The state and class discipline: European labour market policy after the financial crisis

This paper looks at two related labour market policies that have persisted and even proliferated across Europe both before and after the financial crisis: wage restraint, and punitive workfare programmes. It asks why these policies, despite their weak empirical records, have been so durable. Moving beyond comparative-institutionalist explanations which emphasise institutional stickiness, it draws on Marxist and Kaleckian ideas around the concept of ‘class discipline’. It argues that under financialisation, the need for states to implement policies that discipline the working class is intensified, even if these policies do little to enable (and may even counteract) future stability. Wage restraint and punitive active labour market policies are two examples of such measures. Moreover, this disciplinary impetus has subverted and marginalised regulatory labour market institutions, rather than being embedded within them

A general refutation of Okishio’s theorem and a proof of the falling rate of profit

This is the first published general refutation of the Okishio theorem. An earlier refutation based on a specific example was published by Kliman and McGlone in 1988. Okishio’s theorem, published in 1961, asserts that if real wages stay constant, the rate of profit necessarily rises in consequence of any cost-reducing technical change. It proves this within a simultaneous equation (general equlibrium) framework. This paper establishes that this proposition is false within a differential equation (temporal) approach. In such a framework the denominator of the rate of profit rises continuously, regardless of whether or not there is technical change, unless capitalist consumption exceeds profit, as occurs in a slump. Okishio himself asserts that his theorem is ‘contrary to Marx’s Gesetz des Tendentiellen Falls der Profitrate’ – contrary to Marx’s law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. This assertion is, within the literature, universally taken to be the substantive content of the ‘Okishio Theorem’. Thus, if Marx’s approach to value is in fact temporal, and not simultaneist, this assertion by Okishio is false, since it applies not to Marx’s own theory, but to the interpretation of that theory subsequently attributed to Marx by a specific school of thought represented principally by Bortkiewicz, Sweezy, Morishima, Seton, and Steedman. The subsequent accumulation of hermeneutic evidence strongly supports the thesis that Marx’s theory is temporalist and not simultaneist. Since the Okishio theorem makes the general assertion that the rate of profit must necessarily rise if there are cost-saving technical changes, and since Kliman and McGlone demonstrate a particular case in which cost-saving technical change leads to a fall in the profit rate, the Kliman-McGlone paper is the first published refutation of the Okishio theorem. The present paper is a generalisation of this refutation which establishes the precise conditions under which the profit rate rise or falls, and establishes the general result that the profit rate necessarily falls as a consequence of capitalist accumulation with a constant real wage, until and unless accumulation ceases in value terms. Consequently the mathematical findings set out in this paper, refute the Okishio Theorem

The Circulation of Bank Capital and the General Rate of Interest

Marxian economists have long asserted the impossibility of discovering an economic law at work in capitalist economies that determines a natural rate of interest. Without contradicting Marx’s claim that it is competition in the money capital market that determines the interest rate, it is possible to identify the general rate of interest with greater precision. To make this argument, this article investigates the connection between two interlocking circuits of finance capital

Quasi-world money and international reserves

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to understanding modern monetary arrangements from a Marxist perspective that takes into account recent developments in the Marxist theory of world money. The paper treats the US dollar as a primus inter pares quasi-world money and challenges the argument of US hegemony by exploring the behavior of major capitalist states and selected developing countries, the BRICS, in so far as their official international reserves are concerned. The findings reveal a clear pattern in the behavior of major capitalist states in terms of the size and form of their reserves with the variations in them implying a hierarchical structure of the corresponding quasi-world moneys. The analysis focuses on developed countries and treats them individually. The merit of this approach, distinctive in the literature on international reserves, is that it reveals the above-mentioned pattern which is blurred when Japan is included. The results imply that current international monetary arrangements reflect and promote multipolarity and competition on the geopolitical scene, the evolution of which is historical. © Copyright 2016 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited