2,697 research outputs found
Monetary policy in a systemic crisis
This paper examines the monetary policy followed during the current financial crisis from the perspective of the theory of the lender of last resort. It is argued that standard monetary policy measures would have failed because the channels through which monetary policy is implemented depend upon the well functioning of the interbank market. As the crisis developed, liquidity vanished and the interbank market collapsed, central banks had to inject much more liquidity at low interest rates than predicted by standard monetary policy models. At the same time, as the interbank market did not allow for the redistribution of liquidity among banks, central banks had to design new channels for liquidity injection.
An overall perspective on banking regulation
We survey the theory of banking regulation from the general perspective of regulatory theory. Starting by considering the different justifications of financial intermediation, we proceed to identify the market failures that make banking regulation necessary. We then succinctly compare how the analysis of regulation compares in the domains of banking and industrial organization. Finally we analyse why a safety net for banks could be part of banking regulation and how it can be structured in an efficient way.Banking regulation, efficiency, financial stability, banking supervision
Post crisis challenges to bank regulation
The current crisis has swept aside not only the whole of the US investment banking industry but also the consensual perception of banking risks, contagion and their implication for banking regulation. As everyone agrees now, risks where mispriced, they accumulated in neuralgic points of the financial system, and where amplified by procyclical regulation as well as by the instability and fragility of financial institutions. The use of ratings as carved in stone and lack of adequate procedure to swiftly deal with systemic institutions bankruptcy (whether too-big-to-fail, too complex to fail or too-many to fail). The current paper will not deal with the description and analysis of the crisis, already covered in other contributions to this issue will address the critical choice regulatory authorities will face. In the future regulation has to change, but it is not clear that it will change in the right direction. This may occur if regulatory authorities, possibly influenced by public opinion and political pressure, adopt an incorrect view of financial crisis prevention and management. Indeed, there are two approaches to post-crisis regulation. One is the rare event approach, whereby financial crises will occur infrequently, but are inescapable.
A Fibonacci sequence for linear structures with two types of components
We investigate binary voting systems with two types of voters and a hierarchy
among the members in each type, so that members in one class have more
influence or importance than members in the other class. The purpose of this
paper is to count, up to isomorphism, the number of these voting systems for an
arbitrary number of voters. We obtain a closed formula for the number of these
systems, this formula follows a Fibonacci sequence with a smooth polynomial
variation on the number of voters.Comment: All the results contained in this file are included in a paper
submitted to Annals of Operations Research in October, 2008 on ocasion of the
Conference on Applied Mathematical Programming and Modelling, that held in
Bratislava in May, 200
Coalitional power indices applied to voting systems
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple games
just consider parties, players or voters. Here, we also consider games with a priori unions, i.e., coalitions
among parties, players or voters. We measure the power of each party, player or voter when there are coalitions
among them. In particular, we study real situations of voting systems using extended ShapleyâShubik
and Banzhaf indices, the so-called coalitional power indices. We also introduce a dynamic programming to
compute them.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version
Corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism
This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model of securities markets and banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric information about banks' net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital, which limits the extent to which banks can relax their capital constraint. In this context monetary policy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity. Rather, it has the effect of changing the aggregate composition of financing by firms. The model also produces multiple equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch". Thus, monetary policy can also have large effects when it induces a shift from one equilibrium to the other.Asymmetric information, liabilities structure, capital regulation, monetary policy, transmission mechanism
Interbank market integration under asymmetric information
We argue that the main barrier to an integrated international interbank market is the existence of asymmetric information between different countries, which may prevail in spite of monetary integration or successful currency pegging. In order to address this issue, we study the scope for international interbank market integration with unsecured lending when cross-country information is noisy. We find not only that an equilibrium with integrated markets need not always exist, but also that when it does, the integrated equilibrium may coexist with one of interbank market segmentation. Therefore, market deregulation, per se, does not guarantee the emergence of an integrated interbank market. The effect of a repo market which, a priori, was supposed to improve efficiency happens to be more complex: it reduces interest rate spreads and improves upon the segmentation equilibrium, but\ it may destroy the unsecured integrated equilibrium, since the repo market will attract the best borrowers. The introduction of other transnational institutional arrangements, such as multinational banking, correspondent banking and the existence of "too-big-to-fail" banks may reduce cross country interest spreads and provide more insurance against country wide liquidity shocks. Still, multinational banking, as the introduction of repos, may threaten the integrated interbank market equilibrium.Banking theory, asymmetric information, financial integration, interbank markets, diamond-dybvig
Lender of Last Resort and Bank Closure Policy
During the last decades a consensus has emerged that it is impossible to disentangle liquidity shocks from solvency shocks. As a consequence the classical lender of last resort rules, as defined by Thornton and Bagehot, based on lending to solvent illiquid institutions appear ill-suited to this environment. We summarize here the main contributions that have developed considering this new paradigm and discuss how institutional features relating to bank closure policy influences lender of last resort and other safety net issues. We devote particular emphasis to the analysis of systemic risk and contagion in banking and the role of the lender of last resort to prevent it.lender of last resort, systemic risk, contagion, bank closure, liquidity, discount window
The role of interbank markets in monetary policy: A model with rationing
This paper analyses the impact of asymmetric information in the interbank market and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfections induce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two major implications: first, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to the user cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy (magnitude effect) and, second, it shows that banksâ liquidity positions condition their reaction to monetary policy (Kashyap and Stein liquidity effect).Banking, Rationing, Monetary Policy
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