Sharing the climate policy burden in the EU

'Zu den am heftigsten umstrittenen Themenfeldern in der internationalen Klimapolitik zaehlt die Frage, wie die aus Klimaschutzmassnahmen resultierenden Lasten zu verteilen sind. Ein seltenes Beispiel fuer eine erfolgreiche und nachvollziehbare Aufteilung von Reduktionsverpflichtungen stellt das zwischen den EU-Staaten ausgehandelte Lastenverteilungsabkommen dar. Dieses wurde in zwei Stufen, im Maerz 1997 und im Fruehjahr 1998 erreicht. Waehrend das erste Abkommen im Vorfeld der internationalen Klimaverhandlungen von Kyoto zustande kam und einen nicht rechtsverbindlichen Charakter aufweist, wurde im zweiten, bindenden Abkommen das in Kyoto akzeptierte Gemeinschaftsziel zwischen den EU-Mitgliedsstaaten aufgeteilt. Dieser Beitrag analysiert die Faktoren, die eine Einigung innerhalb der EU ermoeglicht haben und das Verhandlungsergebnis beeinflussten. Aus der Analyse des Verhandlungsprozesses ergeben sich drei stilisierte Fakten: Staaten, die ein ehrgeiziges nationales Emissionsziel aufweisen, erhielten ein hohes Reduktionsziel in der ersten Verhandlungsrunde, konnten sich in der zweiten Runde aber signifikant verbessern. Das Land, das in der jeweiligen Verhandlungsrunde die Ratspraesidentschaft innehatte, wurde mit einem hoeheren Lastenanteil bestraft. Ueber Ausnahmeregelungen fuer bestimmte Sektoren konnten Widerstaende einflussreicher Gruppen gegen die geplante Verteilung gemildert werden. Diese Beobachtungen lassen sich anhand eines einfachen Verhandlungsspiels rationalisieren. Die Autoren zeigen, wie der Lastenanteil, den ein Land im Gleichgewicht traegt, von seinem nationalen Ziel, der Rueckfallposition anderer Laender sowie von der Frage, wer die Verhandlungen praesidiert, abhaengig ist.' (Autorenreferat)'The question of how to share the costs of the measures to be taken against global warming is one of the most controversial questions in the international climate policy debate, and is, as yet, unsettled. The burden sharing agreement (BSA) reached by EU member states is a rare example of a successful (regional) burden sharing scheme. The agreement was reached in two stages in March 1997 (pre-Kyoto) and in the Spring of 1998 (post-Kyoto). This paper analyses, from a political economy perspective, the factors which facilitated burden sharing within the EU and which determined the particular sharing rule adopted. Three 'stylised facts' emerge from the study. First, countries with high national targets, which were assigned relatively large shares in the pre-Kyoto BSA, had their shares reduced significantly in the post-Kyoto BSA. Second, the country presiding over the negotiations was assigned a disproportionate large share. Third, attempts were made to relax political constraints by singling out the abatement requirements of specific sectors. We propose a simple game-theoretical model to explain these facts. We show how the share of the total burden that a country has to shoulder in equilibrium depends on what national targets it adopts, the fall-back positions of the other countries, and on who chairs the negotiations.' (author's abstract)German title: Wie werden die aus der Klimaschutzpolitik resultierenden Belastungen in der EU verteilt?Available from http://www.hwwa.de/Publikationen/Discussion Paper/2002/176.pdf / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekSIGLEDEGerman

Defining investment additionality for CDM projects Practical approaches

'The environmental integrity of the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol depends an the possibility to avoid giving emission credits to projects that would have happened anyway. Whether and how 'Investment Additionality' of CDM projects has to be determined is currently part of climate negotiations. The authors discuss the rationale of companies to invest in projects and analyse possible criteria to determine Investment Additionality from a theoretical point of view. A number of case studies is used to show the implications of the different criteria. The use of a single criterion is not possible, especially due to the importance of non-monetary barriers. However, some criteria are better than others. Moreover, the institutional framework for the selection and application of criteria is very important. Concluding, the authors suggest a combination of a threshold Internal Rate of Return with a risk factor as primary criterion. To take non-monetary barriers into account, additional criteria could be used such as the existence of similar privately financed projects in the host country. If no explicit criterion is politically feasible, stringent baseline methodologies could at least capture some aspects of Investment Additionality.' (author's abstract)'Die umweltpolitische Integritaet des im Kyoto-Protokoll verankerten CDM haengt davon ab, ob Projekte, die ohnehin stattgefunden haetten, Emissionsgutschriften erhalten koennen. Ob und wie die 'Zusaetzlichkeit der Investition' nachgewiesen werden muss, ist derzeit Bestandteil der Klimaverhandlungen. Die Autoren diskutieren die Entscheidungsgruende, die Firmen zu Investitionen in Projekte bewegen und analysieren moegliche Kriterien fuer die Bestimmung der Zusaetzlichkeit aus einer theoretischen Perspektive. Darueber hinaus werden Fallstudien zur Untersuchung der Auswirkungen der verschiedenen Kriterien herangezogen. Sie zeigen, dass die generelle Beschraenkung auf ein einzelnes Kriterium nicht moeglich ist. Jedoch sind einige Kriterien besser als andere. Ausserdem sind die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen fuer die Auswahl und Anwendung der Kriterien sehr wichtig. Zusammenfassend befuerworten die Autoren die Kombination eines Schwellenwerts fuer die interne Ertragsrate mit einem Risikofaktor. Um nicht-monetaere Hindernisse zu beruecksichtigen, koennen zusaetzliche Kriterien wie die Existenz von aehnlichen, privat finanzierten Projekten im Gastland ueberprueft werden. Wenn kein derartiges Kriterium politisch durchsetzbar ist, koennen strenge Regeln fuer die Referenzfallbestimmung zumindest einige Aspekte der Zusaetzlichkeit einfangen.' (Autorenreferat)German title: Die Definition von Investitionen zusaetzlich zu CDM-Projekten: praktische AnsaetzeSIGLEAvailable from UuStB Koeln(38)-20000106598 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

Re-directed T cells for the treatment of fibroblast activation protein (FAP)-positive malignant pleural mesothelioma (FAPME-1)

ABSTRACT: BACKGROUND: Asbestos is the main cause of MPM in industrialized countries. Even since asbestos is banned in most developed countries, the peak wave of MPM incidence is anticipated for the next years due to the long latency of asbestos induced MPM. MPM patients not eligible for surgical procedures like decortication or pleuro-pneumectomie have a median survival of 12 months with palliative chemotherapy. Therefore, new therapeutic approaches are of crucial need in this clinical situation. METHODS: This is a phase I trial for patients with malignant pleural mesothelioma with pleural effusion testing the safety of a fixed single dose of 1x106 adoptively transferred FAP-specific re-directed T cells given directly in the pleural effusion. Lymphocytes will be taken 21 days before transfer from peripheral blood. CD8 positive T cells will be isolated and re-programmed by retroviral transfer of a chimeric antigen receptor recognizing FAP which serves as target structure in MPM. At day 0 of the protocol, re-directed T cells will be injected in the pleural effusion and patients will be monitored for 48h under intermediate care conditions. AE, SAE, SADR and SUSAR will be monitored for 35 days and evaluated by an independent safety board to define any dose limiting toxicity (DLT). No further patient can be treated before the previous patient passed day 14 after T cell transfer. The protocol will be judged as save when no DLT occurred in the first 3 patients, or 1 DLT in 6 patients. Secondary objectives are feasibility and immune monitoring. DISCUSSION: Adoptive T cell transfer is a new and rapidly expanding branch of immunotherapies focusing on cancer treatment. Recently, objective responses could be observed in patients with chronic lymphatic leukemia treated with adoptively transferred CD19-specific re-directed T cells. The choice of the target antigen determines the possible on-target off-tissue toxicity of such approaches. There are reports of severe toxicity in patients who received T cells intravenously due to unexpected expression of the target antigen (on-target) in other tissues than the tumor (off-tissue). To minimize the risk of on-target off-tissue toxicity and to maximize the on-target anti-tumor effect we propose a clinical protocol with loco-regional administration of re-directed T cells. FAP-specific T cells will be directly injected in the pleural effusion of patients with MPM.Trial registration: ClinicalTrials.gov (NCT01722149)

Reluctant powers : a concept-building approach and an application to the case of Germany

Reluctance is an extremely widespread phenomenon in international politics. For example, several rising powers have displayed an inconsistent, flip-flopping approach towards their regions and have not conformed to the expectations and wishes of their potential regional followers. While the notion of reluctance is frequently employed to describe this type of incoherent and unresponsive foreign policy, the concept of reluctance has not been systematically defined and discussed in the fields of International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis. This paper develops a conceptualization of reluctance by identifying the concept’s semantic field and discussing how reluctance relates to similar but distinct notions in the field of IR (concept reconstruction) and, on that basis, by outlining the constitutive dimensions of reluctance and their operationalization (concept building). To illustrate how this conceptualization of reluctance can provide new insights in empirical analyses, the concept is applied to the case of Germany’s approach to crisis management in Europe and the European neighborhood