Self-organization and phase transition in financial markets with multiple choices

Market confidence is essential for successful investing. By incorporating multi-market into the evolutionary minority game, we investigate the effects of investor beliefs on the evolution of collective behaviors and asset prices. When there exists another investment opportunity, market confidence, including overconfidence and under-confidence, is not always good or bad for investment. The roles of market confidence is closely related to market impact. For low market impact, overconfidence in a particular asset makes an investor become insensitive to losses and a delayed strategy adjustment leads to a decline in wealth, and thereafter, one's runaway from the market. For high market impact, under-confidence in a particular asset makes an investor over-sensitive to losses and one's too frequent strategy adjustment leads to a large fluctuation in asset prices, and thereafter, a decrease in the number of agents. At an intermediate market impact, the phase transition occurs. No matter what the market impact is, an equilibrium between different markets exists, which is reflected in the occurrence of similar price fluctuations in different markets. A theoretical analysis indicates that such an equilibrium results from the coupled effects of strategy updating and shift in investment. The runaway of the agents trading a specific asset will lead to a decline in the asset price volatility and such a decline will be inhibited by the clustering of the strategies. A uniform strategy distribution will lead to a large fluctuation in asset prices and such a fluctuation will be suppressed by the decrease in the number of agents in the market. A functional relationship between the price fluctuations and the numbers of agents is found

Coupled effects of local movement and global interaction on contagion

By incorporating segregated spatial domain and individual-based linkage into the SIS (susceptible-infected-susceptible) model, we investigate the coupled effects of random walk and intragroup interaction on contagion. Compared with the situation where only local movement or individual-based linkage exists, the coexistence of them leads to a wider spread of infectious disease. The roles of narrowing segregated spatial domain and reducing mobility in epidemic control are checked, these two measures are found to be conducive to curbing the spread of infectious disease. Considering heterogeneous time scales between local movement and global interaction, a log-log relation between the change in the number of infected individuals and the timescale $\tau$ is found. A theoretical analysis indicates that the evolutionary dynamics in the present model is related to the encounter probability and the encounter time. A functional relation between the epidemic threshold and the ratio of shortcuts, and a functional relation between the encounter time and the timescale $\tau$ are found

Limitation of network inhomogeneity in improving cooperation in coevolutionary dynamics

Cooperative behavior is common in nature even if selfishness is sometimes better for an individual. Empirical and theoretical studies have shown that the invasion and expansion of cooperators are related to an inhomogeneous connectivity distribution. Here we study the evolution of cooperation on an adaptive network, in which an individual is able to avoid being exploited by rewiring its link(s). Our results indicate that the broadening of connectivity distribution is not always beneficial for cooperation. Compared with the Poisson-like degree distribution, the exponential-like degree distribution is detrimental to the occurrence of a higher level of cooperation in the continuous snowdrift game (CSG)

A generalized public goods game with coupling of individual ability and project benefit

Facing a heavy task, any single person can only make a limited contribution and team cooperation is needed. As one enjoys the benefit of the public goods, the potential benefits of the project are not always maximized and may be partly wasted. By incorporating individual ability and project benefit into the original public goods game, we study the coupling effect of the four parameters, the upper limit of individual contribution, the upper limit of individual benefit, the needed project cost and the upper limit of project benefit on the evolution of cooperation. Coevolving with the individual-level group size preferences, an increase in the upper limit of individual benefit promotes cooperation while an increase in the upper limit of individual contribution inhibits cooperation. The coupling of the upper limit of individual contribution and the needed project cost determines the critical point of the upper limit of project benefit, where the equilibrium frequency of cooperators reaches its highest level. Above the critical point, an increase in the upper limit of project benefit inhibits cooperation. The evolution of cooperation is closely related to the preferred group-size distribution. A functional relation between the frequency of cooperators and the dominant group size is found

Multi-objective Optimization Design of Wing Structure with the Model Management Framework

AbstractEvolutionary algorithm is time-consuming because of the large number of evolutions and much times of finite element analysis, when it is used to optimize the wing structure of a certain high attitude long endurance unmanned aviation vehicle(UAV). In order to improve efficiency it is proposed to construct a model management framework to perform the multi-objective optimization design of wing structure. The sufficient accurate approximation models of objective and constraint functions in the wing structure optimization model are built when using the model management framework, therefore in the evolutionary algorithm a number of finite element analyses can be avoided and the satisfactory multi-objective optimization results of the wing structure of the high altitude long endurance UAV are obtained