Did Corporate Governance Compliance Have an Impact on Auditor Selection and Quality? Evidence From FTSE 350

The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.This paper examines the possible effects of corporate governance (GC) on audit quality (AQ) among the FTSE 350 companies. Using a sample of 180 companies from 2012 to 2017 (i.e., 1080 firm-year observations) a binary logistic model has been employed to investigate the CG-AQ nexus. This analysis was supported by conducting a probit logistic model as a sensitivity analysis. Our findings are associative of a heterogeneous impact of CG on AQ post the implementation of the 2012 CG reforms in the UK. For example, although institutional ownership and management ownership are positively associated with auditor selection and AQ, board independence, non-executive directors and audit committee are not attributed to AQ in the UK. This implies that corporate compliance with good CG practices has a limited impact on the decision to select a Big4 auditor in the UK. Despite the limitations of our study, we hope it can motivate further investigations in this area

Banche Islamiche, Regole E Vigilanza: Il Ruolo Dello Sharia Board

Italian Abstract:Il lavoro esamina le principali tendenze in materia di regolamentazione e vigilanza delle istituzioni finanziarie islamiche e il ruolo dello Sharia supervisory board nel monitoraggio di tali istituzioni nel Regno Unito. Gli autori prendono le mosse dalla normativa che attualmente regola gli strumenti finanziari all'ingrosso e al dettaglio e suggeriscono margini di miglioramento nel ruolo dello Sharia supervisory board. I risultati rivelano differenze tra le banche esaminate per quanto riguarda sia le aree coperte dal board sia la sua stessa struttura. Sono evidenziate anche molte carenze nei modelli attuali utilizzati dalle banche per i loro Sharia supervisory board.English Abstract: The research paper examines the main views of regulating and supervising of Islamic financial institutions and the role of the Sharia supervisory board in overseeing the operations of these institutions in the UK. The authors draw lessons from the existing regulatory experience of both wholesale and retail financial instruments and suggest areas of improvements in terms of the role of Sharia board. The results reveal clear discrepancies across banks in terms of areas covered by the Sharia board as well as its structure. There are also many weaknesses in the current models used by banks for their Sharia board