Implications and Ramifications of a Sample-Size Approach to Intuition

[...from the chapter] In the present article, we delineate a different approach, which is by no means inconsistent, but largely overlaps with the aforementioned definitions. However, our approach is simpler and refrains from a number of rather strong assumptions to which other conceptions subscribe. Using a simple and straightforward criterion, we define intuition in terms of the size of the sample used in reaching a decision: Judgments and decisions are intuitive to the extent that they rest on small samples.

Implications and ramifications of a sample-size approach to intuition

[...from the chapter] In the present article, we delineate a different approach, which is by no means inconsistent, but largely overlaps with the aforementioned definitions. However, our approach is simpler and refrains from a number of rather strong assumptions to which other conceptions subscribe. Using a simple and straightforward criterion, we define intuition in terms of the size of the sample used in reaching a decision: Judgments and decisions are intuitive to the extent that they rest on small samples

Learning (Not) To Yield: An Experimental Study of Evolving Ultimatum Game Behavior

Whether behavior converges toward rational play or fair play in repeated ultimatum games depends on which player yields first. If responders concede first by accepting low offers, proposers would not need to learn to offer more, and play would converge toward unequal sharing. By the same token, if proposers learn fast that low offers are doomed to be rejected and adjust their offers accordingly, pressure would be lifted from responders to learn to accept such offers. Play would converge toward equal sharing. Here we tested the hypothesis that it is regret-both material and strategic-which determines how players modify their behavior. We conducted a repeated ultimatum game experiment with random strangers, in which one treatment does and another does not provide population feedback in addition to informing players about their own outcome. Our results show that regret is a good predictor of the dynamics of play. Specifically, we will turn to the dynamics that unfold when players make repeated decisions in the ultimatum game with randomly changing opponents, and when they learn not only about their own outcome in the previous round but also find out how the population on average has adapted to previous results (path dependence).Ultimatum bargaining game, Reputation, Regret, Learning, Experiment

Taking the sting out of choice: Diversification of investments

It is often the case that one can choose a mix of alternative options rather than have to select one option only. Such an opportunity to diversify may blunt the risk involved in all-or-none choice. Here we investigate repeated investment decisions in two-valued options that differ in their riskiness, looking for the effects of recent decisions and their outcomes on upcoming decisions. We compare these effects to those evident in all-or-none choice between the same risky options. The “state of the world”, namely, the likelihood of the high versus the low outcomes of the options, is manipulated. We find that aggregate allocation diverges from uniformity (i.e., from 1/n), and is sensitive to outcome probabilities, with the pattern of results indicating reactivity to the outcome of the previous decision. Round-to-round dynamics reveal that the outcome of the previous decision has an effect on the subsequent decision, on top of inertia; the aspects of the outcome that influence the next decision indicate an effect of a missed opportunity, if there was one, in the previous decision. Importantly, recent outcomes have a similar effect in diversification decisions and in all-or-none choice

Is that the answer you had in mind? The effect of perspective on unethical behavior

We explored how the perspective through which individuals view their actions influences their ethicality, comparing a narrow perspective that allows for evaluation of each choice in isolation, to a broad perspective that promotes an aggregate view of one’s choices. To examine unethical behavior we employed a computerized variation of a trivia game that challenges the player’s integrity because, rather than choosing the correct answer, players indicate whether the correct highlighted answer is the answer they had in mind. In Experiment 1 perspective was modified through the choice procedure: broad perspective evoked by an aggregate decision regarding the upcoming test items and narrow perspective evoked by a segregated decision regarding each upcoming test item. In Experiment 2 perspective was evoked through differential priming. Across both experiments, when given a monetary incentive to succeed, the adoption of a narrow perspective increased cheating, as evidenced by overall higher reported success rates

The zoo of models of deliberate ignorance

This chapter looks at deliberate ignorance from a modeling perspective. Standard economic models cannot produce deliberate ignorance in a meaningful way; if there were no cost for acquisition and processing, data could be looked at privately and processed perfectly. Here the focus is on cases where the standard assumptions are violated in some way. Cases are considered from an individual’s perspective, without game-theoretic (strategic) aspects. Different classes of “not wanting to know” something are identified: aside from the boring case of the cost of information acquisition being too high, an individual may prefer to not know some information (e.g., when knowledge would reduce the enjoyment of other experiences) or may want to not use some information (e.g., relating to a lack of self-control). In addition, strategic cases of deliberate ignorance are reviewed, where obtaining information would also signal to others that information acquisition has occurred, and thus it may be better to remain ignorant. Finally, the possibility of deliberate ignorance emerging in population-level models is discussed, where there seems to be a relative dearth of models of the phenomenon at present. Throughout, the authors make use of examples to summarize different classes of models, ideas for how deliberate ignorance can make sense, and gaps in the literature for future modeling

The Parasite Game: Exploiting the Abundance of Nature in Face of Competition

A situation in which the regularity in nature can be utilized while competition is to be avoided is modelled by the Parasite game. In this game regular behaviour could enhance guessing nature but strategic randomization is required to avoid being outguessed. In an experiment, 60 pairs of participants (partner design) played many rounds of the Parasite game. The treatments differed in nature’s probabilities and whether or not these probabilities were announced in advance or could only be experienced over time. Before playing, the working memory (WM) of participants was measured. Data analyses test the correspondence of participants behavior to game-theoretic benchmarks and the effect of participants’ WM on their behavior

Predating Predators

Predating predators requires at least three specimen to which we refer as players 1, 2, and 3. Player 1 has simply to guess nature when trying to find food. Player 2 is hunting player 1 in the hope that 1 is well-fed but must also avoid being hunted by player 3. One major motivation is to test three benchmark solutions (uniformly perfect, impulse balance and payoff balance equilibrium) in such a complex strategic setting. In the experiment three participants play repeatedly the game (partner design) which allows to test whether certain types of behavior are just initial inclinations or stable patterns which survive learning and experience