Emerging Hepatitis E viruses from swine in Europe

Hepatitis E virus (HEV) is endemic in much of the developing world. Infections in humans can resulte of acute hepatitis and especially in pregnant women the infection may cause serious complications. The most important route of transmission is faecal-orally, and HEV disease outbreaks are often associated with contaminated drinking water or poor hygienic conditions

Public Health Threat of New, Reemerging, and Neglected Zoonoses in the Industrialized World

Microbiologic infections acquired from animals, known as zoonoses, pose a risk to public health. An estimated 60% of emerging human pathogens are zoonotic. Of these pathogens, >71% have wildlife origins. These pathogens can switch hosts by acquiring new genetic combinations that have altered pathogenic potential or by changes in behavior or socioeconomic, environmental, or ecologic characteristics of the hosts. We discuss causal factors that influence the dynamics associated with emergence or reemergence of zoonoses, particularly in the industrialized world, and highlight selected examples to provide a comprehensive view of their range and diversity

European Bat Lyssaviruses, the Netherlands

Genotype 5 lyssaviruses are endemic in the Netherlands, and can cause fatal infections in humans

Coverage and Representativeness of Passive Surveillance Components for Cattle and Swine in The Netherlands

Common aims of animal health surveillance systems are the timely detection of emerging diseases and health status monitoring. This study aimed to evaluate the coverage and representativeness of passive surveillance components for cattle and swine in the Netherlands from 2015–2019. The passive surveillance components consisted of a telephone helpdesk for veterinary advice and diagnostic and postmortem facilities. Spatial analysis showed heterogeneity (range in RR = 0.26–5.37) of participation across the Netherlands. Generalized linear mixed models showed that distance to the diagnostic facility and farm density were associated with the number of contacts of farmers with the helpdesk and postmortem examination. The contact rate of veterinary practices was associated with their number of clients, ranging in RR from 0.39 to 1.59. We concluded that the evaluation indicated differences in coverage of the passive surveillance components across regions, farms and veterinary practices. Due to the absence of emerging infections in the study period, we were unable to estimate the consequences of the observed differences for the early detection of disease. Nevertheless, regions and veterinary practices with low participation in passive surveillance might be a risk for early detection, and consequently, further understanding of the motivation to participate in passive surveillance components is needed

Detection of noroviruses in foods: a study on virus extraction procedures in foods implicated in outbreaks of human gastroenteritis.

Disease outbreaks in which foods are epidemiologically implicated as the common source are frequently reported. Noroviruses and enteric hepatitis A viruses are among the most prevalent causative agents of foodborne diseases. However, the detection of these viruses in foods other than shellfish is often time-consuming and unsuccessful. In this study, three virus concentration methods were compared: polyethylene glycol (PEG) plus NaCl, ultracentrifugation, and ultrafiltration. Two RNA extraction methods, TRIzol and RNeasy Mini Kit (Qiagen), were compared for detection of viruses in whipped cream and lettuce (as representatives of the dairy and vegetable-fruit food groups, respectively). A seeding experiment with canine calicivirus was conducted to determine the efficiency of each virus extraction procedure. The PEG-NaCl-TRIzol method was most efficient for the detection of viruses in whipped cream and the ultracentrifugation-RNeasy-Mini Kit procedure was best for detection on lettuce. Based on the seeding experiments, food items implicated in norovirus-associated gastroenteritis outbreaks were subjected to the optimal procedure for a specific composition and matrix. No noroviruses were detected in the implicated food items, possibly because the concentration of virus on the food item was too low or because of the presence of inhibitory factors. For each food group, a specific procedure is optimal. Inhibitory factors should be controlled in these procedures because they influence virus detection in food

VITAL, Monitoring and Control for Virus Safe Pork

VITAL is an ongoing (2008-2011) EU funded project on monitoring and control of food-borne viruses. The concept of VITAL is the integrated risk assessment and management of contamination of the European farm to market food chain by pathogenic viruses, such as norovirus and hepatitis E virus. The project’s focus is on the production and processing phase, moving away from the concept of endpoint monitoring towards input monitoring

Farm biosecurity measures to prevent hepatitis E virus infection in finishing pigs on endemically infected pig farms

Hepatitis E virus (HEV) can be transmitted from pigs to humans and cause liver inflammation. Pigs are a major reservoir of HEV and most slaughter pigs show evidence of infection by presence of antibodies (ELISA) or viral RNA (PCR). Reducing the number of HEV infected pigs at slaughter would likely reduce human exposure, yet how this can be achieved, is unknown. We aimed to identify and quantify the effect of biosecurity measures to deliver HEV negative batches of pigs to slaughter. A case-control study was performed with Dutch pig farms selected based on results of multiple slaughter batches. Case farms delivered at least one PCR and ELISA negative batch to slaughter (PCR−ELISA−), indicating absence of HEV infection, and control farms had the highest proportion of PCR and/or ELISA positive batches (PCR+ELISA+), indicating high within-farm transmission. Data about biosecurity and housing were collected via a questionnaire and an audit. Variables were selected by regularization (LASSO regression) and ranked, based the frequency of variable selection. The odds ratios (OR) for the relation between case-control status and the highest ranked variables were determined via grouped logistic regression. Thirty-five case farms, with 10 to 60% PCR−ELISA− batches, and 38 control farms with on average 40% PCR+ELISA+ batches, were included. Rubber and steel floor material in fattening pens had the highest ranking and increased the odds of a PCR−ELISA− batch by 5.87 (95%CI 3.03–11.6) and 7.13 (95%CI 3.05–16.9) respectively. Cleaning pig driving boards weekly (OR 1.99 (95%CI 1.07–3.80)), and fly control with predatory flies (OR 4.52 (95%CI 1.59–13.5)) were protective, whereas a long fattening period was a risk. This study shows that cleaning and cleanability of floors and fomites and adequate fly control are measures to consider for HEV control in infected farms. Yet, intervention studies are needed to confirm the robustness of these outcomes

The course of hepatitis E virus infection in pigs after contact-infection and intravenous inoculation

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Worldwide, hepatitis E virus (HEV) genotype 3 is observed in pigs and transmission to humans is implied. To be able to estimate public health risks from <it>e.g</it>. contact with pigs or consumption of pork products, the transmission routes and dynamics of infection should be identified. Hence, the course of HEV-infection in naturally infected pigs should be studied.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>To resemble natural transmission, 24 HEV-susceptible pigs were infected either by one-to-one exposure to intravenously inoculated pigs (C1-pigs; n = 10), by one-to-one exposure to contact-infected pigs (C2-pigs: n = 7; C3-pigs: n = 5) or due to an unknown non-intravenous infection route (one C2-pig and one C3-pig). The course of HEV-infection for contact-infected pigs was characterized by: faecal HEV RNA excretion that started at day 7 (95% confidence interval: 5–10) postexposure and lasted 23 (19–28) days; viremia that started after 13 (8–17) days of faecal HEV RNA excretion and lasted 11 (8–13) days; antibody development that was detected after 13 (10–16) days of faecal HEV RNA excretion. The time until onset of faecal HEV RNA excretion and onset of viremia was significantly shorter for <it>iv</it>-pigs compared to contact-infected pigs, whereas the duration of faecal HEV RNA excretion was significantly longer. At 28 days postinfection HEV RNA was detected less frequently in organs of contact-infected pigs compared to <it>iv</it>-pigs. For contact-infected pigs, HEV RNA was detected in 20 of 39 muscle samples that were proxies for pork at retail and in 4 of 7 urine samples.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>The course of infection differed between infection routes, suggesting that contact-infection could be a better model for natural transmission than <it>iv </it>inoculation. Urine and meat were identified as possible HEV-sources for pig-to-pig and pig-to-human HEV transmission.</p

Animal board invited review: Risks of zoonotic disease emergence at the interface of wildlife and livestock systems.

The ongoing coronavirus disease 19s pandemic has yet again demonstrated the importance of the human-animal interface in the emergence of zoonotic diseases, and in particular the role of wildlife and livestock species as potential hosts and virus reservoirs. As most diseases emerge out of the human-animal interface, a better understanding of the specific drivers and mechanisms involved is crucial to prepare for future disease outbreaks. Interactions between wildlife and livestock systems contribute to the emergence of zoonotic diseases, especially in the face of globalization, habitat fragmentation and destruction and climate change. As several groups of viruses and bacteria are more likely to emerge, we focus on pathogenic viruses of the Bunyavirales, Coronaviridae, Flaviviridae, Orthomyxoviridae, and Paramyxoviridae, as well as bacterial species including Mycobacterium sp., Brucella sp., Bacillus anthracis and Coxiella burnetii. Noteworthy, it was difficult to predict the drivers of disease emergence in the past, even for well-known pathogens. Thus, an improved surveillance in hotspot areas and the availability of fast, effective, and adaptable control measures would definitely contribute to preparedness. We here propose strategies to mitigate the risk of emergence and/or re-emergence of prioritized pathogens to prevent future epidemics