Cannabis sativa L.

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/herbarium_specimens_byname/19996/thumbnail.jp

$22 Trillion Lost, Zero Wall Street Executives Jailed: Prosecutors Should Utilize Whistleblowers to Establish Criminal Intent

The Financial Crisis, which began in the United States on Wall Street in the fall of 2008, cost the global economy trillions of dollars, caused millions of people to lose their jobs, homes, life and retirement savings, and resulted in the collapse or taxpayer-funded government bailout of several century-old, storied financial institutions. Irresponsible risk-taking, fraudulent mortgage and lending practices, and misrepresentations around increasingly complex products are among the many theories that have been put forth as to what caused the Financial Crisis. Importantly, there are numerous state and federal statutes on the books prohibiting and criminalizing such activity. To put away those who engaged in such criminal behavior, Wall Street-focused prosecutors just had to establish that they did so with the requisite criminal intent, or mens rea. Yet, not a single high-level Wall Street executive has been prosecuted criminally for their role in bringing about the worst crisis since the Great Depression. In the rather blunt words of a former Senate investigator: “Everything’s fucked up, and nobody goes to jail.” This Note argues that the current enforcement framework, whereby cozy financial regulators and prosecutors are content with levying civil fines against financial institutions and allowing the bad actors therein to remain insulated, is insufficient. A key underlying premise throughout this Note is that the identification and prosecution of bad actors in the financial markets are “vital to the American economic engine.” This premise is especially true at this juncture in American history where, due to the interconnectedness and complexity of modern finance, a single harm or instance of wrongdoing can destabilize the entire global market. This Note, therefore, suggests that prosecutors overseeing the financial services industry should increasingly rely on whistleblowers from within a particular institution or the industry as a whole in order to establish the seemingly elusive element of criminal intent in these cases of alleged individual criminal financial wrongdoing

$22 Trillion Lost, Zero Wall Street Executives Jailed: Prosecutors Should Utilize Whistleblowers to Establish Criminal Intent

The Financial Crisis, which began in the United States on Wall Street in the fall of 2008, cost the global economy trillions of dollars, caused millions of people to lose their jobs, homes, life and retirement savings, and resulted in the collapse or taxpayer-funded government bailout of several century-old, storied financial institutions. Irresponsible risk-taking, fraudulent mortgage and lending practices, and misrepresentations around increasingly complex products are among the many theories that have been put forth as to what caused the Financial Crisis. Importantly, there are numerous state and federal statutes on the books prohibiting and criminalizing such activity. To put away those who engaged in such criminal behavior, Wall Street-focused prosecutors just had to establish that they did so with the requisite criminal intent, or mens rea. Yet, not a single high-level Wall Street executive has been prosecuted criminally for their role in bringing about the worst crisis since the Great Depression. In the rather blunt words of a former Senate investigator: “Everything’s fucked up, and nobody goes to jail.” This Note argues that the current enforcement framework, whereby cozy financial regulators and prosecutors are content with levying civil fines against financial institutions and allowing the bad actors therein to remain insulated, is insufficient. A key underlying premise throughout this Note is that the identification and prosecution of bad actors in the financial markets are “vital to the American economic engine.” This premise is especially true at this juncture in American history where, due to the interconnectedness and complexity of modern finance, a single harm or instance of wrongdoing can destabilize the entire global market. This Note, therefore, suggests that prosecutors overseeing the financial services industry should increasingly rely on whistleblowers from within a particular institution or the industry as a whole in order to establish the seemingly elusive element of criminal intent in these cases of alleged individual criminal financial wrongdoing

Phyla nodiflora (L.) Greene

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/herbarium_specimens_byname/19075/thumbnail.jp

Spiranthes vernalis Engelm. & A. Gray

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/herbarium_specimens_byname/21402/thumbnail.jp

Acer rubrum Wats.

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/herbarium_specimens_byname/21749/thumbnail.jp

Influencia de la turbulencia del gas y geométrica en la curva de rotación básica para la línea de 21 cm

Se ha estudiado el efecto de la turbulencia del gas y de la resolución en velocidades de la antena en la posición y dispersión del pico de acumulación que se observa en los perfiles de la línea de 21 cm mediante la simulación numérica de perfiles teóricos para b=0° y un amplio rango de longitudes. Se encuentra que la turbulencia puede jugar en ciertos casos un papel predominante en la posición en velocidades del pico de acumulación. Este estudio comprende además un análisis paramétrico de la variación de la curva de rotación básica y la posición del pico de acumulación con la turbulencia del gas. Una comparación con perfiles observados permite obtener un orden de magnitud de las perturbaciones en velocidad debido a la presencia de antisimetrías en el potencial (brazos espirales).Asociación Argentina de Astronomí

The risk of cardiomyopathy in inherited epidermolysis bullosa

BackgroundCase reports have suggested that cardiomyopathy may be a complication of recessive dystrophic epidermolysis bullosa (RDEB).ObjectiveTo determine the risk of congestive heart failure (CHF) or cardiomyopathy in each major EB subtype.MethodsThese data represent systematic case findings and data collection performed throughout the continental United States from 1986 through 2002, by the National Epidermolysis Bullosa Registry. Study design is cross-sectional (n = 3280) with a nested randomly sampled longitudinal subcohort (n = 450). Frequencies of CHF and cardiomyopathy were determined by patient self-reporting, medical histories and review of medical records. In those who died, death certificates were reviewed and histories obtained from surviving family. Cumulative risks were stratified by cause and EB subtype.ResultsCardiomyopathy was reported as early as within the first year of life. In patients having no other known risk factors for CHF or cardiomyopathy, the highest risk of cardiomyopathy was seen among patients with Hallopeau–Siemens RDEB (RDEB-HS), with a cumulative risk of 4·51% on or after age 20 years. The cumulative risk of cardiomyopathy was only 1·14% and 0·40% in non-Herlitz junctional EB (JEB) and non-Hallopeau–Siemens RDEB, respectively, and was not observed in any other EB subtype. When patients with coexistent chronic renal failure were included, the cumulative risk for RDEB-HS rose to 18·86% by age 35 years. About 30% of our patients affected with RDEB-HS died of CHF or cardiomyopathy, even those with no other known risk factors.ConclusionsCHF and cardiomyopathy are uncommon complications in both major RDEB subtypes and non-Herlitz JEB, and may be fatal