Confuse, Divide and Rule - How Russia Drives Europe Apart. IES Policy Brief Issue 2016/2 • March 2016

Whereas the EU typically views regional integration as a vehicle for positive change, Russia has repeatedly tried to portray European integration as a malign force. Whereas the European Commission prefers to operate as a Union of 28 states, Russia by contrast, prefers to employ a tactic of ‘divide and rule’ whereby it either aims at weakening the centre (Brussels) by playing off one Member State against the other, or undermine EU cohesion and coherence as a whole. This Policy Brief analyses two domains where these competing narratives meet in closer detail: (i) how Russia engages in patterns of information and disinformation to spin certain narratives about Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas imports, which can in turn undermine the EU’s efforts to create an Energy Union, and (ii) how the Kremlin draws on Eurosceptic political parties and stakeholders in support of certain narratives that advance its political goals of undermining the EU’s cohesion and coherence

Vers une gouvernance mondiale de l’énergie : comment compléter le puzzle

Les relations énergétiques mondiales contemporaines se sont profondément transformées en raison, notamment, de la diminution des réserves de gaz et de pétrole, de l’accroissement de la demande en énergie provenant des économies émergentes, de la nécessité de prendre en compte les changements climatiques à l’échelle mondiale, de l’impact des sources d’énergie alternatives et renouvelables, et, en corrélation avec tout cela, du renforcement de la politisation et de la sécurité de l’approvisionnement de l’énergie. L’architecture institutionnelle régissant les relations énergétiques au niveau mondial n’a pas su s’adapter à ces évolutions. Elle souffre de problèmes fondamentaux de représentativité, d’un niveau d’institutionnalisation faible ainsi que d’un manque de capacité pour la mise en œuvre de la conformité. Les institutions actuelles risquent donc de devenir non représentatives et, en fin de compte, inefficaces, à moins qu’une réforme n’ait lieu. L’on se livrera par la suite à une analyse des institutions et instances de discussion internationales les plus influentes en matière d’énergie, en s’attachant particulièrement à déterminer leur compétence à gérer avec succès les relations énergétiques mondiales, le rôle des pays émergents et en développement au sein de l’architecture actuelle, et les possibilités pour ces instances de discussion et institutions de contribuer à une forme de gouvernance mondiale de l’énergie qui soit efficace et exhaustive

Towards Global Energy Governance : How to Patch the Patchwork

Published by Palgrave Macmillan Contemporary global energy relations have fundamentally changed, inter alia, as a result of dwindling oil and gas reserves, an increase in demand for energy from emerging economies, the need for global climate change action, the impact of renewable and alternative sources of energy, and, linked to all this, the increased politicisation and securitisation of energy. The institutional architecture governing energy relations worldwide has been unable to accommodate these developments. It suffers from fundamental issues of representativeness, a low level of institutionalisation and a lack of compliance enforcement capacity. Today’s institutions thus risk becoming unrepresentative and ultimately ineffective unless reform takes place. Subsequently an analysis is made of the most influential international energy fora and institutions with a particular view to identifying their ability to effectively govern global energy relations, the role of emerging and developing countries within the current architecture, and the potential for these fora and institutions to contribute to an inclusive and effective form of global energy governance

The EU's External Natural Gas Policy - Caught Between National Priorities and Supranationalism

The EU s External Natural Gas Policy Caught Between National Prioriti es and Supranationalism , studies EU external relations in the area of n atural gas supply with Russia and the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia. The primary question the thesis tries to answer is to assess to w hat extent Europe manages to formulate and execute its policy on natural gas towards Russia and Central Asia in a coherent manner. Moreover, wha t are the underlying causes as to why the Union does (not) succeed in do ing so? The aim of answering the above questions is to put forward an ex planation for both the current state of EU natural gas relations with Ru ssia and Central Asia, as well as their future direction. In order to aid an assessment of the future direction of EU natural gas relations with Russia and Central Asia, two theories of European in tegration are applied: (i) supranational governance theory and (ii) libe ral intergovernmentalist (LI) theory. According to the former, the integ ration of one sector leads to technical pressures pushing states to in tegrate other sectors. Based on this theory, it seems that pressures to enable the smooth operation of the internal market, allow us to explain why internal energy policy has been able to allow for European Community -level coordination, rules and dispute resolution. According to LI theor y, external energy policy by contrast rather seems to follow a more inte rgovernmental logic whereby states attain their goals through intergover nmental negotiation and bargaining, rather than through a centralised au thority making and enforcing decisions. The outcome of negotiations betw een EU Member States depends on the relative bargaining power of the act ors involved. The actors which would benefit least from a cooperative ag reement and more from the status quo are generally in a stronger positio n than those who would benefit most and can thus demand concessions from the latter. Thus, the extent to which Member States would benefit from a cooperative approach in external energy policy, or rather prefer to ke ep the status quo depends to a large extent on their perceived necessity for change. Europe s long term energy security depends lar gely on its ability to establish effective dialogues and forms of cooper ation with external suppliers. Thus partly a foreign policy matter, ener gy security should, according to the EU, abide by its normative foreign policy doctrine of effective multilateralism . The ability to act effec tively however also requires the Union to organise itself efficiently in a consistent and coherent manner in cooperation with key actors involve d. Although coherence and consistency are often used interchangeably, th e two terms have different meanings. Whereas, consistency merely refers to the absence of contradiction, coherence, by contrast, implies positiv e connections and is a much broader concept. Combining the notion of coh erence with the EU s normative goal to live up to its principle of effective multilateralism , this thesis systematically engages ina comparati ve analysis of EU and Member State actions on natural gas vis-à-vis Russ ia and Central Asia to check for apparent signs of contradiction in thei r stated objectives or actions (consistency). To establish whether syner gies have actually been exploited between actors, the Union s external p olicy performance first needs to be understood: did it reach its objecti ves through enhanced unity and coordination (coherence)? Empirically, three cases are examined in detail: (i) gas crises mana gement, (ii) (planned) pipeline projects and negotiations, and (iii) con sumer-producer relations on an institutional level. Particular attention is thereby given to the roles played by the division of competences bet ween the EU and its Member States in the field of energy, EU Treaty revi sions, the global institutional frameworks on energy governance, and ind ividual natural gas security at EU Member State level. In carrying out t he analysis, vital information is drawn from an in-depth stakeholder con sultation among key-experts involved in EU external energy relations. Th is information is complemented by document analysis and observation rese arch. The information gathered throughout the research is used to (i) ex plain how external policy on natural gas is formed; (ii) which factors d etermine the eventual outcome at EU level; and through this shed light o n (iii) the (future) direction and pace of European integration in this field. Coherence in Gas Crisis Management On 1 January 2009, natural gas delivers from Russia to Ukraine w ere halted. Reported shortages and a cut in supplies to other European c ountries followed a few days later. In January 2006, a similar crisis be tween the two countries had resulted in falling pressures and non-delive ry of gas reports by European companies. An analysis of the January 2009 crisis shows that a lack of a well-functioning exchange of up-to-date, reliable and consistent information between gas companies, as well as in adequate and fragmented information on cross-border flows served to unde rmine full effectiveness of emergency measures. On the political level, the Commission s bilateral diplomacy proved ineffective in preventing th e crisis from escalating as neither Russia, nor Ukraine acted on the EU s statements. Two clear coherence deficits in the EU s resolve can be discerned: (i) the fragmented character of information on the internal market and the coordination thereof in terms of emergenc y plans; and (ii) the sometimes haphazard manner by which bilateral dipl omacy is conducted. The Lisbon Treaty offers the Union a distinct set of actors and structures that could make for a more ambitious solution to the first problem, and solve the second problem at the same time. When a crisis occurs that carries foreign and security implications, it should be the task of the High Representative (HR) or, at the highest level, t he President of the European Council, assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS), to engage in diplomatic efforts on behalf of theE U with the aim of striking a political agreement to the crisis and ensur e full consistency and coherence. Yet, their combined efforts should be based on EU-wide information on the Union s internal market, provid ed by emergency plans coordinated at Union level under the auspices of t he Commissioner for Energy. Coherence in Pipeline Projects and Negotiations In terms of coherence, th e impact of the 2006 and 2009 Russia-Ukraine crisis on both occasions se rved to get the EU Institutions and its 27 Member States to agree on the need to diversify natural gas suppliers and transit routes, and for Eur ope to present a united position externally. This would suggest that in a narrow view, the positions of all actors were consistent. However, in terms of the execution thereof, significant discrepancies exist between the positions of the European Commission and European Parliament (EP) on the one hand, and those of the Council and EU Member States on the othe r. Whereas the Commission and EP firmly advocated diversifying natural g as supplies and transit routes away from Russia by attracting gas from t he Caspian and Central Asia, Member States acted differently. Germany struck a deal with Gazprom in early 2006 to construct a direct pipeline between the two nations underneath the Baltic Sea. Simi larly, many central and eastern European Member States in fact strengthe ned their ties to Gazprom. What undoubtedly influenced this decision is the fact that many central and eastern European Member States possess fe w gas pipeline interconnections other than eastwards and do not have the financial means to construct new routes. Overall, when taking a broad u nderstanding of coherence, Member State actions have largely undermined the positions of the European Commission and the EP concerning diversifi cation of natural gas suppliers and transit routes prior to the Lisbon T reaty s entry into force. The limited coherence in this period is essent ially related to the fact that the EU possesses few competences on energ y outside of the internal market. As decisions regarding the energy mix fall under the exclusive competence of the Member States, the Russia-Ukr aine crises prompted many of the Union s members to seek individual bi lateral, rather than multilateral solutions to the challenges posed by the interruptions. To alter this situation, the Commission instead has argued that energy policy should rather be given its own legal basis, re questing measures to be taken in connection with related policies on the environment and the EU internal market, but not based on the latter s p rovisions in the treaties. The Lisbon Treaty fulfilled this desire. Lisbon s creation of a specific legal basis for energy with det ailed objectives and new actors such as the HR and EEAS had sparked high hopes for a more coherent EU external energy policy. The European Commi ssion, the EP, as well as a majority of central and eastern European EU Member States were in favour ofgreater Europeanisation of energy polic y and a stated a desire to move away from bilateral agreements. This poi nted to some degree of coherence in the views of the above mentioned act ors. Yet, Europe s larger Member States still hold positions inconsisten t with these policies. This not only undermines the EU s coherence, but even its consistency. Diversification efforts are a good example. T hree years after the Treaty s entry into force, intra-EU competition has rendered Nabucco the one pipeline among three initiatives with the mo st favourable overall impact on European energy security an unlikely c andidate to wheel in a crucial gas contract from Azerbaijan. When asked, third states confirm that Member States promoting this or th e other pipeline, followed by the Commission ushering its support for ye t another, undermines the EU s negotiating position. In sum mary, where some of the Union s central and eastern Members are positive towards a larger role for the European Commission, countries such as Fr ance, Germany, the UK, Italy and the Netherlands are not too eager on ha ving their sovereignty limited, as they view their market size, level of interconnectedness through multiple gas pipelines, and energy sector s power as a sufficient defence against any threat posed by external depen dency. Different energy exposures are largely seen as preventing a stren gthened commitment to the external dimension of European energy policy. It seems therefore that the central and eastern European Memb er States feel they need the support of the European Commission to keep up with the bigger Member States when it comes to energy. When taking a broader understanding of coherence, the belief held by the larger EU Mem ber States that (large) infrastructural projects should preferably be in dustry driven, rather than discussed at Council level, undermines the po tential for synergies to trickle down and raise the impact of EU energy security initiatives beyond their immediate region of implementation. Consumer-Producer Relations at Institutional Level Of particular relevance to EU-Russia/Central Asia energy relati ons on an institutional level is the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). The EC T represents a legally binding multilateral energy agreement that has as its aim to strengthen the rule of law on energy issues, by creating a l evel playing field of rules to be observed by all participating governme nts, and so mitigate risks associated with energy-related investment and trade. On the transit of energy, the ECT obliges its members not to let transit be interrupted as a result of a conflict with another member. P recisely, this obligation was broken by Ukraine in 2006 and 2009. During both crises, the EU did not resort to issuing public statements which d enounced Ukraine s breach of the Charter s transit provisions on non-int erruption and non-reduction of transit flows. In ligh t of the Union s overarching aim to conduct effective multilateralism , it is peculiar why the EU did not invoke the ECT. Doing so could havese nt a signal that the Union took a violation of an international agreemen t by one of its contracting parties very seriously, thus providing the T reaty with a potential early role in resolving the conflict. A possible reason as to why this was not done is that Russia refused to ratify the Treaty in spite of the ECT s recognition of sovereignty over energy re sources. The Treaty was however applied provisionally, until on 20 Augus t 2009, Russia officially stated it intended to terminate provisional ap plication. Conclusions From a theoretica l point of view, EU Member States follow much closer the logic of libera l intergovernmentalist theory rather than supranational governance when it comes to decision-making on EU external natural gas relations. The fa ct that the central and eastern European states favour EU coordination o n natural gas matters has in this context little to do with a real prefe rence for supranational involvement, but much more with a calculation of available courses of action and a selection of the one that maximises t heir utility. Nonetheless, the observation that Europe seems split in w est and east when it comes to involvement of the European Commission, does indicate that a kind of energy iron curtain haunts European deci sion-makers. An analysis of the EU s crisis management effo rts during the January 2009 gas crisis showed that the EU s actions were both in terms of a narrow and broad view on coherence at times cont radictive and one could not speak of any apparent synergy between them. Moreover, recourse to effective multilateral interventions was rendere d troublesome due to the absence of Russia from the ECT. This means that as seen during the January 2009 gas crisis EU Member States do not necessarily act in concert as ECT Contracting Parties whenever there is a future problem with the supply of Russian gas. Moreover, a lack of suc h a multilateral safety net strengthens the perceived necessity for EU Member States to ensure their own energy security, leading to a further accentuation of existing divides within the European natural gas market . Lisbon s creation of a specific legal basis for ene rgy may have inspired hopes for greater coherence in external energy rel ations, yet the fact remains that energy is still an area of shared competence where EU Member States hold the ultimate say over their energy mi x and often go their own way when it comes to natural gas security. This limits the occurrence of potential synergies with energy security initi atives taken by different actors and at different levels. To date, the H R and EEAS appear to have little to no authority to alter this state of affairs. Although desirable from the viewpoint of improving external coh erence, their inclusion seems unlikely as long as influential EU Member States continue to assert their competences in this field. The conclusion that no coherence gains were made through Lisbon might ju st be the snapshot of EU external natural gas policy at this moment in t he history of its integration. It may however also point to a broader tr end of renewed Member State reluctance to the communitarisation of forei gn policy, even in domains where much suggests that a common defence of positions would lead to desirable synergies. This begs the question whet her the Treaty reforms actually serve the purpose of their creation or if they do just the opposite. Whilst the designation of the HR and EEAS was meant to move EU external policies beyond the purely cooperative go vernance mode into some form of centralisation, the analysis indicates t hat in the area of energy, where there are few possibilities for the EU to force Member States to comply if they choose otherwise, the two ins titutions make cooperation actually less likely. A certain degree of con sistency had been reached at the outset of policy formation since the Tr eaty of Maastricht for energy policy, which had been experiencing a grad ual integration among institutions through internal market and environme ntal legislation. Awareness that additional integration in external rela tions was needed for the Union to attain its goals was thus clearly pres ent among Member States. This incremental integration dynamic, while by no means stable, appears to have been interrupted by the new Treaty, wit h the HR and the EEAS provoking, in the first instance, negative respons es against further integration. If generalised and persistent, the Lisbo n Treaty may thus have the perverse effect of legally cementing the stat us quo of incoherence in EU external policies.Introduction 1 1: Energy Security Governance 3 2: The Issue of Coherence 6 3: Current Literature on EU External Energy Policy 9 4: Energy and European Integration 10 4.1: Supranational Governance 10 4.2: Liberal Intergovernmentalism 12 5: Case Selection 14 5.1: Selection Criteria 14 5.2: Selected Case 15 6: Data and Measurement 17 7: Key-Findings 18 7.1: Coherence in Gas Crises Management 19 7.1.1: The EU’s Handling of the January 2009 Crisis 19 7.1.2: Critical Appraisal of EU Interventions 21 7.1.3: Crisis Management under the Treaty of Lisbon 22 7.2: Coherence in Pipeline Projects and Negotiations 25 7.2.1: The Coherence in EU Gas Diversification Actions Prior to the Lisbon Treaty 26 7.2.2: The Coherence in EU Gas Diversification Actions After Lisbon’s Entry into Force 28 7.3: Consumer-Producer Relations at Institutional Level 32 7.3.1: Producer- Consumer- and Transit States 33 7.3.2: The Energy Charter Treaty 35 8: Concluding Remarks 38 Bibliography 40 ANNEX 1: English Language Summary 51 ANNEX 2: Nederlandstalige Samenvatting 55 ANNEX 3: Stakeholder Consultation 60 ANNEX 4: Peer-Reviewed Publications 62nrpages: 192status: publishe

Leren is ondernemen – Draagvlak voor een vignet Leren Ondernemen?

Het stimuleren van ondernemerschap in het onderwijs kampt met een aantal knelpunten: belang van ondernemerschap wordt in de onderwijscultuur onvoldoende ingezien en erkend, docenten zijn onvoldoende opgeleid in ondernemerschap en er is onvoldoende direct toepasbaar lesmateriaal voor ondernemerschapsvakken beschikbaar. De Staatssecretarissen van Onderwijs en Economische Zaken willen het ondernemerschap in het onderwijs stimuleren door onder andere opleidingen die hier goed in zijn een opleidingsvignet Leren Ondernemen te geven. Het vignet is van toepassing op opleidingen van onderwijsinstellingen uit het middelbaar beroepsonderwijs en hoger onderwijs. In dit rapport is een verkennend onderzoek uitgevoerd naar het draagvlak voor een dergelijk vignet bij het onderwijs en bedrijfsleven in de provincie Groningen. De focus van het onderzoek ligt op het Eemsdeltagebied, omdat men hier in het kader van het Missiedocument Arbeidsmarkt bezig is om bedrijfsleven en onderwijs beter op elkaar aan te sluiten, met als één van de specifieke doelstellingen het bevorderen van aandacht voor het ondernemerschap in het onderwijs. Om het draagvlak voor een vignet te peilen heeft een aantal interviews plaatsgevonden met mensen uit het bedrijfsleven, de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, onderwijsinstellingen en intermediaire organisaties. Daarnaast heeft een rondetafelgesprek plaatsgevonden met partijen die betrokken zijn bij het Missiedocument Arbeidsmarkt Eemsdelta. Zowel bij de interviews als bij het rondetafelgesprek is specifiek aandacht besteed aan de eventuele meerwaarde van een dergelijk vignet, aan de criteria waaraan een dergelijk vignet zou moeten voldoen en aan de knelpunten zoals hiervoor zijn geformuleerd.

The geopolitical impact of the shale revolution: Exploring consequences on energy prices and rentier states

While the shale revolution was largely a US’ affair, it affects the global energy system. In this paper, we look at the effects of this spectacular increase in natural gas, and oil, extraction capacity can have on the mix of primary energy sources, on energy prices, and through that on internal political stability of rentier states. We use two exploratory simulation models to investigate the consequences of the combination of both complexity and uncertainty in relation to the global energy system and state stability. Our simulations show that shale developments could be seen as part of a long term hog-cycle, with a short term drop in oil prices if unconventional supply substitutes demand for oil. These lower oil prices may lead to instability in rentier states neighbouring the EU, especially when dependence on oil and gas income is high, youth bulges are present, or buffers like sovereign wealth funds are too limited to bridge the negative economic effects of temporary low oil prices.Accepted author manuscriptPolicy Analysi