On a Simple Hedonic Game with Graph-Restricted Communication

International audienceWe study a hedonic game for which the feasible coalitions are prescribed by a graph representing the agents' social relations. A group of agents can form a feasible coalition if and only if their corresponding vertices can be spanned with a star. This requirement guarantees that agents are connected, close to each other, and one central agent can coordinate the actions of the group. In our game everyone strives to join the largest feasible coalition. We study the existence and computational complexity of both Nash stable and core stable partitions. Then, we provide tight or asymptotically tight bounds on their quality, with respect to both the price of anarchy and stability, under two natural social functions, namely, the number of agents who are not in a singleton coalition, and the number of coalitions. We also derive refined bounds for games in which the social graph is restricted to be claw-free. Finally, we investigate the complexity of computing socially optimal partitions as well as extreme Nash stable ones

Multi-tier Loyalty Programs to Stimulate Customer Engagement

Customers differ in their purchase behavior, profitability, attitude toward the firm, and so on. These differences between customers have led to numerous firms introducing multi-tier loyalty programs. A multi-tier loyalty program explicitly distinguishes between customers by means of hierarchical tiers (e.g. Silver, Gold, Platinum) and assigns customers to different tiers based on their past purchase behavior. Next, customers in different tiers are provided varying levels of tangible rewards and intangible benefits, which are potentially powerful instruments to stimulate customer engagement. In this chapter, we focus on the design and effectiveness of such multi-tier loyalty programs. Building on loyalty program and customer prioritization research, we discuss whether, why, and how multi-tier loyalty programs are effective (or not) in influencing customer behavior, thereby enhancing customer engagement and financial performance

The soft power of popular cinema: the case of India

Among BRICS nations, India has the most developed and globalised film industry, and the Indian government as well as corporations are increasingly deploying the power of Bollywood in their international interactions. India’s soft power, arising from its cultural and civilizational influence outside its territorial boundaries, has a long history. Focusing on contemporary India’s thriving Hindi film industry, this article suggests that the globalisation of the country’s popular cinema, aided by a large diaspora, has created possibilities of promoting India’s public diplomacy. It examines the global imprint of this cinema as an instrument of soft power

Sales promotions and channel coordination

Consumer sales promotions are usually the result of the decisions of two marketing channel parties, the manufacturer and the retailer. In making these decisions, each party normally follows its own interest: i.e. maximizes its own profit. Unfortunately, this results in a suboptimal outcome for the channel as a whole. Independent profit maximization by channel parties leads to a lack of channel coordination with the implication of leaving money on the table. This may well contribute to the notoriously low profitability of sales promotions. This paper first shows analytically why the suboptimality occurs, and then presents an empirical demonstration, using a unique dataset from an Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) project; ECR is a movement in which parties work together to optimize the distribution channel). In this dataset, actual profit is only a small fraction of potential profit, implying that there is a large degree of suboptimality. It is important that (1) channel parties are aware of this suboptimality; and (2) that they have tools to deal with it. Solutions to the channel coordination problem should ensure that the goals of the individual channel parties are aligned with the goals of the channel as a whole. The paper proposes one particular agreement for this purpose, called proportional discount sharing. Application to the ECR data shows a win-win result for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Recognition of the channel coordination problem by the manufacturer and the retailer is the necessary starting point for agreeing on a way of solving it in a win-win fashion

Toward a theory of repeat purchase drivers for consumer services

The marketing discipline’s knowledge about the drivers of service customers’ repeat purchase behavior is highly fragmented. This research attempts to overcome that fragmented state of knowledge by making major advances toward a theory of repeat purchase drivers for consumer services. Drawing on means–end theory, the authors develop a hierarchical classification scheme that organizes repeat purchase drivers into an integrative and comprehensive framework. They then identify drivers on the basis of 188 face-to-face laddering interviews in two countries (USA and Germany) and assess the drivers’ importance and interrelations through a national probability sample survey of 618 service customers. In addition to presenting an exhaustive and coherent set of hierarchical repeat-purchase drivers, the authors provide theoretical explanations for how and why drivers relate to one another and to repeat purchase behavior. This research also tests the boundary conditions of the proposed framework by accounting for different service types. In addition to its theoretical contribution, the framework provides companies with specific information about how to manage long-term customer relationships successfully