Quasidegeneracy of Majorana Neutrinos and the Origin of Large Leptonic Mixing

We propose that the observed large leptonic mixing may just reflect a quasidegeneracy of three Majorana neutrinos. The limit of exact degeneracy of Majorana neutrinos is not trivial, as leptonic mixing and even CP violation may occur. We conjecture that the smallness of $|U_{13}|$, when compared to the other elements of $U_{PMNS}$, may just reflect the fact that, in the limit of exact mass degeneracy, the leptonic mixing matrix necessarily has a vanishing element. We show that the lifting of the mass degeneracy can lead to the measured value of $|U_{13}|$ while at the same time accommodating the observed solar and atmospheric mixing angles. In the scenario we consider for the breaking of the mass degeneracy there is only one CP violating phase, already present in the limit of exact degeneracy, which upon the lifting of the degeneracy generates both Majorana and Dirac-type CP violation in the leptonic sector. We analyse some of the correlations among physical observables and point out that in most of the cases considered, the implied strength of leptonic Dirac-type CP violation is large enough to be detected in the next round of experiments.Comment: 16 pages, 4 figures. Matches published version, references added, improved discussion, results unchange

Crowdsourcing Linked Data on listening experiences through reuse and enhancement of library data

Research has approached the practice of musical reception in a multitude of ways, such as the analysis of professional critique, sales figures and psychological processes activated by the act of listening. Studies in the Humanities, on the other hand, have been hindered by the lack of structured evidence of actual experiences of listening as reported by the listeners themselves, a concern that was voiced since the early Web era. It was however assumed that such evidence existed, albeit in pure textual form, but could not be leveraged until it was digitised and aggregated. The Listening Experience Database (LED) responds to this research need by providing a centralised hub for evidence of listening in the literature. Not only does LED support search and reuse across nearly 10,000 records, but it also provides machine-readable structured data of the knowledge around the contexts of listening. To take advantage of the mass of formal knowledge that already exists on the Web concerning these contexts, the entire framework adopts Linked Data principles and technologies. This also allows LED to directly reuse open data from the British Library for the source documentation that is already published. Reused data are re-published as open data with enhancements obtained by expanding over the model of the original data, such as the partitioning of published books and collections into individual stand-alone documents. The database was populated through crowdsourcing and seamlessly incorporates data reuse from the very early data entry phases. As the sources of the evidence often contain vague, fragmentary of uncertain information, facilities were put in place to generate structured data out of such fuzziness. Alongside elaborating on these functionalities, this article provides insights into the most recent features of the latest instalment of the dataset and portal, such as the interlinking with the MusicBrainz database, the relaxation of geographical input constraints through text mining, and the plotting of key locations in an interactive geographical browser

Security of the Bennett 1992 quantum-key distribution against individual attack over a realistic channel

The security of two-state quantum key distribution against individual attack is estimated when the channel has losses and noises. We assume that Alice and Bob use two nonorthogonal single-photon polarization states. To make our analysis simple, we propose a modified B92 protocol in which Alice and Bob make use of inconclusive results and Bob performs a kind of symmetrization of received states. Using this protocol, Alice and Bob can estimate Eve's information gain as a function of a few parameters which reflect the imperfections of devices or Eve's disturbance. In some parameter regions, Eve's maximum information gain shows counter-intuitive behavior, namely, it decreases as the amount of disturbances increases. For a small noise rate Eve can extract perfect information in the case where the angle between Alice's two states is small or large, while she cannot extract perfect information for intermediate angles. We also estimate the secret key gain which is the net growth of the secret key per one pulse. We show the region where the modified B92 protocol over a realistic channel is secure against individual attack.Comment: 16 pages, 15 figure

Attacks on quantum key distribution protocols that employ non-ITS authentication

We demonstrate how adversaries with unbounded computing resources can break Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols which employ a particular message authentication code suggested previously. This authentication code, featuring low key consumption, is not Information-Theoretically Secure (ITS) since for each message the eavesdropper has intercepted she is able to send a different message from a set of messages that she can calculate by finding collisions of a cryptographic hash function. However, when this authentication code was introduced it was shown to prevent straightforward Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks against QKD protocols. In this paper, we prove that the set of messages that collide with any given message under this authentication code contains with high probability a message that has small Hamming distance to any other given message. Based on this fact we present extended MITM attacks against different versions of BB84 QKD protocols using the addressed authentication code; for three protocols we describe every single action taken by the adversary. For all protocols the adversary can obtain complete knowledge of the key, and for most protocols her success probability in doing so approaches unity. Since the attacks work against all authentication methods which allow to calculate colliding messages, the underlying building blocks of the presented attacks expose the potential pitfalls arising as a consequence of non-ITS authentication in QKD-postprocessing. We propose countermeasures, increasing the eavesdroppers demand for computational power, and also prove necessary and sufficient conditions for upgrading the discussed authentication code to the ITS level.Comment: 34 page