Biomedicals from Bone

The realm of biomaterials, under which biomedical materials can be categorised, has a broad definition base and recognises materials that are synthesized or naturally sourced. Biomaterials are normally those that come into contact with live tissue and physiological fluids. They have applications as prostheses to replace lost function of joints or to replace bone tissue, for diagnosing medical conditions, as a form of therapy, or as a storage unit. The diversity and scope of biomaterials science research, and especially its application to the improvement of trauma, disease, and congenital defects in the human condition, are making this branch of science increasingly dominant and topical in many countries. An exciting aspect is that such research is interdisciplinary. The varied problems of the human condition that biomaterials research addresses occupy the efforts not only of medical doctors who act as the end users of such technology, but also those of chemists, physicists, engineers, and biologists in creating the technological advances. Chemistry, in particular, plays a major role in such research, after all it is the foundation stone on which biomaterials polymer science and biomedical scaffold materials are built

Long term monitoring and field testing of an innovative multi-storey timber building

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WILLS-RIGHT OF LEGATEE TO RENOUNCE TO DETRIMENT OF CREDITORS

A judgment creditor of an insolvent residuary legatee commenced supplementary proceedings to reach the legacy. While these proceedings were pending, some ten months after the will was probated, and after testifying that he had a one-third interest in the residuary estate, the legatee filed a formal renunciation of his interest. In the proceeding by the executors for a final accounting, the Surrogate\u27s Court and the Appellate Division ruled that the renunciation was effective to divest the judgment debtor of his interest under the will. On appeal, held, reversed, two judges dissenting. In re Wilson\u27s Estate, 298 N.Y. 398, 83 N.E. (2d) 852 (1949)

CORPORATIONS-APPRAISAL STATUTES-EXCLUSIVENESS OF STATUTORY REMEDY

Defendant corporation\u27s charter provided for retirement \u27of preferred stock at par plus accumulated dividends, before payment could be made to common stockholders, in the event of dissolution or recapture of its assets by the enfranchising city. Under authority of a majority vote of its stockholders, the corporation conveyed all its assets to defendant City of Quincy, the enfranchising city. Defendants offered to pay preferred stockholders only $150 per share, although par plus accumulated dividends amounted to$205 and some common stockholders had already received $5 per share. Plaintiffs, preferred stockholders, sued to secure full payment, but the trial court held that their only remedy was assertion of the statutory right to appraisal and payment. On appeal, held, reversed. The statutory remedy is not exclusive when the distribution agreement is in fraud of stockholders\u27 rights. Opelka v. Quincy Memorial Bridge Co., (Ill. App. 1948) 82 N.E. (2d) 184

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-PUNISHMENT FOR DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT

Opposing counsel\u27s objection to material in petitioner\u27s opening statement to the jury was sustained. When petitioner rephrased his statement, the trial court, feeling that he was still trying to get inadmissible material before the jury, threatened to declare a mistrial if you mess with me two minutes and a half, and fine you besides.\u27\u27 Petitioner took an exception to the conduct of the court, and was immediately fined $25. His protests led to successive increases in penalty, culminating in a$100 fine and three days in jail. The Supreme Court of Texas denied habeas corpus on the ground that the evidence supported the judgment of the trial court. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Held, affirmed, four justices dissenting. Since the acts charged constituted direct contempt, petitioner was not deprived of his liberty without due process of law. Fisher v. Pace, (U.S. 1949) 69S.Ct.425

TAXATION--INCOME TAX-EFFECT OF LOSS CARRY--BACK ON DEFICIENCY ASSESSMENT INTEREST CHARGES

In 1943 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed deficiencies against respondent taxpayer in its 1941 income and excess profits taxes, adding interest from the date the tax was properly due to the assessment date. The taxpayer suffered a net operating loss in 1943 sufficient to abate completely all tax liability for 1941. When application for a refund of the amount paid and abatement of the deficiency was made, however, the commissioner deducted the interest assessed from the amount to be returned, claiming that the liability to pay interest on the deficiency was still outstanding. The district court held for the collector when the taxpayer brought suit for full refund, but was reversed by the court of appeals on the theory that if the taxpayer owed the government nothing, the interest on that debt was nothing. Held, reversed. Cancellation of the duty to pay a validly assessed deficiency does not cancel the duty to pay interest on such deficiency. Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box Co. of New Jersey, 338 U.S. 561, 70 S.Ct. 386 (1950)

BANKRUPTCY-THE NEW TEST OF PERFECTION UNDER SECTION 60A-EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 461

A preference given to a creditor by an insolvent debtor is not a fraud on his other creditors, regardless of the fact that such payment reduces the share that they would be able to obtain upon an orderly liquidation and pro rata distribution of his estate. This simple principle has caused great confusion and trouble in the development of collective procedures for the satisfaction of the claims of creditors. It led through various channels to a very sweeping definition of preferences and provision for their avoidance in the Chandler Act of 1938, and has now produced, by a process of reaction from that step, the enactment of Public Law 461, amending sections 60a and 70c of the Bankruptcy Act

WITNESSES--COMPETENCE OF DEFENDANT\u27S SPOUSE AS WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION

Defendant, on trial for the offense of transporting across state lines a sum of money exceeding $5,000 feloniously obtained by fraud, was convicted largely through the testimony of his victim. The fraud charged consisted of a lightning courtship and hasty marriage, closely followed by the disappearance of the new husband along with the entire estate of the too-gullible bride. Over the objection of the defendant, his wife was permitted to testify to the swindle practiced upon her. After conviction, he filed a motion for a new trial, contending that it was error to permit a wife to testify against her husband in a criminal prosecution where the essence of the offense charged was the felonious taking of her property. Held, the testimony was admissible in evidence, the common law rule being now outmoded in the light of reason and experience. United States v. Graham, (D.C. Mich. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 237

REGULATION OF BUSINESS-ANTITRUST LAW AS AFFECTED BY STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA V. UNITED STATES

In Standard Oil Company of California v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States has given what appears to be a final and definitive answer to this question, although differing from what had formerly been thought to be the final and definite answer. This comment will be centered on that case and its implications