Corporate managers protect themselves at shareholders’expense with campaign spending to encourage states to passantitakeover legislation

Since the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United decision, which allowed corporations to make campaign contributions, much of the commentary on the ruling has centered on how it would affect election outcomes. But what has the impact been on policy outcomes? Timothy Werner argues that corporate managers will use the influence of their new spending ability to push for corporate governance laws that will protect their positions from competition. In new research which uses data from 38 states over 15 years, he finds that states are likely to pass one additional antitakeover law when corporate independent expenditures are allowed, and that this effect tends to occur when state legislators feel electorally vulnerable

Blacklisted Benefactors: The Political Contestation of Non-Market Strategy

This paper explores whether and how contentious stakeholders can disrupt a firm’s non-market strategy. We offer the first systematic study of the effect of public protest on corporate political activity, using a unique database that allows us to empirically analyze the impact of social movement boycotts on targeted firms’ campaign contributions. We show that boycotts lead to significant reductions in the amount of targets’ campaign contributions and increase the proportion of contributions that politicians refund. These results highlight the importance of considering how a firm’s socio-political environment shapes its non-market strategy. We supplement this primary analysis by drawing from social movement theory to extrapolate and test a number of mechanisms that moderate the extent to which movement challenges effectively disrupt corporate political activity

Use of Sedimentary Megasequences to Re-create Pre-Flood Geography

Knowledge of pre-Flood geography and the location of the Garden of Eden have eluded Bible-believing scientists and theologians. This study attempts to reconstruct the gross geography of the pre-Flood world by examining the detailed stratigraphy that was deposited during the Flood. Over 1500 stratigraphic columns were constructed across North and South America and Africa, recording the lithology and stratigraphy at each location. Sedimentary layers were examined using Sloss-type megasequences which allowed detailed analysis of the progression of the Flood in six discrete depositional segments. The three earliest megasequences, Sauk, Tippecanoe and Kaskaskia, were the most limited in areal coverage and volume and contain almost exclusively marine fossils, indicating a likely marine realm. The 4th megasequence (Absaroka) shows a dramatic increase in global coverage and volume and includes the first major plant and terrestrial animal fossils. The 5th megasequence (Zuni) appears to be the highest water point of the Flood (Day 150) as it exhibits the maximum global volume of sediment and the maximum areal coverage, compared to all earlier megasequences. The final megasequence (Tejas) exhibits fossils indicative of the highest upland areas of the pre-Flood world. Its rocks document a major shift in direction reflective of the receding water phase of the Flood. Results include the first, data-based, pre-Flood geography map for half of the world. By comparing the individual megasequences to the fossil record, patterns emerge that fit the concept of ecological zonation. The paper concludes with a new ecological zonation-megasequence model for Flood strata and the fossil record

Global Stratigraphy and the Fossil Record Validate a Flood Origin for the Geologic Column

The geologic column has been under the scrutiny of numerous creationists for many decades. Critics have claimed the column is intimately tied to the evolutionary worldview and deep time, and cannot be trusted or used by creation scientists. Other creation scientists have argued that the geologic column, although incomplete at most locations, can provide useful correlations of rocks and fossils across the globe. This paper examines the sedimentary rocks across three continents in an attempt to test the validity of the global geologic column. We attempted to assess the data primarily from a lithologic viewpoint, and as independent of the fossil data as possible. To accomplish this, we constructed a new data set of over 1500 local, stratigraphic columns across three continents, recording the detailed lithologic information and Sloss-type megasequence boundaries at each site. A detailed 3-D lithology model was created for each continent using the local columns. We also constructed maps of the basal lithology for each megasequence. Unique lithologic units, like salt and chert-rich layers were also tracked from column to column. Results show extensive lithologic units (i.e. blanket sandstones) covered portions of every continent and are correlative across vast regions and even continent to continent. The correlation of these stacked basal megasequence units, and other unique lithologies (i.e. salt and chert layers) within the megasequences, confirm the validity of the geologic column on a global scale. The observable pattern in the fossil record further confirms these findings. Indeed, a global Flood could produce globally extensive, stacked lithologic units on an intercontinental scale. Creationists should not be critical of the geologic column, but embrace it as evidence of a global Flood event

Corporate Political Power: The Politics of Reputation & Traceability

We live, it is said, in a second Gilded Age, in which politics is dominated by corporate power and elite business interests. But how does corporate money flow into politics? This Article provides an original empirical analysis of when and why corporations engage in particular forms of political activity and uses those findings to develop a novel, empirically-grounded approach to the First Amendment’s treatment of traceability mandates in politics. We analyze the conditions under which firms shift between (1) using their political action committees (PACs) to contribute to candidates and political parties, and (2) engaging in less traceable forms of political activity, like lobbying, in which the specific targets of firms’ influence efforts are unknown. This Article identifies a key variable that explains when and why corporations shift from lighter (more traceable and direct) to darker (less traceable and more indirect) channels of political engagement. We demonstrate that corporate political activity grows darker as a firm’s reputation grows more negative. This dynamic produces the disquieting result that the corporate political interventions that are likely to be the most controversial are also those most likely to be deployed in ways the public is least able to monitor. Our findings indicate that the traceability of money creates a concrete limit on the ability of corporate actors to influence politics—a limit which plausibly applies to political giving more broadly. Corporate donors who are seen as political liabilities find it increasingly difficult to locate politicians who will openly take their money or accept other support. Politicians refuse or return traceable donations from disreputable donors. Our research thus demonstrates that the power of business in politics is more conditional than generally appreciated. This Article uses these empirical findings to interrogate the relationship between traceability mandates in politics and theories of the First Amendment. While the Supreme Court has prominently struck down restrictions on money in politics in cases like Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, it has repeatedly upheld a variety of disclosure requirements. For a range of reasons, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, however, disclosure mandates are likely to become an increasingly important site of conflict in both policy and litigation, making it ever more important to assess and theorize the justifications for them. Our research suggests an empirically-grounded justification: traceability alters politicians’ behavior, causing them to act more consistently with public opinion. In other words, traceability mandates make politicians more accountable to the people. At the same time, there is evidence that traceability policies, and the reduction of darker corporate money in politics they produce, promote the public’s belief that their views shape the political system. Traceability mandates, in sort, advance both objective and subjective forms of democratic accountability. We thus argue that policies that advance the traceability of corporate money in politics not only further core First Amendment values but may be required by them. By identifying how and why corporate money flows into politics at a fine level of detail, this Article also provides important information that policy makers can use to craft campaign finance and lobbying reforms. Our empirical findings and theoretical analysis support policy changes that increase the traceability of corporate money in politics, including broader and more robust disclosure requirements for corporate lobbying and individual donations made by corporate executives and directors

BLACKLISTED BENEFACTORS: THE POLITICAL CONTESTATION OF NON-MARKET STRATEGY*

ABSTRACT This paper explores whether and how contentious stakeholders can disrupt a firm's non-market strategy. We offer the first systematic study of the effect of public protest on corporate political activity, using a unique database that allows us to empirically analyze the impact of social movement boycotts on targeted firms' campaign contributions. We show that boycotts lead to significant reductions in the amount of targets' campaign contributions and increase the proportion of contributions that politicians refund. These results highlight the importance of considering how a firm's socio-political environment shapes its non-market strategy. We supplement this primary analysis by drawing from social movement theory to extrapolate and test a number of mechanisms that moderate the extent to which movement challenges effectively disrupt corporate political activity. (Scott, 1987; The broader literature collectively refers to this tactical repertoire as a firm's non-market strategy. A particularly prolific stream of research in non-market strategy explores corporate political activity, or the pursuit of legislative and regulatory influence through tactics like campaign contributions and lobbying Despite this rich, interdisciplinary attention to corporate political activity, we continue to know little about how a company's reputation affects its ability to engage in political strategy and influence regulatory stakeholders. This theoretical gap is surprising given the intimate role that reputational concerns appear to play in the political process. After all, despite its ubiquity, corporate political activity is a contentious subject that draws widespread media coverage and public opprobrium, especially given steady declines since the 1970s in public approval of the role of business in American politics In this paper, we explore this possibility by employing organizational and social movement theory as a lens to understand the relationship between reputational threats and political activity. We propose that non-market strategy is politically contested, meaning that a firm's non-market strategy can be disrupted when contentious stakeholders question the legitimacy of a firm's practices, policies, or products. To test this general proposition, we offer Blacklisted Benefactors 4 the first systematic study of the effect of public protest on corporate political activity, using a unique database that allows us to empirically analyze the impact of social movement boycotts on targeted firms' campaign contributions through their affiliated political action committees (PACs). Results from our analyses confirm that boycotts lead to significant reductions in the amount of targets' campaign contributions. Moreover, we show that boycotts lead to a significant increase in the proportion of targeted firms' contributions that are refunded, thereby being effectively rejected by the politicians they seek to support. These results highlight the important role that the socio-political environment in which a firm is embedded plays in determining firms' freedom to strategically interact with their regulatory environment. We supplement this primary analysis by drawing from social movement theory to extrapolate and test a number of mechanisms that moderate the extent to which movement challenges disrupt corporate political activity. Background and Theory: Movements and the Disruption of Non-market Strateg

NESTING ECOLOGY OF THE NORTHERN BEARDLESSTYRANNULET (CAMPTOSTOMA IMBERBE) IN THE LOWER RIO GRANDE VALLEY OF TEXAS, U.S.A.

During 2002–2003, we studied the breeding ecology of the Northern Beardless-Tyrannulet (Camptostoma imberbe), a poorly known and rare permanent resident in the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas, United States of America. We found 28 nests in clusters of Spanish moss (Tillandsia usneoides) or ball moss (T. recurvata), 93% of which were in cedar elm (Ulmus crassifolia) trees. Nest-building, incubation, and nestling periods averaged 7.0, 14.0, and 18.5 days, respectively. Of the 28 nests, 43% were successful, while 38% of the failed nests showed obvious signs of depredation. Nests were located in areas with denser Tillandsia growth and with taller trees than nearby non-used areas. Availability of this habitat may limit the population size of Northern Beardless-Tyrannulets in the Lower Rio Grande Valley