How to Get Beyond the Zero-Sum Game Mentality between State and Non-State Actors in International Environmental Governance

This paper examines the participation of stakeholders in environmental policy formulation and implementation. After a short discussion of the main functions and challenges of environmental governance the paper addresses the issue of stakeholder participation and the claim of “democratic deficits” in international environmental governance. It stresses that while non-state actor involvement does not necessarily increase democratic legitimacy, it may nevertheless increase the quality of the environmental policy processes. It will then argue that certain international processes such as the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) have led to an unsatisfactory situation of non-state actor involvement where excessive formalization and proceduralization impede active interaction and input of expertise from non-state actors. It seems that the interaction between state and non-state actors in some of today’s international processes, such as the CSD, has led to a zero-sum gamewhere no party is really benefiting from the contributions of the other. This paper will suggest several changes to get beyond this zero-sum game mentality, including de-formalization of participation, replacement of generalist non-governmental organizations with those that specialize in specific fields, and reformation of the relationship between state and non-state actors so that each might come to see the other as a partner, not as a competitor. It will conclude by arguing that neither the alleged lack of an authoritative, effective central institution addressing the main environmental problems, nor the so-called “democratic deficit” is the main challenge to today’s international environmental governance, but the lack of political will. Political will, however, is not an absolute; it can and has to be stimulated. And this may be one of the most productive contributions that non-state actors can make

The Role of the United Nations Environment Assembly in Emerging Issues of International Environmental Law

This article takes a closer look at the scientific, policy and catalytic functions of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and its Assembly (UNEA) and UNEA’s role in addressing emerging issues in international environmental policy and law by examining two concrete examples. The first shows how UNEA was able to contribute to the international environmental law on mercury: UNEA played a catalytic policy role by contributing to the development of international soft law, customary law, and treaty law. Further, UNEA played a policy shaping role by influencing the further development of key international environmental law principles in the negotiations of new environmental norms in other fora. The second example describes UNEA’s unsuccessful attempt to address geoengineering. Building on the two examples, the article identifies factors that support or impede the fulfilment of UNEA’s role in addressing emerging issues of international environmental policy and law

Efficiency of Cooperation: A Functional Analysis of Sovereignty [Article]

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