 11
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PrzerysowaÄ mapÄ i przestawiÄ czas: fenomenologia i nauki kognitywne
We argue that phenomenology can be of central and positive importance to the cognitive sciences, and that it can also learn from the empirical research conducted in those sciences. We discuss the project of naturalizing phenomenology and how this can be best accomplished. We provide several examples of how phenomenology and the cognitive sciences can integrate their research. Specifically, we consider issues related to embodied cognition and intersubjectivity. We provide a detailed analysis of issues related to time-consciousness, with reference to understanding schizophrenia and the loss of the sense of agency. We offer a positive proposal to address these issues based on a neurobiological dynamic-systems model
Making enactivism even more embodied
The full scope of enactivist approaches to cognition includes not only a focus on sensory-motor contingencies and physical affordances for action, but also an emphasis on affective factors of embodiment and intersubjective affordances for social interaction. This strong conception of embodied cognition calls for a new way to think about the role of the brain in the larger system of brain-body-environment. We ask whether recent work on predictive coding offers a way to think about brain function in an enactive system, and we suggest that a positive answer is possible if we interpret predictive coding in a more enactive way, i.e., as involved in the organismâs dynamic adjustments to its environment
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