Human factors of flight-deck checklists: The normal checklist

Although the aircraft checklist has long been regarded as the foundation of pilot standardization and cockpit safety, it has escaped the scrutiny of the human factors profession. The improper use, or the non-use, of the normal checklist by flight crews is often cited as the probable cause or at least a contributing factor to aircraft accidents. An attempt is made to analyze the normal checklist, its functions, format, design, length, usage, and the limitations of the humans who must interact with it. The development of the checklist from the certification of a new model to its delivery and use by the customer are discussed. The influence of the government, particularly the FAA Principle Operations Inspector, the manufacturer's philosophy, the airline's culture, and the end user, the pilot, influence the ultimate design and usage of this device. The effects of airline mergers and acquisitions on checklist usage and design are noted. In addition, the interaction between production pressures and checklist usage and checklist management are addressed. Finally, a list of design guidelines for normal checklists is provided

Flight-deck automation: Promises and problems

The state of the art in human factors in flight-deck automation is presented. A number of critical problem areas are identified and broad design guidelines are offered. Automation-related aircraft accidents and incidents are discussed as examples of human factors problems in automated flight

Death Penalty Research in Nebraska: How Do Judges and Juries Reach Penalty Decisions?

I. Introduction . . . . . 757 II. Aggravating Factors as Predictors of the Death Sentence Outcomes . . . . . 764 III. Number of Aggravating Factors, Mitigation, and Predicting Death Sentences . . . . . 768 IV. Socioeconomic Status of Victims and Sentence Outcomes . . . . . 772 V. Minorities Advancing to the Penalty Phase in Capital Cases . . . . . 773 VI. Conclusion . . . . . 77

Death Penalty Research in Nebraska: How Do Judges and Juries Reach Penalty Decisions?

I. Introduction . . . . . 757 II. Aggravating Factors as Predictors of the Death Sentence Outcomes . . . . . 764 III. Number of Aggravating Factors, Mitigation, and Predicting Death Sentences . . . . . 768 IV. Socioeconomic Status of Victims and Sentence Outcomes . . . . . 772 V. Minorities Advancing to the Penalty Phase in Capital Cases . . . . . 773 VI. Conclusion . . . . . 77

Human Factors of Flight-deck Automation: NASA/Industry Workshop

The scope of automation, the benefits of automation, and automation-induced problems were discussed at a workshop held to determine whether those functions previously performed manually on the flight deck of commercial aircraft should always be automated in view of various human factors. Issues which require research for resolution were identified. The research questions developed are presented

Human factors of the high technology cockpit

The rapid advance of cockpit automation in the last decade has outstripped the ability of the human factors profession to understand the changes in human functions required. High technology cockpits require less physical (observable) workload, but are highly demanding of cognitive functions such as planning, alternative selection, and monitoring. Furthermore, automation creates opportunity for new and more serious forms of human error, and many pilots are concerned about the possibility of complacency affecting their performance. On the positive side, the equipment works as advertized with high reliability, offering highly efficient, computer-based flight. These findings from the cockpit studies probably apply equally to other industries, such as nuclear power production, other modes of transportation, medicine, and manufacturing, all of which traditionally have looked to aviation for technological leadership. The challenge to the human factors profession is to aid designers, operators, and training departments in exploiting the positive side of automation, while seeking solutions to the negative side. Viewgraphs are given

Intervention strategies for the management of human error

This report examines the management of human error in the cockpit. The principles probably apply as well to other applications in the aviation realm (e.g. air traffic control, dispatch, weather, etc.) as well as other high-risk systems outside of aviation (e.g. shipping, high-technology medical procedures, military operations, nuclear power production). Management of human error is distinguished from error prevention. It is a more encompassing term, which includes not only the prevention of error, but also a means of disallowing an error, once made, from adversely affecting system output. Such techniques include: traditional human factors engineering, improvement of feedback and feedforward of information from system to crew, 'error-evident' displays which make erroneous input more obvious to the crew, trapping of errors within a system, goal-sharing between humans and machines (also called 'intent-driven' systems), paperwork management, and behaviorally based approaches, including procedures, standardization, checklist design, training, cockpit resource management, etc. Fifteen guidelines for the design and implementation of intervention strategies are included

Human factors in cockpit automation: A field study of flight crew transition

The factors which affected two groups of airline pilots in the transition from traditional airline cockpits to a highly automated version were studied. All pilots were highly experienced in traditional models of the McDonnell-Douglas DC-9 prior to their transition to the more automated DC-9-80. Specific features of the new aircraft, particularly the digital flight guidance system (DFGS) and other automatic features such as the autothrottle system (ATS), autobrake, and digital display were studied. Particular attention was paid to the first 200 hours of line flying experience in the new aircraft, and the difficulties that some pilots found in adapting to the new systems during this initial operating period. Efforts to prevent skill loss from automation, training methods, traditional human factors issues, and general views of the pilots toward cockpit automation are discussed

Human factors of advanced technology (glass cockpit) transport aircraft

A three-year study of airline crews at two U.S. airlines who were flying an advanced technology aircraft, the Boeing 757 is discussed. The opinions and experiences of these pilots as they view the advanced, automated features of this aircraft, and contrast them with previous models they have flown are discussed. Training for advanced automation; (2) cockpit errors and error reduction; (3) management of cockpit workload; and (4) general attitudes toward cockpit automation are emphasized. The limitations of the air traffic control (ATC) system on the ability to utilize the advanced features of the new aircraft are discussed. In general the pilots are enthusiastic about flying an advanced technology aircraft, but they express mixed feelings about the impact of automation on workload, crew errors, and ability to manage the flight