The impact of hidden liquidity in limit order books

This paper analyzes liquidity in an order driven market. We only investigate the best limits in the limit order book, but also take into account the book behind these inside prices. When subsequent prices are close to the best ones and depth at them is substantial, larger orders can be executed without an extensive price impact and without deterring liquidity. We develop and estimate several econometric models, based on depth and prices in the book, as well as on the slopes of the limit order book. The dynamics of different dimensions of liquidity are analyzed: prices, depth at and beyond the best prices, as well as resiliency, i.e. how fast the different liquidity measures recover after a liquidity shock. Our results show a somewhat less favorable image of liquidity than often found in the literature. After a liquidity shock (in the spread or depth or in the book beyond the best limits), several dimension of liquidity deteriorate at the same time. Not only does the inside spread increase, and depth at the best prices decrease, also the difference between subsequent bid and ask prices may become larger and depth provided at them decreases. The impacts are both econometrically and economically significant. Also, our findings point to an interaction between different measures of liquidity, between liquidity at the best prices and beyond in the book, and between ask and bid side of the market

Measuring Scale Economies in a Heterogeneous Industry: The Case of European Settlement Institutions

We examine whether the European settlement institutions are technically efficient. This is done by means of estimating a translog cost function, and investigating whether scale economies are fully exploited. Since the sample is quite heterogeneous, fixed effects regression is introduced. From the results obtained, there clearly are economies of scale in this industry throughout all output ranges. This implies that further consolidation in this industry probably is ahead.

'SO STONED' : common sense approach of the dizzy patient

The history taking of a dizzy patient is of utmost importance in order to differentiate the possible etiologies of vertigo. The key factors that allow a first approximation of diagnosis identification are based on the time profile, symptom profile, and trigger profile of the disease. Here, the proposed mnemonic "SO STONED" comprises eight different dimensions that characterize the vertigo-related complaints of the patient and guide the clinician in his or her decision scheme. All the letters "SO STONED" have a specific meaning: Symptoms, Often (Frequency), Since, Trigger, Otology, Neurology, Evolution, and Duration. Since the most common vestibular diseases have different fingerprints when all dimensions are considered, this tool can facilitate the identification of the appropriate vestibular diagnosis

Product Differentiation and the Equilibrium Structure of the Manufacturer-Retailer Relationship

In this paper, we analyse the manufacturers' choice of vertical arrangement with retailers. We focus on two types of vertical arrangements namely exclusive dealing and exclusive territory. Both are used by manufacturers as instruments to dampen manufacturer competition. Exclusive dealing is used to avoid a head-to-head competition with other brands within a retail outlet. Thus, it restricts interbrand competition. Exclusive territory is used to eliminate intrabrand competition. Our results show that the choice of vertical arrangement depends on the degree of product substitution. When products are less subsitutable, in other words the interbrand rivalry is weak, manufacturers prefer to sell the products to a large number of competitive retailers. When the interbrand rivalry is strong, exclusive territory with exclusive dealing might be adopted by manufacturers. We derive welfare and antitrust policy implications.

Dynamic order submission strategies with competition between a dealer market and a crossing network.

We present a dynamic microstructure model where a dealer market (DM) and a crossing network (CN) interact. We consider sequentially arriving agents having different valuations for an asset. Agents maximize their profits by either trading at a DM or by submitting an order for (possibly) uncertain execution at a CN. We develop the analysis for three different informational settings: transparency, “complete” opaqueness of all order flow, and “partial” opaqueness (with observable DM trades). We find that a CN and a DM cater for different types of traders. Investors with a high eagerness to trade are more likely to prefer a DM. The introduction of a CN increases overall order flow by attracting traders who would not otherwise submit orders (“order creation”). It also diverts trades from the DM. The transparency and “partial” opaqueness settings generate systematic patterns in order flow. With transparency, the probability of observing a CN order at the same side of the market is smaller after such an order than if it was not. Buy (sell) orders at a CN are also less likely to attract subsequent sell (buy) orders at the DM.Competition; Market; Order; Strategy;