A comprehensive approach to the euro-area debt crisis

In this Policy Brief Zsolt Darvas, André Sapir and Jean Pisani-Ferry, propose a comprehensive solution to the current European crisis based in three pillars: a plan to restore banking sector soundness, a resolution of sovereign debt crisis including a reduction of the Greek public debt and a strategy to foster growth and competitiveness. The paper provides novel estimates and analysis focusing on the current situation of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Bruegel produced a video of the authors Jean Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir and Zsolt Darvas commenting on the "A comprehensive approach to the euro area debt crisis".Watch the video

Some are more equal than others: new estimates of global and regional inequality. Bruegel Working Paper Issue 8, 8 November 2016

In this Working Paper, Zsolt Darvas estimates the global and regional distribution of income and calculates statistics of global and regional income inequality

A comprehensive approach to the euro-area crisis: Background calculations

This background paper describes in detail the assumptions and calculations behind the results presented in Zsolt Darvas, Jean Pisani-Ferry and André Sapir "A comprehensive approach to the euro-area debt crisis", Bruegel Policy Brief No 2011/02, February 2011. An assessment of the results and policy conclusions can be found in the Policy Brief.

The EU's Role in Supporting Crisis-Hit Countries in Central and Eastern Europe

The crisis has hit central and eastern European countries harder than other regions of the world. In this policy contribution Resident Scholar Zsolt Darvas looks at the role of the EU and its institutions in supporting crisis-hit CEE countries; the stabilising effects of the EUÂ?s coordinated multilateral financial assistance; and the commitment shown by Western European banks to the region. However Darvas argues that there were certain actions, or failures to act, on the part of EU institutions and governments, that have amplified the effects on CEE countries of the crisis. The European Central Bank has given little direct support to non-euro-area countries, and the EU has done little for EU neighbourhood countries. Meanwhile, euro-area membership has shielded from the crisis some countries with worse fundamentals than certain CEE countries.

Real effective exchange rates for 178 countries: A new database

We use data on exchange rates and consumer price indices and the weighting matrix derived by Bayoumi, Lee and Jaewoo (2006) to calculate consumer price index-based REER. The main novelties of our database are that (1) it includes data for 178 countries –many more than in any other publicly available database– plus an external REER for the euro area, using a consistent methodology; (2) it includes up-to-date REER values, such as data for January 2012; and (3) it is relatively easy to calculate REER against any arbitrary group of countries. The annual database is complete for 172 countries and the euro area for 1992-2011 and data is available for six other countries for a shorter period. For several countries annual data is available for earlier years as well, eg data is available for 67 countries from 1960. The monthly database is complete for 138 countries for January 1995-January 2012, and data is also available for 15 other countries for a shorter period. The indicators calculated by us are freely downloadable and will be irregularly updated

Forecast errors and monetary policy normalisation in the euro area. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue n˚24 | December 2018

What did we learn from the recent monetary policy normalisation experiences of Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom? Zsolt Darvas consider the lessons and analyse the European Central Bank’s forecasting track record and possible factors that might explain the forecast errors

Should non-euro area countries join the single supervisory mechanism?

Irrespective of the euro crisis, a European banking union makes sense, including for non-euro area countries, because of the extent of European Union financial integration. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the first element of the banking union. From the point of view of non-euro countries, the draft SSM regulation as amended by the EU Council includes strong safeguards relating to decision-making, accountability, attention to financial stability in small countries and the applicability of national macroprudential measures. Non-euro countries will also have the right to leave the SSM and thereby exempt themselves from a supervisory decision. The SSM by itself cannot bring the full benefits of the banking union, but would foster financial integration, improve the supervision of cross-border banks, ensure greater consistency of supervisory practices, increase the quality of supervision, avoid competitive distortions and provide ample supervisory information. While the decision to join the SSM is made difficult by uncertainty surrounding other elements of the banking union, including possible burden sharing, we conclude that non-euro EU members should stand ready to join the SSM and be prepared for negotiations on the other elements of the banking union

Tax morale and tax evasion: Social preferences and bounded rationality

We study a family of models of tax evasion, where a flat-rate tax finances only the provision of public goods, neglecting audits and wage differences. We focus on the comparison of two modeling approaches. The first is based on optimizing agents, who are endowed with social preferences, their utility being the sum of private consumption and moral utility. The second approach involves agents acting according to simple heuristics. We find that while we encounter the traditionally shaped Laffer-curve in the optimizing model, the heuristics models exhibit (linearly) increasing Laffercurves. This difference is related to a peculiar type of behavior emerging within the heuristics based approach: a number of agents lurk in a moral state of limbo, alternating between altruism and selfishness

Europe’s Growth Emergency

Highlights: • The European Union growth agenda has become even more pressing because growth is needed to support public and private sector deleveraging, reduce the fragility of the banking sector, counter the falling behind of southern European countries and prove that Europe is still a worthwhile place to invest. • The crisis has had a similar impact on most European countries and the US: a persistent drop in output level and a growth slowdown. This contrasts sharply with the experience of the emerging countries of Asia and Latin America. • Productivity improvement was immediate in the US, but Europe hoarded labour and productivity improvements were in general delayed. Southern European countries have hardly adjusted so far. • There is a negative feedback loop between the crisis and growth, and without effective solutions to deal with the crisis, growth is unlikely to resume. National and EU-level policies should aim to foster reforms and adjustment and should not risk medium-term objectives under the pressure of events. A more hands-on approach, including industrial policies, should be considered

Debt Restructuring in the Euro Area: a Necessary but Manageable Evil?

There are two possible responses to the Greek debt crisis: ‘Plan A’, continued official lending, for as long as needed, with possible voluntary private sector involvement, and ‘Plan B’, coercive preemptive or post-default restructuring with significant face value reduction in privately-held debt. Both options have risks, but it is necessary to move to Plan B sooner or later. The impact on Greece could be mitigated by foreign bank ownership and proper liquidity support measures. The direct spillover impact on the rest of the euro area seems small. But there is the risk of contagion, which is a serious concern. There is a cautious case for delaying somewhat Plan B in order to prepare for it