PRAVDA U ODGOJU: DVA PRIMJERA

Until recently, justice in education has not attracted much attention. However, social justice has been an exception for many years, above all in the Anglo-American philosophy of education,. The main reason was the first publication of John Rawls’ book A Theory of Justice (1971), which has significantly influenced not only political philosophy, but also the philosophy of education. According to Rawls, justice should be seen as the first virtue of social institutions and should no longer be perceived only as a value to be weighed alongside the others (such as freedom, rights, or the common good). It should, therefore, be seen as “the standard by which we assign weight to other values”. If we accept Rawls’ thesis, than justice should be the first virtue of educational institutions as well. However, the problem is knowing what the central issues of justice are. Different conceptions of justice provide different answers. In this paper, the author discusses two topics related to justice in education: educational assessment and punishment.Do nedavno, pravda u odgoju nije privlačila mnogo pozornosti. Ipak kroz dulje vrijeme izuzetak je bila, naročito u Anglo-Američkoj filozofiji odgoja, društvena pravda. Glavni je razlog bio objavljivanje knjige Johna Rawlsa A Theory of Justice (1971.), koja je imala snažan utjecaj ne samo na političku filozofiju nego i na filozofiju odgoja. Prema Rawlesu, na pravdu treba gledati kao na prvu vrlinu društvenih ustanova a ne samo na vrijednost pored drugih (takvih kao sloboda, prava, ili opće dobro). Dosljedno tome treba vidjeti „standard kojim mi određujemo težinu drugim vrijednostima“. Ako mi prihvatimo Rawlsovu postavku, tada pravda kao takva treba biti prva vrlina odgojnih ustanova. Ali problem je: kako znati koja su centralna pitanja pravde. Različite koncepcije pravde daju nam različite odgovore. U ovom članku ja ću raspravljati, ukratko, dvije stvari vezane za pravdu u odgoju: odgojno vrednovanje i kažnjavanje

Totalitarianism and the Violation of Human Rights in Education. The Case of Slovenia

Slovenian schools were victims of the totalitarianism of Italian Fascism from the advent of fascist rule in 1922 until the capitulation of Italy in 1943 and of German Nazism during World War II (1941–1945). However, the question remains whether schools in Slovenia were victims of totalitarianism after the war, too. The answer depends on whether the socialist regime was merely undemocratic or also totalitarian. But even if the state at that time was not totalitarian, it violated human rights also in the field of education. According to the European Court of Human Rights, the State is forbidden to pursue an aim of indoctrination in public schools – as was the case in Slovenia – because indoctrination is considered to not respect parents’ religious and philosophical convictions. In this paper it will be shown that the state also violated two other human rights of their citizens which are in close connection to this parents’ right, namely, the right of parents to choose private schools based on specific moral, religious or secular values; and (if there are not such schools) the right to establish them. Both of these rights were violated because private schools, except religious schools for the education of priests, were forbidden. These rights were violated in the socialist republic of Slovenia even though ex-Yugoslavia (one of whose constitutive parts was at that time Slovenia) signed and ratified these international documents on human rights

Preliminaries for the Analysis of Rousseau’s Understanding of the terms patria and nation

Rousseau razumije pojam patria kao ekvivalent za izraz ‘republika’, a patriotizam kao ljubav prema domovini. Ta ljubav je za njega neka vrsta političke ljubavi, ljubav prema zajedničkoj slobodi, što znači prema našoj slobodi i prema slobodi naših sugrađana. Zato tamo gdje nema slobode, nema ni domovine; postoji samo zemlja. Temelj domovine Rousseau vidi u odnosima između države i državljana te u načinu življenja, koji je u skladu sa zakonima. Zato je ljubav prema domovini ljubav prema slobodi i zakonima. No, za Rousseaua, kako upozorava Viroli, ljubav prema domovini ipak nije samo politička ljubav, nije samo ljubav prema slobodi i zakonima, nego i vezanost za određeni način života, za kulturu, običaje, jezik, religiju, itd. I upravo u naglašavanju takve vezanosti neki kritičari vide put koji je vodio – ili bi mogao voditi – Rousseaua od patriotizma u nacionalizam.Rousseau understands the notion of patria as equivalent to the term ‘republic’, and patriotism as love for the country. This love is, according to Rousseau, a kind of political love, love towards common freedom, i.e. towards our freedom and the freedom of our fellow citizens. Hence, where there is no freedom, there is no homeland, there is only a land. Rousseau finds the foundation of homeland in relations between the state and its citizens as well as in the way of life in accordance with laws. Therefore, the love for the homeland is the love for freedom and laws. Nevertheless, for Rousseau, as Viroli warns, the love for the homeland is not only a political love, a love for freedom and laws, but also attachment to a certain way of life, to culture, customs, language, religion etc. Precisely in emphasising these attachments some critics see the way which led Rousseau – or could lead – from patriotism into nationalism

Preliminaries for the Analysis of Rousseau’s Understanding of the terms patria and nation

Rousseau razumije pojam patria kao ekvivalent za izraz ‘republika’, a patriotizam kao ljubav prema domovini. Ta ljubav je za njega neka vrsta političke ljubavi, ljubav prema zajedničkoj slobodi, što znači prema našoj slobodi i prema slobodi naših sugrađana. Zato tamo gdje nema slobode, nema ni domovine; postoji samo zemlja. Temelj domovine Rousseau vidi u odnosima između države i državljana te u načinu življenja, koji je u skladu sa zakonima. Zato je ljubav prema domovini ljubav prema slobodi i zakonima. No, za Rousseaua, kako upozorava Viroli, ljubav prema domovini ipak nije samo politička ljubav, nije samo ljubav prema slobodi i zakonima, nego i vezanost za određeni način života, za kulturu, običaje, jezik, religiju, itd. I upravo u naglašavanju takve vezanosti neki kritičari vide put koji je vodio – ili bi mogao voditi – Rousseaua od patriotizma u nacionalizam.Rousseau understands the notion of patria as equivalent to the term ‘republic’, and patriotism as love for the country. This love is, according to Rousseau, a kind of political love, love towards common freedom, i.e. towards our freedom and the freedom of our fellow citizens. Hence, where there is no freedom, there is no homeland, there is only a land. Rousseau finds the foundation of homeland in relations between the state and its citizens as well as in the way of life in accordance with laws. Therefore, the love for the homeland is the love for freedom and laws. Nevertheless, for Rousseau, as Viroli warns, the love for the homeland is not only a political love, a love for freedom and laws, but also attachment to a certain way of life, to culture, customs, language, religion etc. Precisely in emphasising these attachments some critics see the way which led Rousseau – or could lead – from patriotism into nationalism

Konsekvencialistični razlogi za nekatere reforme izobraževanja

The reasons for education reforms – as a particular form of social reforms – are either consequentialist or non-consequentialist. However, the reasons for the education reforms that are briefly discussed from the perspective of the philosophy of education in the present paper are above all consequentialist. These are the reasons for proposed education reforms in EU countries whose strategic aim is equated with the enhancement of two values: creativity and innovation. It is supposed that these education reforms will have good effects and not that they are good in and of themselves. Therefore, although creativity and innovation might be seen as having intrinsic value, they are – in these education reforms – treated predominantly as instrumental values. It seems that the introduction of such education reforms can be understood as a decision founded not on causal explanation, but rather on the basis of a special type of teleological explanation, which has the logical form of a “practical syllogism”. In this case, the occurrence of an action is explained in terms of the goals and purposes of the agent; it shows that the agent did what s/he did because s/he tried to achieve a certain goal and believed that certain means were necessary or sufficient for achieving this goal. (DIPF/Orig.

Ali je strojno ucenje pravo ucenje?

The question of whether machine learning is real learning is ambiguous, because the term “real learning” can be understood in two different ways. Firstly, it can be understood as learning that actually exists and is, as such, opposed to something that only appears to be learning, or is misleadingly called learning despite being something else, something that is different from learning. Secondly, it can be understood as the highest form of human learning, which presupposes that an agent understands what is learned and acquires new knowledge as a justified true belief. As a result, there are also two opposite answers to the question of whether machine learning is real learning. Some experts in the field of machine learning, which is a subset of artificial intelligence, claim that machine learning is in fact learning and not something else, while some others – including philosophers – reject the claim that machine learning is real learning. For them, real learning means the highest form of human learning. The main purpose of this paper is to present and discuss, very briefly and in a simplifying manner, certain interpretations of human and machine learning, on the one hand, and the problem of real learning, on the other, in order to make it clearer that the answer to the question of whether machine learning is real learning depends on the definition of learning. (DIPF/Orig.

Enakost moznosti in enakost rezultatov

The report on the findings of extensive empirical research on equality of educational opportunities carried out in the US on a very large sample of public schools by Coleman and his colleagues has had a major impact on education policy and has given rise to a large amount of research and various interpretations. However, as some interpreters have highlighted, even more important than the findings of the survey themselves has been Coleman’s redefinition of equality of opportunity, abandoning the then prevailing conception of equality of educational opportunities as equality of starting points and replacing it with the concept of equality of educational opportunities as equality of educational outcomes. The question is, therefore, whether equality of outcomes really is one of the two types of equality of opportunity. The purpose of the present article is to show that equality of opportunity and equality of outcomes are two different types of equality. If they are different, the interpretation that Coleman has redefined the concept of “equality of educational opportunity” turns out to be incorrect. (DIPF/Orig.

Some Thoughts on Philosophy of Education

Philosophy of education is usually understood as a special branch of philosophy. However, a noteworthy fact is that in many countries philosophy of education is not recognized as such and, consequently, is not taught in departments of philosophy, but rather in departments or faculties of education. In these cases the term “philosophy of education” is or was also used as a synonym for two things: firstly, for one of the educational sciences, and secondly, for one of the interpretations of that traditional academic discipline whose name has the same meaning and etymological origin in several languages: Pädagogik, pedagogika, pedagogija, pedagogia, pédagogie, and the like. Therefore, if we accept such interpretations, philosophy of education is not a constitutive part of philosophy. But, if it is not, then why is it called “philosophy”? And on the other hand, if philosophy of education is not the same as the history of philosophical ideas about education, if it is not just a kind of collection of what the great philosophers have said about education, then what is it