Peran Emosi Memediasi Keadilan Distributif, Prosedural Dan Interaksional Terhadap Kepuasan Pemulihan Layanan

The research objectives were to analyze: the influence of distributive justice, procedural, and interactional, justice in handling customer complaints against emotions, the influence of negative emotions toward the satisfaction of handling customer complaints, the influence of distributive justice, procedural, and interactional justice on the handling of complaints to the satisfaction of handling complaints, the customers' negative emotions which reinforce the influence of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice toward satisfaction with service recovery. The respondents of this study were Rumah Makan customers who have a minimum of 5 experience service failure of 110 in amount. The data analysis technique used was Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). The results showed that distributive, procedural, and interactional justice had negative effect on emotions, emotions can improve satisfaction with service recovery, distributive and procedural justice not significant effects on the satisfaction with service recovery. Interactional justice had positive and significant effects on the satisfaction with service recovery, emotions may mediate the effect of justice to the satisfaction with service recovery

Antecedents Pengembangan Loyalitas Pada Service Recovary Melalui Peran Customer Trust

This study aims to examine and analyze the mediating role of trust in the fairness of the development of customer loyalty. This research is a survey using a questionnaire given to the authorized service customer service in handling complaints (service recovery). A statistical technique used Structural Equation Modelling, individu analysis unit used the customers who have experienced or service recovery process a service vehicle two-wheeled motor Se-Cirebon region totaled 180 respondents. This study found that the justice handling complaints positive effect on trust Justice complaint against attitude and behavioral loyalty. Trust effect on behavioral loyalty and no effect on loyalty attitude. Mediates the effect of trust on loyalty justice grievance attitude and behavioral loyalt

Merger Class Actions in Delaware and the Symptoms of Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation

Recent research on corporate litigation has focused on three trends: the growth in percentage of mergers that result in litigation, the migration of cases away from Delaware, and the increasing prevalence of merger litigation occurring simultaneously in multiple jurisdictions. This Article uses a new and unique dataset of public company litigation to track how these trends have affected filings and litigation tactics in the Delaware Court of Chancery from 2004 to 2011. The data confirm that Delaware appears to have experienced a decline in filings during the early and middle periods of the sample, but the data also shows that there has been a sharp increase in the number of the number of acqusition-related cases filed in Delaware in 2010 and 2011. The rise of concurrent, multi-jurisdictional litigation and the litigation tactics that it encourages are the likely reasons for the growth of acquisition-related cases in Delaware. While some plaintiffs’ attorneys may have left Delaware to escape the Chancery’s threats of lower attorneys’ fees and merit-based selection of lead counsel, in the current environment a Delaware filing may provide strategic advantages as foreign jurisdictions become saturated with filings. For example, lawyers may try to take control of a case by moving for expedited proceedings in Delaware or they may try to complicate negotations over the selection of lead plaintiffs’ counsel. The threat of using these tactics may increase the possibility that a plaintiff will receive some share of a fee award either in Delaware or in a case being litigated elsewhere. This Article explores how the rules Delaware uses to manage deal cases may enable strategic behavior in the context of multi-jurisdictional litigation. This discussion provides reasons to believe that the use of tactics such as requesting expedited proceedings, contesting consolidation of cases, and involving out-of-state counsel earlier in proceedings should increase as multi-jurisdictional litigation increases. The empirical evidence provides substantial support for these theories. The Article concludes with an assessment of how the observed increase in strategic tactics may affect debates over how and whether to respond to the rise of multi-jurisdictional litigation

Rationality\u27s Reach

Economic analysis and the rational actor model have dominated contracts scholarship for at least a generation. In the past fifteen years or so, however, a group of behaviorists has challenged the ability of the rational choice model to account for consumer behavior. These behaviorists are not trying to dismantle the entire enterprise. They generally accept the fundamentals of economic analysis but argue that the rational actor model can be improved by incorporating evidence of decisionmaking flaws that people exhibit. Oren Bar-Gill has been one of the foremost and influential proponents of a behaviorist take on contracts, and his recent book, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets, is the culmination of these efforts. In the book, he portrays consumers as the targets of temptation. The tempters are credit card, subprime mortgage, and cell phone companies that structure contracts in ways that exploit the behavioral weaknesses of some consumers. They seduce by offering upfront lures like frequent-flier miles, interest-only payments, and ostensibly free cell phones. But these contracts also bury deferred penalties such as escalating interest rates and a bevy of fees. The later costs are a source of regret for consumers and, in Bar-Gill’s view, may warrant regulation that can limit this undesirable seduction. Bar-Gill builds his analysis around a framework that emphasizes the problems with contractual complexity and deferred costs. Complexity can obscure the content of contracts, and consumers may be overly optimistic about what they do not know. This effect, Bar-Gill argues, can lead people to make errors when they assess the value of a bargain (p. 10). Deferred costs, meanwhile, exploit the intense preference that some consumers may have for immediate gratification (pp. 21–23). This myopia leads them to underestimate whether and how often they will fall prey to the deferred fees that many consumer contracts impose. Throughout the book, Bar-Gill recommends the same salve for both ills. Targeted disclosure, he argues, is a minimally intrusive way to improve consumer- purchasing decisions (pp. 32–43). It can correct optimism by alerting people to the cost of terms that may be buried in contracts, and it can minimize myopia by informing people about typical usage patterns. In this Review, I contrast Bar-Gill’s analysis of complexity and deferred costs with an analysis of these problems that uses a pure rational choice model. My goal is to evaluate which of these approaches fares better at explaining the necessarily limited evidence we have about consumer responses to contractual complexity and deferred costs

Lobbying, Pandering, and Information in the Firm

In their classic and insightful article on team production in corporate law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout identify the minimization of rent-seeking as one of the chief benefits of vesting ultimate authority over a firm with the board of directors. In their analysis, this problematic rent-seeking arises when parties need to divide the gains from production after the fact. The squabbling that is likely to ensue may threaten to eat away most, or all, of the gains that come from productive activity. If parties know that this sort of rent-seeking will occur, they may not engage in productive activity in the first place. Parties view the board’s ability to act—or threaten to act—as a neutral arbiter to divide the gains from production as a mechanism that preserves the incentive to engage in productive activity. While this is a creative and plausible account of the board’s role and of its enduring success, the presence and prominence of the board introduces new opportunities for rent-seeking and other similarly distortive activity. In this Article, the authors identifies the rent-seeking and related problems that the board creates rather than solves. Like Blair and Stout, this Article draw on insights from the theory of the firm literature to understand the incentives that firm managers may have to shade, contort, and otherwise manipulate the information that the board receives. Particularly, this Article focuses on two specific behaviors that the informational dynamic between managers and the board engenders: lobbying and pandering. Part II describes the literature on influence costs and applies that literature to the problems faced by the board. Part III works through a recent model of pandering and analogizes that model to the interaction between the board and management. Part IV concludes by relating the problems of lobbying and pandering to the team production model of corporate law

Crack-entry invasion of wheat roots by Azospirillumbrasilensevia chemical-enzyme treatment: a way facilitating para-nodule formation and forced association for proper crop yield

The induction of nodule-like structures referred to para-nodules was assessed due to 2,4-D, IAA and the enzyme mixture of cellulase and pectolyase in presence of PEG treatment of wheat cultivars inoculated with Azospirillumbrasilense. In gnotobiotic model experiment; 9-18 and 6-19 para-nodule plant-1 were produced due to 2,4 D and IAA treatments respectively. Less than 7 para-nodules plant-1were attributed to Azospirllum alone, numbers increased to 26 when the diazotroph was introduced in combination with p-nodule-inducing agents. The cell wall-degrading enzyme mixture with PEG facilitated the crack-entry invasion of the diazotroph in population of > 5x105cfu g-1 root. High rates of C2H2 reductions of > 200 nmoles C2H4 g-1 root hr-1 were estimated for the enzyme mixture-PEG treated plants. The average glutamine synthetase activities of plant leaves were the highest (57.1-86.3 µ mol g-1Fw hr-1) for IAA-Azospirillum treatment. Wheat plants successfully paranodulated in pot experiment when pre-treated with IAA and enzyme mixture and inoculated with Azospirillum in presence of 50 % of recommended N, plant biomass and N yields increased as well. The highest levels of chlorophyll a (2.10 µg g-1Dw), chlorophyll b (2.28) and carotenoids (1.59) were estimated for inoculated plants pre-treated with IAA plus enzyme mixture. In the field trial, as high as > 2.0 kg plot-1 total biological yield was produced by plants initially primed by soaking in water. The superior grain yields of 441.7-571.4 g plot-1 were attributed to Azospirillum inoculation together with IAA and enzyme mixture for 50 % N-supplied plants. Seed priming somewhat raised the grain yield

The Shareholder Wealth Effects of Delaware Litigation

We collect data on the record of every action in over one thousand cases involving public companies from 2004 to 2011 in the Delaware Court of Chancery, which is the leading court for corporate law disputes in the United States. We use these data to estimate how markets respond to Delaware litigation events and characteristics such as case initiations, procedural motions, case quality, and judge identity. We find that negative abnormal returns are associated with the filing of derivative and contract cases, but we observe little effect associated with the filing of the average merger challenge. When we include measures of case quality, we see that higher quality cases increase the expected impact of derivative and contract litigation on firm value. We also develop evidence that tactics associated with multijurisdictional litigation are associated with a weakened impact of litigation on firm value. This evidence is consistent with the belief that the presence of litigation in another jurisdiction allows defense lawyers to bid down competing groups of plaintiffs’ lawyers during settlement negotiations. Finally, we show that abnormal returns are not associated with information on judicial assignment at the time of case filing, nor are they associated with judge identity at case resolution. These results suggest that the judicial impact on shareholder wealth at the time of judicial assignment and the time of case termination is too small to be statistically detected

The Shareholder Wealth Effects of Delaware Litigation

We collect data on the record of every action in over one thousand cases involving public companies from 2004 to 2011 in the Delaware Court of Chancery, which is the leading court for corporate law disputes in the United States. We use these data to estimate how markets respond to Delaware litigation events and characteristics such as case initiations, procedural motions, case quality, and judge identity. We find that negative abnormal returns are associated with the filing of derivative and contract cases, but we observe little effect associated with the filing of the average merger challenge. When we include measures of case quality, we see that higher quality cases increase the expected impact of derivative and contract litigation on firm value. We also develop evidence that tactics associated with multijurisdictional litigation are associated with a weakened impact of litigation on firm value. This evidence is consistent with the belief that the presence of litigation in another jurisdiction allows defense lawyers to bid down competing groups of plaintiffs’ lawyers during settlement negotiations. Finally, we show that abnormal returns are not associated with information on judicial assignment at the time of case filing, nor are they associated with judge identity at case resolution. These results suggest that the judicial impact on shareholder wealth at the time of judicial assignment and the time of case termination is too small to be statistically detected