Compulsory Arbitration - What Is It?

The identification of arbitration as it is constituted in legal lore is not very difficult. There is a near consensus of judicial utterances and statutory provisions posing it as a process for hearing and deciding controversies of economic consequence between parties. It begins with and depends upon an agreement between the parties to submit their claims to one or more persons chosen by them to serve as their arbitrator. The identification of compulsory arbitration is more difficult; it is more elusive. The instances or particulars of compulsion as covered by the name compulsory arbitration in legal lore, vary substantially. They are to be found in different statutes. The administration of these compulsions and the consequences of disregarding them also are variable. Joinder of any of these instances or particulars of compulsion with arbitration seems to serve no useful purpose in evaluating their legality. Some of them appear to be an anathema to parties in interest and to politicians. Other and different instances have been cited as praiseworthy. Arbitration does not count for much in resolving these likes and dislikes

Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration in Washington

A review of the case law and statutes of the state of Washington relating to arbitration points up several issues which are of importance to those who may become concerned with arbitrations in the state of either commercial or labor controversies. Some of these issues result from the views which were advanced by the supreme court relating to the arbitration statute of 1881. These issues are still open, although that statute was repealed by the present act, which was originally enacted in 1943. Other uncertainties inhere in the views which have been advanced by the court since the enactment of the present arbitration statute, and still others relate to the intent of the statute after the 1947 amendment of the first section. These matters of uncertainty are bound to plague any lawyer who is called upon to advise any client whether or not to enter upon any arbitration agreement or upon any arbitration. And in the case of employees (or their union) and employers who would agree upon grievance machinery and arbitration provisions in their collective agreements, there is question whether or not their agreement or any arbitrations or awards thereunder will be honored by the courts. These questions may be summarized as follows: 1. Does the present arbitration statute operate to exclude common law arbitration, or may the parties elect to arbitrate under the statute or at common law? 2. May employers and their employees (or their unions) qualify their agreements for grievance procedures and arbitration under the present statute? What are the consequences of their arbitration agreements and any arbitrations and awards thereunder

Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Action

Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration under the United States Arbitration Act The cases are remarkably in accord that, in the absence of enabling statute, an unincorporated association cannot sue or be sued in the common or association name. Like unanimity substantially obtains in the reason assigned for the general rule. The following excerpts are cited as typical: Since a partnership is not a person, either natural or artificial, it cannot sue as a party plaintiff in the firm name. Lister v. Vowell (1898) 122 Ala. 264, 267, 25 So. 564, 565. As we have said, the plaintiffs have undertaken to make three unincorporated labor unions parties defendant. That is an impossibility. There is no such entity known to the law as an unincorporated association, and consequently it cannot be made a party defendant. Pickett v. Walsh (1906) 192 Mass. 572, 589, 78 N. E. 753, 760. A voluntary association, being only a collection of individuals, could not, at common law, sue or be sued by its associated name. . . . .” Lewelling v. Woodworkers Underwriters (1919) 140 Ark. 124, 128, 215 S. W. 258, 259. There is no principle better settled than that an unincorporated association cannot, in absence of a statute authorizing it, be sued in its society or company name, but all the members must be made parties, since such bodies have, in the absence of statute, no legal entity distinct from their members. Baskins v. United Mine Workers (1921) 150 Ark. 398, 40l, 234 S. W. 464, 465

Arbitration under the New North Carolina Arbitration Statute -- The Uniform Arbitration Act

The arbitration statute which was enacted by the legislature of North Carolina at its last session is the Uniform Arbitration Act which was drafted by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and recommended to the legislatures of the several states for adoption. It has also been formally approved by the American Bar Association. It has been adopted in Nevada (1925), Utah (1927), Wyoming (1927) and North Carolina (1927). In most, if not all, important particulars this act differs from the arbitration statutes which have been recently enacted in other jurisdictions as follows: The United States Arbitration Act (1925), effective January 1, 1926, the New York Arbitration Law (1920), and the arbitration statutes of New Jersey (1923), Massachusetts (1925), Oregon (1925), Territory of Hawaii (1925), California (1927) and Pennsylvania (1927). Without intending to minimize the importance of the other particulars in which the Uniform Act departs from the arbitration statutes last cited, it is proposed to report first what appears to have been regarded by the Commissioners and by the American Bar Association as the most important matter of difference between the two classes of arbitration statutes. That matter of difference assumes the further importance that the American Bar Association expressly repudiated the position which it had taken on the question in connection with the United States Arbitration Act when it approved the Uniform Act

The Legal Status of the Red Cross

Red Cross is a term well known in the world at large; so is the heraldic emblem of the red cross on a white background. Many people in many lands use them to indicate and symbolize a variety of humanitarian purposes, principles and services. When the term is used as a proper name, generally it identifies an organization which is lawfully authorized to carry out those purposes and services under that name. Organizations by that name have been accorded exclusive authority to carry out the given humanitarian programs, exclusive authority to use the words, whether as a proper name or otherwise, and exclusive authority to use the emblem consisting of the red cross on the white ground. These delegations of exclusive authority and attending obligations derive from national legislation in the several countries and from international conventions to which nearly all of the governments of the civilized world are parties

Commercial Arbitration or Court Application of Common Law Rules of Marketing

Mr. Justice Holmes has referred to a noble instinct of scientific curiosity to understand why we maintain what now is. But, he adds, most even of the enlightened reformers that I hear or read seem to me . . . to become rhetorical just where I want figures. It is the purpose of this paper, first: to raise the question why, in the light of facts and figures, we have certain common law rules that affect the activity of marketing goods, and second: to ascertain to what extent these rules are, and may continue to be, what Professor Commons calls actual working rules in the business community