22 research outputs found

    Richer concepts are better remembered: number of features effects in free recall

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    Many models of memory build in a term for encoding variability, the observation that there can be variability in the richness or extensiveness of processing at encoding, and that this variability has consequences for retrieval. In four experiments, we tested the expectation that encoding variability could be driven by the properties of the to-be-remembered item. Specifically, that concepts associated with more semantic features would be better remembered than concepts associated with fewer semantic features. Using feature listing norms we selected sets of items for which people tend to list higher numbers of features (high NoF) and items for which people tend to list lower numbers of features (low NoF). Results showed more accurate free recall for high NoF concepts than for low NoF concepts in expected memory tasks (Experiments 1–3) and also in an unexpected memory task (Experiment 4). This effect was not the result of associative chaining between study items (Experiment 3), and can be attributed to the amount of item-specific processing that occurs at study (Experiment 4). These results provide evidence that stimulus-specific differences in processing at encoding have consequences for explicit memory retrieval

    Understanding the Meanings of Abstract Concepts: Keeping it Grounded and Real

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    Abstract words refer to things and entities in the world that cannot be directly experienced through our senses (e.g., truth, morality). How we learn, represent, and use abstract words is one of the deepest problems in cognitive science today. I investigated this question in two experiments. In Experiment 1, I examined the effects of six semantic richness variables (sensory experience, valence, number of associates, context availability, arousal, semantic neighbourhood, and number of associates) on lexical-semantic processing for 207 abstract nouns. Behavioural tasks were lexical decision (LDT) and semantic categorization (SCT). Results showed that participants were faster to respond in LDT to words high in context availability, and faster to respond in SCT to words high in valence and sensory experience. These results suggest that abstract meanings might be grounded in our experiences with situational contexts and our bodily experiences. To further assess the extent of grounding for abstract word meanings (Experiment 2), I tested thirty-one pairs of undergraduate students in a variation of the Taboo task, in which participants communicated the meaning of the “secret” word (10 concrete, e.g., insect; 20 abstract nouns, e.g., impulse) to a partner in 1 minute or less. Analysis of verbal and gestural data yielded a number of important insights. Most notably, on a majority of trials, participants activated their partner’s concept of self or other (“You”, “Dalai Lama”), then placed that self into a situational context (“in class”) and then described the mental states, feelings, goals, etc. the self may experience. This, together with the results of my quantitative data analyses, suggests extensive recruitment of information derived from our experiences with the social and physical world and that such information is an important aspect of what we know about abstract words

    Does culture influence how we think?

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    Bibliography: p. 29-3
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