Self-Fulfilling Crises in the Eurozone: An Empirical Test. CEPS Working Document No. 366, 22 June 2012

This paper tests the hypothesis that government bond markets in the eurozone are more fragile and more susceptible to self-fulfilling liquidity crises than in stand-alone countries. We find evidence that a significant part of the surge in the spreads of the PIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) in the eurozone during 2010-11 was disconnected from underlying increases in the debt-to-GDP ratios and fiscal space variables, and was the result of negative self-fulfilling market sentiments that became very strong since the end of 2010. We argue that this can drive member countries of the eurozone into bad equilibria. We also find evidence that after years of neglecting high government debt, investors became increasingly worried about this in the eurozone, and reacted by raising the spreads. No such worries developed in stand-alone countries despite the fact that debt-to-GDP ratios and fiscal space variables were equally high and increasing in these countries

Strong governments, weak banks. CEPS Policy Brief No. 305, 25 November 2013

Banks in the northern eurozone have capital ratios that are, on average, less than half of the capital ratios of banks in the eurozone’s periphery. The authors explain this by the fact that northern eurozone banks profit from the financial solidity of their governments and follow business strategies aimed at issuing too much subsidised debt. In doing so, they weaken their balance sheets and become more fragile – less able to withstand future shocks. Paradoxically, financially strong governments breed fragile banks. The opposite occurs in countries with financially weak governments. In these countries banks are forced to strengthen themselves because they are unable to rely on their governments. As a result they have significantly more capital and reserves than banks in the northern eurozone. Recommendations More than in the south, the governments of northern Europe should stand up and force the banks to issue more equity. This should go much further than what is foreseen in the Basel III accord. If the experience of the southern eurozone countries is any guide, banks in the north of the eurozone should at least double the capital and the reserves as a percentage of their balance sheets. Failure to do so risks destroying the financial solidity of the northern European governments when, in the future, negative shocks force these governments to come to the rescue of their undercapitalised banks. The new responsibilities entrusted to the European Central Bank as the single supervisor in the eurozone create a unique opportunity for that institution to change the regulatory and supervisory culture in the eurozone – one that has allowed the large banks to continue living dangerously, with insufficient capital

What Germany should fear most is its own fear: An analysis of Target2 and current account imbalances. CEPS Working Document No. 368, September 2012

This paper analyzes two claims that have been made about the Target2 payment system. The first one is that this system has been used to support unsustainable current account deficits of Southern European countries. The second one is that the large accumulation of Target2 claims by the Bundesbank represents an unacceptable risk for Germany if the eurozone were to break up. We argue that these claims are unfounded. They also lead to unnecessary fears in Germany that make a solution of the eurozone crisis more difficult. Ultimately, this fear increases the risk of a break-up of the eurozone. Or to paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt, what Germany should fear most is simply its own fear

Market sentiments and the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone

In this paper we test two theories of the determination of the government bond spreads in a monetary union. The first one is based on the efficient market theory. According to this theory, the surging spreads observed from 2010 to the middle of 2012 were the result of deteriorating fundamentals (e.g. domestic government debt, external debt, competitiveness, etc.). The second theory recognizes that collective movements of fear and panic can have dramatic effects on spreads. These movements can drive the spreads away from underlying fundamentals, very much like in the stock markets prices can be gripped by a bubble pushing them far away from underlying fundamentals. The implication of that theory is that while fundamentals cannot be ignored, there is a special role for the central bank that has to provide liquidity in times of market panic, so as to avoid that countries are pushed into a bad equilibrium. We tested these theories and concluded that there is strong evidence for the second theory. The policy implications are that the role of the ECB as lender of last resort in the government bond markets is an important one. The recent attempts by the German Constitutional Court risk undermining this role and by the same token the stability of the Eurozone

How safe is a safe asset? CEPS Policy Insights No 2018-08/February 2018

The European Systemic Risk Board proposes to create a “safe asset” for the eurozone that is based on a repackaging of the risks of sovereign bonds. The hope is that this financial engineering will stabilise an otherwise unstable system of sovereign bond markets in the eurozone. We argue that a financial system that is fundamentally unstable cannot be stabilised by financial engineering. The ESRB-proposal creates the illusion that the sovereign bond markets in the eurozone can be stabilised without the need to share the risk among sovereigns. We argue that sovereign bond markets can only be stabilised vi

Flexibility versus Stability: A difficult trade-off in the eurozone. CEPS Working Document No. 422, 29 April 2016

Optimal currency area (OCA) theory has been influential in pushing eurozone countries towards structural reforms to make product and labour markets more flexible. The underlying assumption of the OCA prescription for structural reform is that asymmetric shocks are permanent. However, when shocks are temporary it does not follow that more flexibility is the answer. When shocks are the result of business-cycle movements, the way to deal with them is by stabilisation efforts. This paper provides empirical evidence that suggests that the biggest shocks in the eurozone were the result of business-cycle movements. These were relatively well synchronised, except for their amplitude. We argue that efforts to stabilise business cycles should be strengthened relative to the efforts that have been made to impose structural reforms, with consideration given to the implications for the governance of the eurozone

The fragility of two monetary regimes: The European Monetary System and the Eurozone. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 243, October 2013

The purpose of these working papers is to promote the circulation of research results (Research Series) and analytical studies (Documents Series) made within the National Bank of Belgium or presented by external economists in seminars, conferences and conventions organised by the Bank. The aim is therefore to provide a platform for discussion. The opinions expressed are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bank of Belgium

How to conduct monetary policies: the ECB in the past, present and future

We study the evolving operating procedures used by the ECB since its creation. During the period up to 2015, bank reserves were scarce and the ECB, like other central banks, used a corridor system in which the money market rate could fluctuate within the bounds set by the lending and the deposit rates. With the start of Quantitative Easing (QE) the operating procedure evolved into a regime of reserve abundance. This regime has become problematic since the inflation surge forced the central banks to raise the policy rate. The result has been a massive transfer of central banks’ profits (and more) to the banks. We propose a two-tier system of reserve requirements that would only remunerate the reserves in excess of the minimum required. This would drastically reduce the giveaways to banks, allow the central banks to maintain their current operating procedures and make monetary policies more effective in fighting inflation. This paper was presented at the ECB@25 Symposium at Erasmus University, Rotterdam on 16th January 2024. We are grateful to Mary Pieterse-Bloem, Sylvester Eijffinger, Casper de Vries, Charles Goodhart and other participants in the Symposium for comments and suggestions. We also profited from comments and suggestions of an anonymous referee. Previous versions of this paper (De Grauwe and Ji, 2023a, 2023b) profited from comments by Ignazio Angeloni, Peter Bofinger, Robert Holzmann, Pablo Rovira Kaltwasser, Karel Lannoo, Vivien Lévy-Garboua, Anna Lozmann, David Marsh, Wim Moesen, Joachim Nagel, Theo Peeters, Stefan Schmitz, Miklos Vari, and by participants in seminars and presentations at the London School of Economics, King's College (London), the Bundesbank, the Central Bank of Luxembourg, OMFIF, Sciences Po (Paris), the Austrian National Bank, SUERF, the Polish National Bank and the National Bank of Ukraine

Disappearing government bond spreads in the eurozone - Back to normal? CEPS Working Document No. 396, May 2014

Since the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, in 2012, the government bond spreads began a strong decline. This paper finds that most of this decline is due to the positive market sentiments that the OMT programme has triggered and is not related to underlying fundamentals, such as the debt-to-GDP ratios or the external debt position that have continued to increase in most countries. The authors even argue that the market’s euphoria may have gone too far in taking into account the same market fundamentals. They conclude with some thoughts about the future governance of the OMT programme

Inflation targets and the zero lower bound in a behavioural macroeconomic model

We analyse the relationship between the level of the inflation target and the zero lower bound imposed on the nominal interest rate in the framework of a behavioural New-Keynesian macroeconomic model in which agents, experiencing cognitive limitations, use adaptive learning forecasting rules. The model produces endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism (animal spirits) that lead to non-normal distributions of the output gap. We find that when the inflation target is too close to zero, the economy can get gripped by ‘chronic pessimism’ that leads to a dominance of negative output gaps and recessions, and in turn feeds back on expectations producing long waves of pessimism. Low inflation targets create the risk of persistence of recessions and low growth. In conclusion, our framework suggests that the 2% inflation target, now pursued by many central banks, is too low