Between state and peasant: Local Cadres and statistical reporting in rural China

Although statistical distortion has long existed in China, not enough effort has been made to explain why it has become a routine practice of local officials despite the enactment of the Statistical Law. By explaining statistics collection in rural China, this article aims to show that there are two reasons for local officials' manipulation of statistics, both rooted in the institutional arrangement of the administrative system in China. Institutions influence people's behaviour by providing them with incentives or imposing constraints on them. In China's case, since the tenure and promotion of lower-level officials are decided by their higher-level counterparts, they are held more accountable to higher-level officials than to the public and thus are more likely to suffer pressure from above. When facing conflicting interests of higher-level officials and the public, local officials often attend to the former at the expense of the latter. On the other hand, since they are less constrained by the people, local officials enjoy considerable autonomy in pursuing their personal goals if supervision by higher-level government is absent

China's moderate middle class - The case of homeowners' resistance

This paper considers how the middle class in China protects its interests against state and social actors by examining homeowners' defense of their rights. The study suggests that members of the Chinese middle class are largely moderate because of their intention to maintain the political order and limited ability to stage disruptive action

Irresponsible state: Local cadres and image-building in China

Existing research on the role of the state ibn economic development tends to categorize the state as developmental or predatory according to how it makes decisions and allocates resources. However, this characterization does not capture the scenario where the states engages in activities that are beyond the developmental-predatory spectrum. State agents may make decisions and allocate resources neither for real development nor for predatory purposes, but to enhance their own image, leading to a waste of public resources. An exploration of this phenomenon promotes our understanding of the role a state may play. White irresponsible behaviour among state agents may not be unique to a particular country, in the case of China, because of the country's political arrangements, local state agents have both incentive and opportunity for making irresponsible decisions and misusing resources. © 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd

Information as a Source of Pressure: Local Government and Information Management in China

Authoritarian governments commonly control information flow to prevent the exposure of regime-damaging issues and to forestall collective actions against the regime. Authoritarian governments are claimed to enjoy advantages in information control when they possess resources and new technologies. However, these advantages do not necessarily alleviate the pressure information management faced by authoritarian governments. Using the case of China, this study shows that information management involves not only the central government but also local governments. Local authorities encounter challenges in information management because of the financial pressure of maintaining the information-collection. In addition, they also face difficulties and costs when they act upon the information they have collected.

Power Structure and Regime Resilience: Contentious Politics in China

Authoritarian governments may face serious uncertainties when dealing with popular resistance because of the unpredictable consequences of making concessions or repressing opposition. However, a political system with multiple levels of authority can help reduce the uncertainties by granting conditional autonomy to lower-level authorities. Such a power structure prevents excessive repression and unconditional concessions when the priorities of different levels of authority do not match. Under this political arrangement, the central authority can avoid blame when local authorities use repression. The divided power also helps reduce the uncertainties faced by the central authority because it will then have to deal with only a very limited number of instances of resistance. Using the case of China, this article shows that divided state power has allowed the party-state to maintain social stability amid numerous instances of social unrest during the reform era

Local Governments and the Suppression of Popular Resistance in China

Local governments are responsible for dealing with many of the instances of resistance in China, and an important mode of response which they use is suppression. This article examines the rationale behind local governments' use of this mode of response. It shows that Chinese citizens who stage resistance are in a weak legal position because their actions often violate the law or government regulations. Given local governments' discretion in interpreting citizens' action, suppression becomes the option when concessions are difficult to make and citizen resistance threatens social stability, policy implementation or local officials' images. However, suppression has not stopped popular resistance, and it remains a channel through which citizens defend or pursue their legitimate rights in China. © 2008 The China Quarterly