Law and order in the '90s: why Blair and Schröder implemented very different policies

Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder were both elected in the late 1990s. But whereas Blair's government toughened law and order policies in the UK, the German Social Democrats did not follow suit. Georg Wenzelburger writes that the ministers involved, as well as the balance of power within each government go some way in explaining why

The policy advice that adjusting public finances by cutting welfare is the best way to proceed is far too simplistic

The argument that cutting social spending is an essential part of necessary fiscal adjustments is pervasive. That slashing welfare does not harm economic growth while tax hikes do is treated as received wisdom by many academics and policymakers. Georg Wenzelburger deconstructs the argument in favour of welfare cuts, writing that we need a much more nuanced understanding of the underlying mechanisms which distinguish successful from unsuccessful adjustments

The partisan politics of the penal–welfare nexus: a quantitative analysis of party influence on the relationship between penal and welfare policies

Evidence of a link between the retrenchment of the welfare state and the expansion of the penal state has sparked a debate about the existence of a nexus. In this study, we critically explore this link by focusing on political parties. First, we argue that welfare and penal policies are likely to follow distinct paths, with left-liberal/green parties pushing for less punitive penal and market-liberal/conservative parties for less generous welfare policy. Second, we only expect a nexus between both policy domains if conservative or “third way” social democratic governments are in power. The former follows a coherent ideology, the latter compensates for welfare retrenchment with tough-on-crime policies. We test these claims quantitatively on a unique dataset covering all changes to welfare and penal legislation in Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom and France between 1990 and 2014 and find our expectations supported except conservative influence on the penal–welfare nexus

Religion, religiosity and the attitudes towards homosexuality - A multi-level analysis of 79 countries

Although the attitudes towards homosexuality have become more liberal, particularly in industrialized Western countries, there is still a great deal of variance in terms of the worldwide levels of homonegativity. Using data from the two most recent waves of the World Values Survey (1999-2004, 2005-2009) this article seeks to explain this variance by means of a multi-level analysis of 79 countries. We include characteristics on the individual level, as age or gender, as well as aggregate variables linked to specificities of the nation-states. In particular, we focus on the religious denomination of a person and her religiosity in order to explain her attitude towards homosexuality. We find clear differences in levels of homonegativity among the followers of the individual religion

The liberal dream of smart detention? Algorithms and the politics of pretrial detention in the US states

In the 2000s and 2010s, US states have seen an important wave of change in criminal justice policies toward a “smart on crime” approach. In this context, several states have rolled out algorithmic risk assessment tools for statewide use in pretrial decisions, whereas some others have not, and still others are moving back from using such tools again. The present article examines the explanations for this variance. To this end, it tests competing expectations about the role of functional pressures, including fiscal strain and the party-political balance of power. The findings show that functional pressures, policy diffusion, and politics affect the likelihood that algorithmic tools will be used in criminal justice. Democratic control of both the state executive and legislative branches increases the likelihood that a state will use these tools, indicating that Republicans are reluctant to leave the “tough on crime” paradigm behind and to advance the “smart on crime” approach

Haushaltskonsolidierungen und Reformprozesse

In den 1990er Jahren haben sich die öffentlichen Finanzen der westlichen Industriestaaten unterschiedlich entwickelt. Während eine Ländergruppe die öffentlichen Finanzen konsolidierte, gelang dies einigen anderen Staaten nicht. Für die Erklärung dieser Variation wendet die vorliegende Arbeit ein dreistufiges Untersuchungsdesign an. Auf der ersten Analyseebene werden unterschiedliche fiskalpolitische Indikatoren mithilfe verschiedener statistischer Analyseverfahren quantitativ ausgewertet. Auch die inhaltliche Zusammensetzung der Konsolidierungen (Konsolidierungsprofile) wird untersucht. Auf der zweiten Ebene analysiert die Arbeit die Reformprozesse in vier ausgewählten Ländern - in drei Konsolidierungsländern (Schweden, Kanada und Belgien), sowie in einem Land, in dem die Sanierung der öffentlichen Finanzen scheiterte (Frankreich). In diesen vier Staaten wird zudem - auf der dritten Ebene - analysiert, mit welchen politischen Strategien die Haushaltskonsolidierungen umgesetzt wurden

Wege aus dem Defizit: eine Analyse der Determinanten der Konsolidierungspolitik in den OECD-Staaten

Die Entwicklung der öffentlichen Finanzen in den OECD-Ländern zeichnet sich in den vergangenen drei Jahrzenten durch eine starke temporale und zwischenstaatliche Varianz aus: Nicht allen Staaten aus der OECD-Ländergruppe gelang es, die öffentlichen Haushalte zumindest zwischenzeitlich zu konsolidieren; zudem schwankt die Konsolidierungsperformanz stark über die Zeit. Die vorliegende Studie verbindet politikwissenschaftliche und politökonomische Theorieansätze und untersucht mithilfe einer quantitativen Analyse die Gründe für diese Unterschiede in der Konsolidierungspolitik. Dabei erweisen sich der sozioökonomische Problemdruck, parteipolitische Differenz, institutionelle Faktoren, wie etwa die Zahl der Vetospieler oder der Grad der Steuerautonomie subnationaler Glieder, die Pfadabhängigkeit der Sozialversicherungssysteme und das Ausmaß der internationalen Verflechtung der Staaten als wichtige Determinanten der Konsolidierungsperformanz.The development of public finances in the western industrialized countries during the last three decades is characterized by a substantial temporal and crossnational variation. This paper aims at explaining this variation by means of a quantitative analysis. We combine different theoretical approaches which are rooted in economics and comparative public policy research to a theoretical framework that enables us to carve out the most important determinants of budget consolidations. The findings of our quantitative analysis indicate that the socio-economic problem load, party politics, institutions (as veto players or the degree of sub-national tax autonomy) as well as the integration of nation-states in the global economy and the importance of the insurance principle in the social security system influence the chances that public finances will be consolidated

Risky business? Welfare state reforms and government support in Britain and Denmark

Are welfare state reforms electorally dangerous for governments? Political scientists have only recently begun to study this seemingly simple question, and existing work still suffers from two shortcomings. First, it has never tested the reform–vote link with data on actual legislative decisions for enough points in time to allow robust statistical tests. Secondly, it has failed to take into account the many expansionary reforms that have occurred in recent decades. Expansions often happen in the same years as cutbacks. By focusing only on cutbacks, estimates of the effects of reforms on government popularity become biased. This article addresses both shortcomings. The results show that voters punish governments for cutbacks, but also reward them for expansions, making so-called compensation, a viable blame-avoidance strategy. The study also finds that the size of punishments and rewards is roughly the same, suggesting that voters’ well-documented negativity bias does not directly translate into electoral behavior