Ancient and Medieval Concepts of Friendship

Suzanne Stern-Gillet & Gary M. Gurtler, SJ (eds.) Ancient and Medieval Concepts of Friendship. State University of New York Press : Albany 2014, 327 p. US $ 34.95 (pb). ISBN 978-1-4384-5364-4

Futuros contingentes: história de uma outra batalha

The problem of future contingents is examined here through the vantage point of another controversy, the one over which answer Aristotle should be credited with. Two answers are attributed to Aristotle. According to the first one, which is nowadays often referred to as the traditional answer, Aristotle argued that, to prevent determinism as the valid conclusion of the argument presented at the beginning of De interpretation 9, one has to deny the universal validity of the principle of bivalence; according to the other, Aristotle accepted the validity of the principle of bivalence, but averted the conclusion of determinism by introducing the notion of indefinite verum. Both answers are examined with a view to shedding some light on this chapter that has kindled so much discussion

Problema Ético XXIX – Alexandre de Afrodísia

This is a translation into Portuguese, accompanied by a brief introduction and commentary, of Ethical Problem number 29, in which Alexander discusses problems related to the voluntary and offers an interpretation of NE III 5 1114a31-b12

Sur Protagoras 351c4-5 et 352b3-c2

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: "Le Protagoras est sûrement l’un des plus beaux dialogues de Platon. Il est traditionnellement placé parmi les dialogues socratiques de Platon, en compagnie, entre autres, du Lachès, de l’Euthyphron et du Charmide. Ces derniers dialogues examinent une vertu en particulier (respectivement : le courage, la piété, la tempérance), alors que, dans le Protagoras, il s’agit de comprendre non pas une certaine vertu, mais l’unité même des vertus. Par là, il se distingue déjà de ces dialogues, tout en restant dans le cadre des rencontres socratiques caractéristiques de la première période de la production intellectuelle de Platon. [...] Je voudrais, dans ce petit essai, revisiter les arguments produits par Socrate pour soutenir l’unité des vertus.

Dialética, indução e inteligência na aquisição dos primeiros princípios

Este texto examina a tese que prof. Porchat atribui à dialética, a saber, o de preparar o terreno para uma visão posterior cujo advento ela tornou possível: segundo prof. Porchat, "o conhecimento dos princípios emerge da argumentação dialética sem ser engendrado por ela". Salienta-se, em direção contrária, o papel negativo e destrutivo da dialética, que se aplica em especial a quem saiu fora do caminho, antes que um papel positivo de encontrar ou de auxiliar a encontrar os primeiros princípios, que obtemos pelo processo de epagôgê. AbstractIn this paper, I focus on the role prof. Porchat attributes to dialectics in establishing the first principles. According to prof. Porchat, the knowledge of principles comes about through dialectical argumentation, although it is not properly produced by it. It seems to me that even this role must be dealt with parsimony, for dialectical method restricts itself rather to a negative or destructive role regarding those who went astray, not the positive one of finding or helping find the principles, at which we arrive by the normal process of epagôgê

O Tratado do Impulso e da Faculdade Impulsiva de Alexandre de Afrodísia e sua versão em Miguel de Éfeso

After a presentation of Michael’s version of a part of Alexander’s De anima called On Impulse, follow Portuguese translations of Alexander’s De anima 73,14 – 80, 15, Michael of Ephesus’ commentary on Aristotle´s De motu 114, 22 – 116, 14, and Alexander’s Mantissa 105, 26 – 106, 17, accompanied by very brief notes

Sur l’intellect comme cause

Le principal objectif de cet article est de démontrer la thèse suivante : l’essentiel de la théorie aristotélicienne de l’action humaine repose sur le fait que l’agent est, au sens propre, capable d’agir autrement. Dans cette perspective, une distinction est établie entre la théorie de l’action et la psychologie morale d’Aristote. La première est structurée par la notion d’un agent capable au moment de l’action de choisir entre des contraires, tandis que la seconde se concentre sur la notion de caractère qui impose une fixité et une régularité aux actions de l’agent. La distinction proposée s’appuie sur une interprétation renouvelée de EN 1112a31-33, passage dans lequel Aristote affirme que l’intellect (pratique) est cause au même titre que la nature, le hasard et la nécessité.The main target of this paper is to provide a basis for the thesis that the core of Aristotle’s theory of human agency lies in the fact that the agent is in a relevant sense able to do otherwise. To this effect, a distinction is drawn between Aristotelian theory of action, and his moral psychology. The former is taken to be governed by the notion of a power to choose between contraries when the agent is about to do something, whereas the latter is focused on the notion of character, which imposes fixity and regularity to the agent’s actions. The distinction proposed is reached at by means of a reappraisal of NE 1112a31-33, passage in which Aristotle declares that (practical) intellect is a cause alongside nature, chance, and necessity