On cost-effective communication network designing

How to efficiently design a communication network is a paramount task for network designing and engineering. It is, however, not a single objective optimization process as perceived by most previous researches, i.e., to maximize its transmission capacity, but a multi-objective optimization process, with lowering its cost to be another important objective. These two objectives are often contradictive in that optimizing one objective may deteriorate the other. After a deep investigation of the impact that network topology, node capability scheme and routing algorithm as well as their interplays have on the two objectives, this letter presents a systematic approach to achieve a cost-effective design by carefully choosing the three designing aspects. Only when routing algorithm and node capability scheme are elegantly chosen can BA-like scale-free networks have the potential of achieving good tradeoff between the two objectives. Random networks, on the other hand, have the built-in character for a cost-effective design, especially when other aspects cannot be determined beforehand.Comment: 6 pages, 4 figure

QCD Evolutions of Twist-3 Chirality-Odd Operators

We study the scale dependence of twist-3 distributions defined with chirality-odd quark-gluon operators. To derive the scale dependence we explicitly calculate these distributions of multi-parton states instead of a hadron. Taking one-loop corrections into account we obtain the leading evolution kernel in the most general case. In some special cases the evolutions are simplified. We observe that the obtained kernel in general does not get simplified in the large-$N_c$ limit in contrast to the case of those twist-3 distributions defined only with chirality-odd quark operators. In the later, the simplification is significant.Comment: 9 pages, 2 figure

Octupole degree of freedom for the critical-point candidate nucleus 152^{152}Sm in a reflection-asymmetric relativistic mean-field approach

The potential energy surfaces of even-even $^{146-156}$Sm are investigated in the constrained reflection-asymmetric relativistic mean-field approach with parameter set PK1. It is shown that the critical-point candidate nucleus $^{152}$Sm marks the shape/phase transition not only from U(5) to SU(3) symmetry, but also from the octupole-deformed ground state in $^{150}$Sm to the quadrupole-deformed ground state in $^{154}$Sm. By including the octupole degree of freedom, an energy gap near the Fermi surface for single-particle levels in $^{152}$Sm with $\beta_2 = 0.14 \sim 0.26$ is found, and the important role of the octupole deformation driving pair $\nu 2f_{7/2}$ and $\nu 1i_{13/2}$ is demonstrated.Comment: 11 pages, 3 figure

Impact of pairing correlations on the orientation of the nuclear

For the first time, the tilted axis cranking covariant density functional theory with pairing correlations has been formulated and implemented in a fully self-consistent and microscopic way to investigate the evolution of the spin axis and the pairing effects in rotating triaxial nuclei. The measured energy spectrum and transition probabilities for the Nd-135 yrast band are reproduced well without any ad hoc renormalization factors when pairing effects are taken into account. A transition from collective to chiral rotation has been demonstrated. It is found that pairing correlations introduce additional admixtures in the single-particle orbitals, and, thus, influence the structure of tilted axis rotating nuclei by reducing the magnitude of the proton and neutron angular momenta while merging their direction.Comment: 13 pages, 5 figure

Revenue maximizing envy-free fixed-price auctions with budgets

Traditional incentive-compatible auctions [6,16] for selling multiple goods to unconstrained and budgeted bidders can discriminate between bidders by selling identical goods at different prices. For this reason, Feldman et al. [7] dropped incentive compatibility and turned the attention to revenue maximizing envy-free item-pricing allocations for budgeted bidders. Envy-free allocations were suggested by classical papers [9,15]. The key property of such allocations is that no one envies the allocation and the price charged to anyone else. In this paper we consider this classical notion of envy-freeness and study fixed-price mechanisms which use nondiscriminatory uniform prices for all goods. Feldman et al. [7] gave an item-pricing mechanism that obtains 1/2 of the revenue obtained from any envy-free fixed-price mechanism for identical goods. We improve over this result by presenting an FPTAS for the problem that returns an (1 − ε)-approximation of the revenue obtained by any envy-free fixed-price mechanism for any ε > 0 and runs in polynomial time in the number of bidders n and 1/ ε even for exponential supply of goods m. Next, we consider the case of budgeted bidders with matching-type preferences on the set of goods, i.e., the valuation of each bidder for each item is either v i or 0. In this more general case, we prove that it is impossible to approximate the optimum revenue within O( min (n,m)1/2 − ε ) for any ε > 0 unless P = NP. On the positive side, we are able to extend the FPTAS for identical goods to budgeted bidders in the case of constant number of different types of goods. Our FPTAS gives also a constant approximation with respect to the general envy-free auction