La imagen mostrada. La cancelación de la imagen en el mundo del arte

Museos y cuadros tienen una cosa en común: ¡unos y otros muestran cosas! Y lo más peculiar es que los museos pueden mostrar imágenes. De ese modo, tiene lugar un mostrar cosas que, a su vez, muestran algo ellas mismas. Tal peculiar situación lleva, a su vez, a lo que equivaldría a una “cancelación” (Aufhebung) de la obra pictórica; con el resultado de que el museo se convierte en la única ubicación institucional que permite al espectador, e incluso le insta, a contemplar la obra pictórica no como un símbolo real, sino más bien como un símbolo posible. El museo, pues, no muestra imágenes que muestren algo, sino que, en vez de ello, lo que muestra son imágenes que podrían mostrar algo si no se hallaran en un museo.Palabras clave: Imagen, mostrar, museo, exposición, presencia.Abstract:Museums and pictures have one thing in common: Both show something! And a special situation arises in that museums can show pictures. This leads to showing something which itself is showing something. This special situation leads to what amounts to a “sublation” (Aufhebung) of the picture with the result that the museum becomes the only institutionalized location allowing and even asking the viewer to see the picture not as a real symbol, but instead as a possible one. The museum does not show pictures that show something, but instead pictures that could show something if they wouldn't be in a museum.Keywords: Image, showing, museum, exhibition, presence.</p

The Philosopher's Medicine of the Mind: Kant's Account of Mental Illness and the Normativity of Thinking

Kant’s conception of mental illness is unlikely to satisfy contemporary readers. His classifications of mental illness are often fluid and ambiguous, and he seems to attribute to human beings at least some responsibility for preventing mental illness. In spite of these apparent disadvantages, I argue that Kant’s account of mental illness can be illuminating to his views about the normative dimensions of human cognition. In contrast to current understandings of mental illness, Kant’s account is what I refer to as “non-pathological.” That is, most mental illnesses are for Kant continuous with normally functioning cognition. Someone with a healthy reason can easily fall into mental illness and someone with mental illness can (perhaps not as easily) re-establish healthy reason. By accepting a non-pathological definition of mental illness, it follows for Kant that humans have more agency and responsibility regarding their mental health than current views allow, which explains why several of his writings aim to prescribe a “diet of the mind” (2:271). Contrary to popular readings of Kant as a champion of reason’s power, Kant’s conception of mental illness shows that he recognizes how fragile human reason can be

Critical appraisal of advance directives given by patients with fatal acute stroke: an observational cohort study

Background: Advance directives (AD) imply the promise of determining future medical treatment in case of decisional incapacity. However, clinical practice increasingly indicates that standardized ADs often fail to support patients’ autonomy. To date, little data are available about the quality and impact of ADs on end-of-life decisions for incapacitated acute stroke patients. Methods: We analyzed the ADs of patients with fatal stroke, focusing on: (a) their availability and type, (b) stated circumstances to which the AD should apply, and (c) stated wishes regarding specific treatment options. Results: Between 2011 and 2014, 143 patients died during their hospitalization on our stroke unit. Forty-two of them (29.4%) had a completed and signed, written AD, as reported by their family, but only 35 ADs (24.5%) were available. The circumstances in which the AD should apply were stated by 21/35 (60%) as a “terminal condition that will cause death within a relatively short time” or an ongoing “dying process.” A retrospective review found only 16 of 35 ADs (45.7%) described circumstances that, according to the medical file, could have been considered applicable by the treating physicians. A majority of patients objected to cardiopulmonary resuscitation (22/35, 62.9%), mechanical ventilation (19/35, 54.3%), and artificial nutrition (26/35, 74.3%), while almost all (33/35, 94.3%) directed that treatment for alleviation of pain or discomfort should be provided at all times even if it could hasten death. Conclusions: The prevalence of ADs among patients who die from acute stroke is still low. A major flaw of the ADs in our cohort was their attempt to determine single medical procedures without focusing on a precise description of applicable scenarios. Therefore, less than half of the ADs were considered applicable for severe acute stroke. These findings stress the need to foster educational programs for the general public about advance care planning to facilitate the processing of timely, comprehensive, and individualized end-of-life decision-making