CBERN-NNK Knowledge Needs Research Summary:Report to the CBERN/Naskapi Steering Committee and the Naskapi Community

This report has been prepared for the Naskapi Steering Committee and the Naskapi community by Peter Siebenmorgen Research Assistantand Dr. Wesley Cragg, Project Director. The Canadian Business Ethics Research Network (CBERN) has been working in collaboration with the Naskapi Nation of Kawawachikamach (NNK) since early 2007. This relationship was initiated by former NNK Chief Phil Einish. The goal has been to ensure that the Naskapi people benefitted from mining on their traditional territories and avoided the negative impacts caused by previous mining activity by the Iron Ore Company of Canada. Working with Naskapi leadership, Dr. Cragg and Dr. Bradshaw developed a plan to identify community concerns and hopes for mining development on their traditional territory and provide access to the information and knowledge the community needed to address those concerns and hopes. The goal is to provide the community with the information it requires to benefit from development now taking place.The first step in the plan has now been completed. This report to the Naskapi community describes what the research team found.The second part of the plan is to improve access to information that will help the community address its concerns and realize its hopes for building a better and stronger future

Human Rights and Business Ethics: Fashioning a New Social Contract

The author speaks about the social contract which is a general understanding of respective responsibilities in complex societies and traces its impact from the Declaration of Independence to more recent times

Ethics and the Academy: Lessons from Business Ethics and the Private Sector

Most academics recognize that universities, as institutions, have an obligation to account rigorously for financial expenditures. There is less agreement about teaching and research wherein issues of autonomy and academic freedom enter the debate. Yet here too, demands for accountability are being pressed on the academy. In recent years, the demand for accountability also has been directed with considerable force to the private sector with what appear, in a number of cases, to be dramatic effects. Equally dramatic has been the extent to which the public debate and the response of the private sector to public criticism have linked issues of accountability to ethics. Of particular interest is the idea that accountability is not just a managerial, organizational or political concept. It is also a moral concept, a concept, furthermore, that is central to understanding the status and legitimacy of the modern corporation. My purpose in this paper is to explore this insight and to develop its relevance for understanding and responding to the crisis which contemporary university systems are currently experiencing. I do so not with the idea of persuading the reader that universities should be understood to be, or managed as though they were, private sector corporations. To the contrary, close study of the sort I propose should help to identify important similarities, but also key differences. Both are central to understand- ing what accountability requires for the contemporary university.La plupart des universitaires reconnaissent que les universités, en tant qu'institutions, ont l'obligation de rendre compte avec rigueur de leur gestion financière. En matière d'enseignement et de recherche, où les questions d'autonomie et de liberté universitaire entrent en jeu, l'accord est moin général. Pourtant là aussi, 1 responsabilité est exigée de l'Université. Au cours des années récentes, la responsabilité exigée instamment du secteur privé semble avoir eu, dans certains cas, des conséquences dramatiques. Le débat public, ainsi que la réaction du secteur privé face aux critiques du public, ont rapproché de façon tout aussi dramatique les questions de responsabilité à la morale. Il est particulièrement intéressant de constater que le concept de responsabilité ne se limite pas aux domaines de la gestion, de l'organisation ou de la politique. C'est également un concept de morale qui est indispensable pour comprendre le statut et la légitimité de la compagnie moderne. Dans cet exposé, j'ai l'intention d'explorer cette perspective et d'en justifier la valeur en vue de mieux comprendre et de répondre à la crise que subit actuellement le réseau universitaire contemporain. Il ne s'agit pas ici de persuader le lecteur que les universités devraient être considérées comme des compagnies du secteur privé. Bien au contraire, l'étude approfondie que j'en fais devrait permettre d'établir non seulement des ressemblances importantes, mais aussi des différences significatives. Tout comme les ressemblances, les différences sont essentielles pour comprendre ce que la notion de responsabilité exige de l'Université de nos jours

Facts and values

The thesis begins with a brief introduction in which I set out a number of the major questions which I intend to consider. I indicate that the focus for discussion will be functional words. Two questions regarding functional words are asked. First, do they have descriptive content? Second, do they have evaluative content? After a brief discussion, I attempt to set out the significance of these two questions. I point out that both are potentially significant relative to recent controversies over how description is related to evaluation. I indicate, however, that my chief concern will not be with the prescriptivist/naturalist controversy; rather, my chief concern will be with attempting to discover the role played by functional words in both descriptive and evaluative contexts The purpose of the discussion will be to discover whether an analysis of functional words can shed any light on the nature of the fact/value relationship. After raising a number of subsidiary questions, which, it is hoped, will aid the reader in following the argument, I introduce some terminology of which the notion of an F-word is central. A definition of 'F-word' is provided in Chapter II. The 'definition' with which the notion is introduced is simply that an F-word is any word which is like functional words in relevant respects. [page ii of abstract missing] In Chapter IV the discussion turns to a detailed examination of a suggestion of Hare in The Language of Morals. I find it necessary to reconstruct his suggestion and find it contains three elements. Of these three elements I argue that Hare is correct in thinking that in F-inferences, a standard of evaluation is introduced by the use of an F-word. I then argue that Hare is incorrect in thinking that, as in inferences from pure descriptions to hypothetical imperatives, the standard of evaluation in F-inferences is introduced via the conclusion of the inference. Finally, I argue that Hare is incorrect in his view that both hypothetical imperatives and F-conclusions are analytic qua their imperative or evaluative content. I then point out that F-conclusions and hypothetical imperatives; are dissimilcir in this important respect, namely, that unlike hypothetical imperatives, evaluations entailed by F-descriptions are genuine evaluations. Chapter V is a summary of the conclusions which follow from the arguments of the first part of the thesis. I conclude that F-words do have both descriptive and evaluative content. Further, that their descriptive and evaluative content derive from the same source, namely, the fact that F-words identify objects by reference to their function. Because of this, the descriptive content of F-words cannot be separated off from their evaluative content and expressed in descriptive sentences which have no evaluative content. In this sense, F-words and F-descriptions cannot be eliminated. The chapter closes by asking whether there is a second sense in which F-words cannot be eliminated. I ask, 'Are F-words such that to eliminate them from one's descriptive vocabulary is to eliminate the possibility of using descriptive language?' The over all purpose of Part II is to answer the question posed at the conclusion of Part I. I begin that task with a two chapter examination of the relation between perception and goal directed behavior. The basis of the argument is the proposition that if the ability to engage in goal directed behavior is a necessary condition of perception, then the purposes or goals which guide human conduct will be reflected in the ways we identify things. The discussion in Chapter VI and VII revolves around three questions: (i) is perception a necessary feature of goal directed behavior? (ii) is perception itself a form of goal directed behavior? (iii) is there a necessary relation between perception and agency such that it is logically necessary that perceivers are agents? The first two questions are discussed in Chapter VI, the third in Chapter VII. The first question finds a positive answer. A thing which is incapable of perception is incapable, as a consequence, of goal directed behavior. The second question is answered negatively. I point out, however, that perception does exhibit a number of characteristics whose possession suggests that perception has much in common with goal directed behavior. Chapter VII considers the question 'Is there a logically necessary relation between perception and agency such that only agents are capable of perception?'. I argue that: (i) it is logically necessary that something be an agent if it is to be determined that it is a percipient thing; (ii) only if a percipient thing is an agent can it be determined what it is capabl of perceiving; (iii) there is convincing empirical evidence which demonstrates that perceptual skills are acquired in the context of goal directed behavior and further that this does have an important bearing on what someone does in fact perceive; but (iv) the kinds of arguments which attempt to show that percipient things logically must be agents are unconvincing. The next two chapters turn to a discussion of the relation between description and goal directed behavior. I argue that the use of descriptive language for communication is possible only to agents. Descriptive uses of language can be taught only if it is possible to establish publicly what the words in the language mean. A number of arguments are used to show that this is a genuine problem and one which cannot be overcome by non-agents. From this it is seen to follow that for communication to be possible, at least some of the objects about which communication takes place must be identified as objects of manipulation. I argue that it follows from this that for descriptive language users, a fundamental and non-eliminable way of identifying objects is as objects of manipulation. Chapter IX is devoted to an attempt to develop and illustrate the conclusions of Chapter VIII through the use of a model. In the course of the discussion, I show that an object of manipulation is an F-object. Chapter X is the concluding chapter of Part II. I conclude that to communicate using descriptive language f an individual must be able to identify at least some of the F-objects which those with whom he wishes to communicate are able to identify. I suggest that this constitutes a second sense in which F-words are not eliminable. Chapter XI comprises Part III of the thesis. Its purpose is to sum up in a brief way the conclusions of the previous two parts. It also suggests in a highly speculative way some possible implications of the position arrived at in the course of previous argument.</p

Facts and values

The thesis begins with a brief introduction in which I set out a number of the major questions which I intend to consider. I indicate that the focus for discussion will be functional words. Two questions regarding functional words are asked. First, do they have descriptive content? Second, do they have evaluative content? After a brief discussion, I attempt to set out the significance of these two questions. I point out that both are potentially significant relative to recent controversies over how description is related to evaluation. I indicate, however, that my chief concern will not be with the prescriptivist/naturalist controversy; rather, my chief concern will be with attempting to discover the role played by functional words in both descriptive and evaluative contexts The purpose of the discussion will be to discover whether an analysis of functional words can shed any light on the nature of the fact/value relationship. After raising a number of subsidiary questions, which, it is hoped, will aid the reader in following the argument, I introduce some terminology of which the notion of an F-word is central. A definition of 'F-word' is provided in Chapter II. The 'definition' with which the notion is introduced is simply that an F-word is any word which is like functional words in relevant respects. [page ii of abstract missing] In Chapter IV the discussion turns to a detailed examination of a suggestion of Hare in The Language of Morals. I find it necessary to reconstruct his suggestion and find it contains three elements. Of these three elements I argue that Hare is correct in thinking that in F-inferences, a standard of evaluation is introduced by the use of an F-word. I then argue that Hare is incorrect in thinking that, as in inferences from pure descriptions to hypothetical imperatives, the standard of evaluation in F-inferences is introduced via the conclusion of the inference. Finally, I argue that Hare is incorrect in his view that both hypothetical imperatives and F-conclusions are analytic qua their imperative or evaluative content. I then point out that F-conclusions and hypothetical imperatives; are dissimilcir in this important respect, namely, that unlike hypothetical imperatives, evaluations entailed by F-descriptions are genuine evaluations. Chapter V is a summary of the conclusions which follow from the arguments of the first part of the thesis. I conclude that F-words do have both descriptive and evaluative content. Further, that their descriptive and evaluative content derive from the same source, namely, the fact that F-words identify objects by reference to their function. Because of this, the descriptive content of F-words cannot be separated off from their evaluative content and expressed in descriptive sentences which have no evaluative content. In this sense, F-words and F-descriptions cannot be eliminated. The chapter closes by asking whether there is a second sense in which F-words cannot be eliminated. I ask, 'Are F-words such that to eliminate them from one's descriptive vocabulary is to eliminate the possibility of using descriptive language?' The over all purpose of Part II is to answer the question posed at the conclusion of Part I. I begin that task with a two chapter examination of the relation between perception and goal directed behavior. The basis of the argument is the proposition that if the ability to engage in goal directed behavior is a necessary condition of perception, then the purposes or goals which guide human conduct will be reflected in the ways we identify things. The discussion in Chapter VI and VII revolves around three questions: (i) is perception a necessary feature of goal directed behavior? (ii) is perception itself a form of goal directed behavior? (iii) is there a necessary relation between perception and agency such that it is logically necessary that perceivers are agents? The first two questions are discussed in Chapter VI, the third in Chapter VII. The first question finds a positive answer. A thing which is incapable of perception is incapable, as a consequence, of goal directed behavior. The second question is answered negatively. I point out, however, that perception does exhibit a number of characteristics whose possession suggests that perception has much in common with goal directed behavior. Chapter VII considers the question 'Is there a logically necessary relation between perception and agency such that only agents are capable of perception?'. I argue that: (i) it is logically necessary that something be an agent if it is to be determined that it is a percipient thing; (ii) only if a percipient thing is an agent can it be determined what it is capabl of perceiving; (iii) there is convincing empirical evidence which demonstrates that perceptual skills are acquired in the context of goal directed behavior and further that this does have an important bearing on what someone does in fact perceive; but (iv) the kinds of arguments which attempt to show that percipient things logically must be agents are unconvincing. The next two chapters turn to a discussion of the relation between description and goal directed behavior. I argue that the use of descriptive language for communication is possible only to agents. Descriptive uses of language can be taught only if it is possible to establish publicly what the words in the language mean. A number of arguments are used to show that this is a genuine problem and one which cannot be overcome by non-agents. From this it is seen to follow that for communication to be possible, at least some of the objects about which communication takes place must be identified as objects of manipulation. I argue that it follows from this that for descriptive language users, a fundamental and non-eliminable way of identifying objects is as objects of manipulation. Chapter IX is devoted to an attempt to develop and illustrate the conclusions of Chapter VIII through the use of a model. In the course of the discussion, I show that an object of manipulation is an F-object. Chapter X is the concluding chapter of Part II. I conclude that to communicate using descriptive language f an individual must be able to identify at least some of the F-objects which those with whom he wishes to communicate are able to identify. I suggest that this constitutes a second sense in which F-words are not eliminable. Chapter XI comprises Part III of the thesis. Its purpose is to sum up in a brief way the conclusions of the previous two parts. It also suggests in a highly speculative way some possible implications of the position arrived at in the course of previous argument.</p

CBERN Newsletter Number 11

The purpose of this newsletter is to announce the move of CBERN's headquarters, upcoming events, discuss CBERN's completion of another SSHRC grant application, CBERN Advisory Board nominations, CBERN's new partnership with Ethipedia, launch of CBERN's social media presence, and Regional Hub updates

CBERN Newsletter Number 4

The purpose of this newsltter is to update Network developments. Maininly, the official launch of the CBERN website, a CBERN/SSHRC Strategic Knowledge Cluster Grant Application, and the tentative First Annual CBERN Conference

CBERN Newsletter Number 3

The purpose of this newsletter is to introduce the website for CBERN which is, as of the time of this newsletter, has a home page mock up ready to be viewed.Canadian Business Ethics Research Network (CBERN