2-irreducible and strongly 2-irreducible ideals of commutative rings

An ideal I of a commutative ring R is said to be irreducible if it cannot be written as the intersection of two larger ideals. A proper ideal I of a ring R is said to be strongly irreducible if for each ideals J, K of R, J\cap K\subseteq I implies that J\subset I or K\subset I. In this paper, we introduce the concepts of 2-irreducible and strongly 2-irreducible ideals which are generalizations of irreducible and strongly irreducible ideals, respectively. We say that a proper ideal I of a ring R is 2-irreducible if for each ideals J, K and L of R, I= J\cap K\cap L implies that either I=J\cap K or I=J\cap L or I=K\cap L. A proper ideal I of a ring R is called strongly 2-irreducible if for each ideals J, K and L of R, J\cap K\cap L\subseteq I implies that either J\cap K\subseteq I or J\cap L\subseteq I or K\cap L\subseteq I.Comment: 15 page

A distributed adaptive steplength stochastic approximation method for monotone stochastic Nash Games

We consider a distributed stochastic approximation (SA) scheme for computing an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash game. Standard SA schemes employ diminishing steplength sequences that are square summable but not summable. Such requirements provide a little or no guidance for how to leverage Lipschitzian and monotonicity properties of the problem and naive choices generally do not preform uniformly well on a breadth of problems. While a centralized adaptive stepsize SA scheme is proposed in [1] for the optimization framework, such a scheme provides no freedom for the agents in choosing their own stepsizes. Thus, a direct application of centralized stepsize schemes is impractical in solving Nash games. Furthermore, extensions to game-theoretic regimes where players may independently choose steplength sequences are limited to recent work by Koshal et al. [2]. Motivated by these shortcomings, we present a distributed algorithm in which each player updates his steplength based on the previous steplength and some problem parameters. The steplength rules are derived from minimizing an upper bound of the errors associated with players' decisions. It is shown that these rules generate sequences that converge almost surely to an equilibrium of the stochastic Nash game. Importantly, variants of this rule are suggested where players independently select steplength sequences while abiding by an overall coordination requirement. Preliminary numerical results are seen to be promising.Comment: 8 pages, Proceedings of the American Control Conference, Washington, 201