23 research outputs found
Due Process and the Right to an Individualized Hearing
Due process requires the government to provide notice and a hearing before depriving individuals of protected rights. This right—the right to an individualized hearing—is powerful. It gives individuals the ability to know why the government is taking action that affects them; and it lets them oppose the government’s plans, often by presenting facts and arguments to a neutral decision-maker. As a result, the right to an individualized hearing can help shape the government’s substantive aims—and it even can prevent the government from acting at all. But, despite its importance, there is a longstanding exception to the right to an individualized hearing. Individualized procedures normally are not required when the government acts on more than a few people at the same time. Although the right to an individualized hearing and its exception are fundamental to due process doctrine, scholars disagree about this right’s origin, and courts have struggled to delineate its contours.
This Article offers a new explanation for the scope of the right to an individualized hearing: it is a living relic of the once-pervasive “class legislation” doctrine. At one time, class legislation doctrine was a robust constitutional mechanism used both to prevent the elevation of one “class” of society at the expense of another and to minimize arbitrary distinctions between groups. Accordingly, class legislation doctrine helped courts enforce the key rule of law value of generality. Although class legislation doctrine has faded from its prominent place in constitutional law, shades of it survive in the right to an individualized hearing. Indeed, courts sorting out the contours of the right to an individualized hearing often invoke class legislation concepts that have been discarded from other areas of the law. Reconnecting the right to an individualized hearing with its class legislation origin sheds light on this mysterious but fundamental corner of due process doctrine. It also can help courts apply the right to an individualized hearing in ways that emphasize its crucial role in protecting the rule of law
The \u3cem\u3eKlein\u3c/em\u3e Rule of Decision Puzzle and the Self-Dealing Solution
Scholars and courts have struggled to make sense of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Klein, an intriguing but enigmatic opinion concerning the limits of Congress’s ability to interfere with cases pending before the federal courts. Klein is intriguing because its broad and emphatic language suggests significant limits on the power of Congress. Klein is enigmatic because the Court has never again struck down a statute because of Klein or even made clear what principle animates its result. In fact, despite reaffirming the existence of a principle based on Klein, the Court has repeatedly read it narrowly, suggesting that the principle it embodies has not been adequately articulated. This Article argues that Klein’s principle is a specific application of a robust constitutional tradition that restrains governmental self-dealing. A Klein principle restraining governmental self-dealing explains the Court’s Klein cases, situates the principle within constitutional theory and doctrine, and provides much-needed direction to lower courts wrestling with questions about legislative intrusions into judicial functions
The Equal Protection Component of Legislative Generality
This article advances the broad project outlined above by recognizing
the equal protection component of legislative generality.
Exploring the relationship between the Equal Protection Clause
and the value of legislative generality both enhances an understanding
of the proper bounds of the Equal Protection Clause and
helps define the ultimate parameters of a value of legislative generality.
Part I of this article defines and provides paradigmatic
examples of special legislation. Part II identifies the most widely
held conceptions of equality that can be enforced through the
Equal Protection Clause and describes how special legislation offends
these conceptions. Part III describes how the Equal Protection
Clause, despite its powerful ability to enforce differing visions
of equality, is incapable, on its own, of combatting special
legislation. Part IV introduces the principle of legislative generality
as a coherent mechanism for restraining special legislation. It
concludes by drawing on equal protection doctrine and theory to
help fashion a coherent and meaningful value of legislative generality
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Due Process and the Right to an Individualized Hearing
Due process requires the government to provide notice and a hearing before depriving individuals of protected rights. This right—the right to an individualized hearing—is powerful. It gives individuals the ability to know why the government is taking action that affects them; and it lets them oppose the government’s plans, often by presenting facts and arguments to a neutral decision-maker. As a result, the right to an individualized hearing can help shape the government’s substantive aims—and it even can prevent the government from acting at all. But, despite its importance, there is a longstanding exception to the right to an individualized hearing. Individualized procedures normally are not required when the government acts on more than a few people at the same time. Although the right to an individualized hearing and its exception are fundamental to due process doctrine, scholars disagree about this right’s origin, and courts have struggled to delineate its contours.
This Article offers a new explanation for the scope of the right to an individualized hearing: it is a living relic of the once-pervasive “class legislation” doctrine. At one time, class legislation doctrine was a robust constitutional mechanism used both to prevent the elevation of one “class” of society at the expense of another and to minimize arbitrary distinctions between groups. Accordingly, class legislation doctrine helped courts enforce the key rule of law value of generality. Although class legislation doctrine has faded from its prominent place in constitutional law, shades of it survive in the right to an individualized hearing. Indeed, courts sorting out the contours of the right to an individualized hearing often invoke class legislation concepts that have been discarded from other areas of the law. Reconnecting the right to an individualized hearing with its class legislation origin sheds light on this mysterious but fundamental corner of due process doctrine. It also can help courts apply the right to an individualized hearing in ways that emphasize its crucial role in protecting the rule of law
Legislative Design and the Controllable Costs of Special Legislation
Legislation that singles out an identifiable individual for benefits or harms that do not apply to the rest of the population is called “special legislation.” In previous work, I have argued that special legislation is constitutionally suspect. In this Article, I explore the normative consequences of special legislation, assessing both the costs it imposes and the benefits that it can provide. Drawing on constitutional theory, public choice theory, and the history of special legislation, I argue that the enactment of special legislation is costly when it reflects the corruption of the legislative process and leads to low-quality legislation, unjustifiably unequal treatment, and legislative encroachment on the judicial and executive functions. By contrast, special legislation is normatively attractive when it addresses a problem unique to a particular location, when it addresses a matter of public concern, when it reduces rather than exacerbates disuniformity in the law, and when it provides relief for underrepresented political minorities. After considering these costs and benefits, I suggest modifications to the legislative process to diminish the costs associated with special legislation while still preserving its benefits