Designing instrument rules for monetary stability: the optimality of interest-rate smoothing

A key issue in monetary policy is that on the importance of following systematic behaviours. The paper revisits the classic debate on rules versus discretion focusing on the design of instrument rules in a manner that push discretionary policy choices in the direction of the commitment equilibrium. It is shown that an instrument rule with an optimal degree of monetary inertia may render negligible the inflationary bias associated with discretion without necessarily implying a trade-off between flexibility and commitment. The rationale for this surprising finding is found in the disciplining effect played by interest-rate smoothing on the incentive to create surprise inflation by reducing suddenly the interest rate within the time horizon of existing nominal contracts. If the degree of gradualism is high it may enhance the credibility of optimal monetary policy as it contrasts the incentive to fool private sector

Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs?

The paper examines the current debate on the real effectiveness of delegation in overcoming the problem of time inconsistency that afflicts discretionary monetary policy. An important contribution by Jensen has shown that, when the government is unable to credibly carry out optimal policy and delegates monetary policy to a central banker with an announced incentive scheme, optimal policy can be credible only if reappointment costs are prohibitive. This finding is questioned in the present analysis. In particular we show that, when delegation is not considered as an alternative, but rather as supplementary, to reputation and is conducive to reputation building for the central banker, the circumstances under which optimal delegation can be credible need not be so extreme. This different result is based on the constraint that the central banker's reputation for low inflation imposes on the government's temptation to deviate from its announcements and on the role played by incentive schemes in strengthening the central banker's reputation. Keywords; delegation, reappointment, in‡ationary bias

Time consistent monetary policy reconsidered: may we have a deflationary bias too?

The celebrated inflationary bias of time consistent monetary policy is re-examined. To this end we consider an extended version of the simple Barro and Gordon framework featuring important aspects of actual policy making such as imperfect instrument control, overlapping wage contracts, policy lags and interest rate control. The model developed provides a counterexample to the standard theory as it yields the result that a deflationary bias may be possible as well. The rationale for this surprising result is found in the distortion caused by instrument uncertainty in the trade-off between the costs and benefits associated with surprisingly lower interest rates faced at the margin by the policy maker. If the size of uncertainty is relatively large the distortion created may imply an optimal choice for the instrument which trades off the marginal benefit of lower deflation against the marginal cost of higher than optimal output. The implications of imprecise instrument control for welfare are discussed too. Keywords; monetary policy, time inconsistency, instrument uncertainty, overlapping wage contracts, lags JEL classification: E52, E58

Designing instrument rules for monetary stability: the optimality of interest-rate smoothing

A key issue in monetary policy is that on the importance of following systematic behaviours. The paper revisits the classic debate on rules versus discretion focusing on the design of instrument rules in a manner that push discretionary policy choices in the direction of the commitment equilibrium. It is shown that an instrument rule with an optimal degree of monetary inertia may render negligible the inflationary bias associated with discretion without necessarily implying a trade-off between flexibility and commitment. The rationale for this surprising finding is found in the disciplining effect played by interest-rate smoothing on the incentive to create surprise inflation by reducing suddenly the interest rate within the time horizon of existing nominal contracts. If the degree of gradualism is high it may enhance the credibility of optimal monetary policy as it contrasts the incentive to fool private sector. Keywords; monetary policy, instrument rules, commitment, discretion, interest-rate smoothing, delegation JEL classification: E52, E58

Inertia in Taylor Rules

The inertia found in econometric estimates of interest rate rules is a continuing puzzle. Many reasons for it have been offered, though unsatisfactorily, and the issue remains open. In the empirical literature on interest rate rules, inertia in setting interest rates is typically modeled by specifying a Taylor rule with the lagged policy rate on the right hand side. We argue that inertia in the policy rule may simply reflect the inertia in the economy itself, since optimal rules typically inherit the inertia present in the model of the economy. Our hypothesis receives some support from US data. Hence we agree with Rudebusch (2002) that monetary inertia is, at least partly, an illusion, but for different reasons.Monetary Policy, Interest Rate Rules, Taylor rule, Interest Rate Smoothing, Monetary Policy Inertia, Predictability of Interest Rates, Term Structure, Expectations Hypothesis

Do Firm-Bank `Odd Couples' Exacerbate Credit Rationing?

We start considering an optimal matching of opaque (transparent) borrowing firrms with relational (transactional) lending main banks. Next we contemplate the possibility that firm-bank "odd couples" materialize where opaque (transparent) firrms end up matched with transactional (re- lational) main banks. We conjecture the "odd couples" emerge either since the bank's lending technology is not perfectly observable to the rm or because riskier firrms - even though opaque - strategically select transac- tional banks in the hope of being classified as lower risks. Our econometric results show the probability of rationing is larger when firrms and banks match in "odd couples".Relationship Banking, Credit Rationing and Asymmetric Information

Bank-firm relations and the role of Mutual Guarantee Institutions during the crisis

We examine the role played by Mutual Guarantee Institutions (MGIs) in the lending policies undertaken by banks at the peak of the Great Crisis of 2007-2009. We address this issue by using a large database on Italian firms built from the credit files of UniCredit banking Group and focusing on small business. We provide an empirical analysis of the determinants of the probability that a borrowing firm will suffer financial tension and obtain two main innovative findings. First, we show that small firms supported by MGIs were less likely to experience financial tensions even at that time of utmost financial stress. Second, our empirical evidence shows that MGIs have played a signalling role beyond the simple provision of a collateral. This latter finding suggests that the information provided by MGIs turned out to be key for bank-firm relations as scoring and rating systems - being typically based on pro-cyclical indicators - had become less informative during the crisis.financial crisis, bank-firm relationships, asymmetric information, credit guarantee schemes, small business finance, peer monitoring

Monetary Policy, Financial Stability and Interest Rate Rules

This paper investigates the empirical properties of simple interest rate rules that embed either “backward” or “forward” interest rate smoothing. Such interest rate rules can be rationalized as the operative reaction functions used by central banks pursuing monetary policy and financial stability targets. We explicitly consider the implications of banks’ risk management practices for monetary policy and we derive interest rate rules by modeling the desire of the central bank to stabilize different definitions of the “basis” risk as a contribution to financial stability.This paper investigates the empirical properties of simple interest rate rules that embed either “backward” or “forward” interest rate smoothing. Such interest rate rules can be rationalized as the operative reaction functions used by central banks pursuing monetary policy and financial stability targets. We explicitly consider the implications of banks’ risk management practices for monetary policy and we derive interest rate rules by modeling the desire of the central bank to stabilize different definitions of the “basis” risk as a contribution to financial stability.Invited Submission

Innovation and export in SMEs: the role of relationship banking

This paper assesses the role of relationship lending in explaining simultaneously the innovation activity of Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), their probability to export (i.e. the extensive margin) and their share of exports on total sales conditional on exporting (i.e. the intensive margin). We adopt a measure of informational tightness based on the ratio of firm’s debt with its main bank to firm’s total assets. Our results show that the strength of the bank-firm relation has a positive impact on both SME’s probability to export and their export margins. This positive effect is only marginally mediated by the SME’s increased propensity to introduce product innovation. We further discuss the financial and non-financial channels through which the intensity of bank-firm relationship supports SMEs’ international activities.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Time consistent monetary policy reconsidered: may we have a deflationary bias too?

The celebrated inflationary bias of time consistent monetary policy is re-examined. To this end we consider an extended version of the simple Barro and Gordon framework featuring important aspects of actual policy making such as imperfect instrument control, overlapping wage contracts, policy lags and interest rate control. The model developed provides a counterexample to the standard theory as it yields the result that a deflationary bias may be possible as well. The rationale for this surprising result is found in the distortion caused by instrument uncertainty in the trade-off between the costs and benefits associated with surprisingly lower interest rates faced at the margin by the policy maker. If the size of uncertainty is relatively large the distortion created may imply an optimal choice for the instrument which trades off the marginal benefit of lower deflation against the marginal cost of higher than optimal output. The implications of imprecise instrument control for welfare are discussed too