Beyond the senses: perception, the environment, and vision impairment

The ‘sensory turn’ in anthropology has generated a significant literature on sensory perception and experience. Whilst much of this literature is critical of the compartmentalization of particular ‘senses’, there has been limited exploration of how anthropologists might examine sensory perception beyond ‘the senses’. Based on ethnographic fieldwork with people who have impaired vision walking the South Downs landscape in England, this article develops such an approach. It suggests that the experiences of seeing in blindness challenge the conceptualization of ‘vision’ (and ‘non‐vision’). In place of ‘vision’ (as a sense), the article explores ‘activities of seeing’ – an approach that contextualizes the visual to examine the biographically constituted and idiosyncratic nature of perception within an environment. Through an ethnography of seeing with anatomical eyes and ‘seeing in the mind's eye’, it articulates an approach that avoids associating perception with anatomy, or compartmentalizing experience into ‘senses’

On the essentially dynamic nature of concepts : Constant if incremental motion in conceptual spaces

Concepts are the means by which we structure our understanding of the world and consequently the primary means by which we encounter it. It is commonly assumed that one of the essential characteristics of concepts – regardless of referent – is their stability, tending toward stasis;and, indeed, it can be hard to see how concepts can otherwise be systematic and productive, inthe way they are conventionally taken to be. Even the question has been raised whether conceptscan change; on some prominent accounts, they cannot. The Unified Conceptual Space Theory(UCST) – an extension of Conceptual Spaces Theory – makes the controversial claim that conceptsnot only are subject to change over an iterative lifecycle but that, at an underlying level, they are in a state of continuous motion; indeed, they must be to function as they do. Mere openness to change is not enough. Even the most seemingly fixed of concepts – mathematical concepts are the paradigm example – can be seen to evolve and continually be evolving as our understanding of mathematics evolves. UCST suggests that concepts possess an intrinsic tension that appears topresent a contradiction: to be able to apply in more or less the same way across unboundedly many contexts (systematicity) and to be able to combine coherently with other concepts (productivity),they must be relatively stable; and yet, since each new application context is, in some nontrivial way, different from every previous context in ways that do not fit within neat conceptual boundaries,they must adapt each time to fit. In a physical world we have reason to view as ultimately one of fluidity, of processes and motion rather than stable entities, concepts should probably have a similar nature

Can Internalism and Externalism be Reconciled in a Biological Epistemology of Language?

This paper is an attempt at exploring the possibility of reconciling the two interpretations of biolinguistics which have been recently projected by Koster(Biolinguistics 3(1):61–92, 2009). The two interpretations—trivial and nontrivial—can be roughly construed as non-internalist and internalist conceptions of biolinguistics respectively. The internalist approach boils down to a conception of language where language as a mental grammar in the form of I-language grows and functions like a biological organ. On the other hand, under such a construal consistent with Koster’s (Biolinguistics 3(1):61-92, 2009), the non-internalist version does not necessarily have to be externalist in nature; rather it is a matter of mutual reinforcement of biology and culture under the rubric of a co-evolutionary dynamics. Here it will be argued that the apparent dichotomy between these two conceptions of biolinguistics can perhaps be resolved if we have a richer synthesis that accounts for both internalism and non-internalism