Causal Responsibility and Counterfactuals.

How do people attribute responsibility in situations where the contributions of multiple agents combine to produce a joint outcome? The prevalence of over-determination in such cases makes this a difficult problem for counterfactual theories of causal responsibility. In this article, we explore a general framework for assigning responsibility in multiple agent contexts. We draw on the structural model account of actual causation (e.g., Halpern & Pearl, 2005) and its extension to responsibility judgments (Chockler & Halpern, 2004). We review the main theoretical and empirical issues that arise from this literature and propose a novel model of intuitive judgments of responsibility. This model is a function of both pivotality (whether an agent made a difference to the outcome) and criticality (how important the agent is perceived to be for the outcome, before any actions are taken). The model explains empirical results from previous studies and is supported by a new experiment that manipulates both pivotality and criticality. We also discuss possible extensions of this model to deal with a broader range of causal situations. Overall, our approach emphasizes the close interrelations between causality, counterfactuals, and responsibility attributions

Finding fault: causality and counterfactuals in group attributions.

Attributions of responsibility play a critical role in many group interactions. This paper explores the role of causal and counterfactual reasoning in blame attributions in groups. We develop a general framework that builds on the notion of pivotality: an agent is pivotal if she could have changed the group outcome by acting differently. In three experiments we test successive refinements of this notion - whether an agent is pivotal in close possible situations and the number of paths to achieve pivotality. In order to discriminate between potential models, we introduced group tasks with asymmetric structures. Some group members were complements (for the two to contribute to the group outcome it was necessary that both succeed) whereas others were substitutes (for the two to contribute to the group outcome it was sufficient that one succeeds). Across all three experiments we found that people's attributions were sensitive to the number of paths to pivotality. In particular, an agent incurred more blame for a team loss in the presence of a successful complementary peer than in the presence of a successful substitute

Information Aggregation in Arrow-Debreu Markets: An Experiment

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Springer Verlag via the DOI in this record.Studies of experimental and betting markets have shown that markets are able to efficiently aggregate information dispersed over many traders. We study information aggregation in Arrow-Debreu markets using a novel information structure. Compared to previous studies, the information structure is more complex, allows for heterogeneity in information among traders – which provides insights into the way in which information is gradually disseminated in the market – and generates situations in which all traders hold identical beliefs over the traded assets’ values, thus providing a harsh stress test for belief updating. We find little evidence for information aggregation and dissemination in early rounds. Nonetheless, after traders gain experience with the market mechanism and structure, prices converge to reveal the true state of the world. Elicited post-market beliefs reveal that markets are able to efficiently aggregate dispersed information even if individual traders remain uninformed, consistent with the marginal trader hypothesis

Manipulation and (mis)trust in prediction markets

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from INFORMS via the DOI in this recordMarkets are increasingly used as information aggregation mechanisms to predict future events. If policy makers and managers use markets to guide policyandmanagerialdecisions,interestedpartiesmayattempttomanipulate the market in order to influence decisions. We study experimentally the willingness of managers to base decisions on market information under the shadow of manipulation. We find that when there are manipulators in the market, managers under-utilize the information revealed in prices. Furthermore, mere suspicion of manipulation erodes trust in the market, leading to the implementation of suboptimal policies—even without actual manipulation.International Foundation for Research in Experimental EconomicsNational Science Foundation of Chin

Auctions with leaks about early bids: analysis and experimental behavior

This is the final version. Available on open access from Wiley via the DOI in this recordIn sequential first- and second-price private value auctions, second movers are informed about the first movers’ bid with commonly known probability. Equilibrium bidding in first-price auctions is mostly unaffected, but there are multiple equilibria in second-price auctions affecting comparative statics across price rules. We show experimentally that informational leaks in first-price auctions qualitatively confirm the theoretical predictions. In second-price auctions, we analyze and experimentally confirm the existence of focal equilibria, and provide evidence for individual consistency in equilibrium selection

Auction with leaks about early bids: Analysis and experimental behavior

© 2020 The Authors. In sequential first‐ and second‐price private value auctions, second movers are informed about the first movers' bid with commonly known probability. Equilibrium bidding in first‐price auctions is mostly unaffected, but there are multiple equilibria in second‐price auctions affecting comparative statics across price rules. We show experimentally that informational leaks in first‐price auctions qualitatively confirm the theoretical predictions. In second‐price auctions, we analyze and experimentally confirm the existence of focal equilibria, and provide evidence for individual consistency in equilibrium selection. (JEL D44, C72, C91

Examining the generalizability of research findings from archival data

This initiative examined systematically the extent to which a large set of archival research findings generalizes across contexts. We repeated the key analyses for 29 original strategic management effects in the same context (direct reproduction) as well as in 52 novel time periods and geographies; 45% of the reproductions returned results matching the original reports together with 55% of tests in different spans of years and 40% of tests in novel geographies. Some original findings were associated with multiple new tests. Reproducibility was the best predictor of generalizability-for the findings that proved directly reproducible, 84% emerged in other available time periods and 57% emerged in other geographies. Overall, only limited empirical evidence emerged for context sensitivity. In a forecasting survey, independent scientists were able to anticipate which effects would find support in tests in new samples

Examining the generalizability of research findings from archival data

This initiative examined systematically the extent to which a large set of archival research findings generalizes across contexts. We repeated the key analyses for 29 original strategic management effects in the same context (direct reproduction) as well as in 52 novel time periods and geographies; 45% of the reproductions returned results matching the original reports together with 55% of tests in different spans of years and 40% of tests in novel geographies. Some original findings were associated with multiple new tests. Reproducibility was the best predictor of generalizability—for the findings that proved directly reproducible, 84% emerged in other available time periods and 57% emerged in other geographies. Overall, only limited empirical evidence emerged for context sensitivity. In a forecasting survey, independent scientists were able to anticipate which effects would find support in tests in new samples