Do CEOs Ever Lose? Fairness Perspective on the Allocation of Residuals Between CEOs and Shareholders

In this study we introduce a justice perspective to examining the result of bargaining between CEOs and boards over the allocation of firm residuals that ultimately determines CEO compensation. Framing CEO pay as the result of bargaining between CEOs and boards focuses attention on the power of CEOs to increase their share of firm residuals in the form of increased compensation, and the diligence of boards of directors to constrain CEO opportunism. Framing this negotiation through a theory of justice offers an alternative perspective to the search for pay-performance sensitivity. We predict and find that as board diligence in controlling opportunism declines and CEO power increases, CEOs are increasingly able to capture a larger portion of firm residuals relative to shareholders. This finding supports critics who charge that CEO pay violates norms of distributive and procedural justice

Entanglement under restricted operations: Analogy to mixed-state entanglement

We show that the classification of bi-partite pure entangled states when local quantum operations are restricted yields a structure that is analogous in many respects to that of mixed-state entanglement. Specifically, we develop this analogy by restricting operations through local superselection rules, and show that such exotic phenomena as bound entanglement and activation arise using pure states in this setting. This analogy aids in resolving several conceptual puzzles in the study of entanglement under restricted operations. In particular, we demonstrate that several types of quantum optical states that possess confusing entanglement properties are analogous to bound entangled states. Also, the classification of pure-state entanglement under restricted operations can be much simpler than for mixed-state entanglement. For instance, in the case of local Abelian superselection rules all questions concerning distillability can be resolved.Comment: 10 pages, 2 figures; published versio

Pooling quantum states obtained by indirect measurements

We consider the pooling of quantum states when Alice and Bob both have one part of a tripartite system and, on the basis of measurements on their respective parts, each infers a quantum state for the third part S. We denote the conditioned states which Alice and Bob assign to S by alpha and beta respectively, while the unconditioned state of S is rho. The state assigned by an overseer, who has all the data available to Alice and Bob, is omega. The pooler is told only alpha, beta, and rho. We show that for certain classes of tripartite states, this information is enough for her to reconstruct omega by the formula omega \propto alpha rho^{-1} beta. Specifically, we identify two classes of states for which this pooling formula works: (i) all pure states for which the rank of rho is equal to the product of the ranks of the states of Alice's and Bob's subsystems; (ii) all mixtures of tripartite product states that are mutually orthogonal on S.Comment: Corrected a mistake regarding the scope of our original result. This version to be published in Phys. Rev. A. 6 pages, 1 figur

08/10/1948 Letter from the Health and Welfare Department of Lewiston, Maine

Letter from Robert J. Wiseman, Jr., M. D., Health Officer with the Lewiston Health and Welfare Department, to Mrs. Carmen Vachon.https://digitalcommons.usm.maine.edu/fac-lpg-letters-1948-07-12/1013/thumbnail.jp

Dialogue Concerning Two Views on Quantum Coherence: Factist and Fictionist

A controversy that has arisen many times over in disparate contexts is whether quantum coherences between eigenstates of certain quantities are fact or fiction. We present a pedagogical introduction to the debate in the form of a hypothetical dialogue between proponents from each of the two camps: a factist and a fictionist. A resolution of the debate can be achieved, we argue, by recognizing that quantum states do not only contain information about the intrinsic properties of a system but about its extrinsic properties as well, that is, about its relation to other systems external to it. Specifically, the coherent quantum state of the factist is the appropriate description of the relation of the system to one reference frame, while the incoherent quantum state of the fictionist is the appropriate description of the relation of the system to another, uncorrelated, reference frame. The two views, we conclude, are alternative but equally valid paradigms of description.Comment: 14 pages, Contribution to the Int. J. of Quant. Info. issue dedicated to the memory of Asher Peres; v2 updated summary and critique of prior literatur

Linear stochastic wave-equations for continuously measured quantum systems

While the linearity of the Schr\"odinger equation and the superposition principle are fundamental to quantum mechanics, so are the backaction of measurements and the resulting nonlinearity. It is remarkable, therefore, that the wave-equation of systems in continuous interaction with some reservoir, which may be a measuring device, can be cast into a linear form, even after the degrees of freedom of the reservoir have been eliminated. The superposition principle still holds for the stochastic wave-function of the observed system, and exact analytical solutions are possible in sufficiently simple cases. We discuss here the coupling to Markovian reservoirs appropriate for homodyne, heterodyne, and photon counting measurements. For these we present a derivation of the linear stochastic wave-equation from first principles and analyze its physical content.Comment: 34 pages, Revte

Compensation framing and the risk-taking behavior of the CEO: testing the influence of alternative reference points

El artículo analiza como el modo en el que el Director General (DG) de la empresa cataloga su retribución afecta al riesgo que asume en sus decisiones, así como el papel mediador del riesgo soportado. El estudio hace uso de una muestra de 108 empresas estadounidenses que comenzaron a cotizar en el mercado de valores en los años 1993, 1994 y 1995. La información de una encuesta realizada a los DG de estas empresas se completó con información secundaria. Se estima un modelo de ecuaciones estructurales que toma en consideración el efecto mediador del riesgo soportado en la relación entre la catalogación de la retribución – riesgo asumido. Los análisis indican que mientras los objetivos de resultados incluidos en el contrato de retribución del DG afectan de manera indirecta al riesgo asumido a través de su influencia en el componente de riesgo percibido de empleo del riesgo soportado, el nivel retributivo en relación a otros ejecutivos no tiene ningún efecto. Muestra por tanto que no todos los puntos de referencia son igualmente relevantes a la hora de definir la propensión del DG a asumir riesgos, ni que todos los elementos del riesgo soportado juegan el mismo papel. El artículo extiende trabajos previos centrados en la modelización del riesgo asumido por los gestores. El artículo proporciona una guía para reflexionar acerca de las consecuencias sobre el comportamiento del nivel retributivo en el mercado de ejecutivos y de los objetivos de rendimiento que se incluyen en los contratos de retribución. El artículo propone y contrasta un modelo sobre cómo diferentes puntos de referencia empleados para catalogar la retribución influyen sobre el riesgo asumido por el DG. A su vez proporciona el primer test de una proposición central del Behavioral Agency Model: el riesgo soportado media parcialmente la influencia de la catalogación de la retribución en el riesgo asumido.This paper seeks to analyze how compensation framing influences the risk-taking behavior of the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO), and the mediating role played by risk bearing. The study employs a sample of 108 US firms that issued an initial public offering in 1993, 1994 and 1995. Data from a survey filled out by the CEO of the firm are completed with secondary information. A structural equation model is estimated which explicitly considers the mediating effect of risk bearing on the compensation framing-risk taking relationship. The analyses indicate that while the performance targets included in the CEO’s compensation contract indirectly influence the riskiness of the CEO’s strategic decisions through its influence on the employment risk component of executive risk bearing, the level of compensation relative to peers does not. It shows that not all reference points are equally relevant in determining the CEO’s willingness to take risk, nor do all the elements of risk bearing play the same role in that partial mediation. The paper provides a refinement of previous work on modelling the risk-taking behavior of managers. The paper provides a guideline to think about the behavioral consequences of the pay level in the market for executives and the performance targets included in the compensation contracts. The paper proposes and tests a model on how different reference points used to frame compensation influence CEO risk taking. It also provides the first test of a central proposition of the behavioral agency model: risk bearing partially mediates the influence of compensation framing on risk taking.Martin Larraza‐Kintana acknowledges financial support provided by the Spanish Ministry of Education (project ECO2010‐21393‐C04‐03)

N-Photon wave packets interacting with an arbitrary quantum system

We present a theoretical framework that describes a wave packet of light prepared in a state of definite photon number interacting with an arbitrary quantum system (e.g. a quantum harmonic oscillator or a multi-level atom). Within this framework we derive master equations for the system as well as for output field quantities such as quadratures and photon flux. These results are then generalized to wave packets with arbitrary spectral distribution functions. Finally, we obtain master equations and output field quantities for systems interacting with wave packets in multiple spatial and/or polarization modes.Comment: 20 pages, 8 figures. Published versio

The resource theory of quantum reference frames: manipulations and monotones

Every restriction on quantum operations defines a resource theory, determining how quantum states that cannot be prepared under the restriction may be manipulated and used to circumvent the restriction. A superselection rule is a restriction that arises through the lack of a classical reference frame and the states that circumvent it (the resource) are quantum reference frames. We consider the resource theories that arise from three types of superselection rule, associated respectively with lacking: (i) a phase reference, (ii) a frame for chirality, and (iii) a frame for spatial orientation. Focussing on pure unipartite quantum states (and in some cases restricting our attention even further to subsets of these), we explore single-copy and asymptotic manipulations. In particular, we identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a deterministic transformation between two resource states to be possible and, when these conditions are not met, the maximum probability with which the transformation can be achieved. We also determine when a particular transformation can be achieved reversibly in the limit of arbitrarily many copies and find the maximum rate of conversion. A comparison of the three resource theories demonstrates that the extent to which resources can be interconverted decreases as the strength of the restriction increases. Along the way, we introduce several measures of frameness and prove that these are monotonically nonincreasing under various classes of operations that are permitted by the superselection rule.Comment: 37 pages, 4 figures, Published Versio