'Dressage Is Full of Queens!' Masculinity, Sexuality and Equestrian Sport

Attitudes towards sexuality are changing and levels of cultural homophobia decreasing, yet there remain very few openly gay men within sport. As a proving ground for heteromasculinity, sport has traditionally been a hostile environment for gay men. This article is based on an ethnographic study within a sporting subworld in which gay men do appear to be accepted: equestrian sport. Drawing on inclusive masculinity theory, equestrian sport is shown to offer an unusually tolerant environment for gay men in which heterosexual men of all ages demonstrate low levels of homophobia. Inclusive masculinity theory is a useful framework for exploring the changing nature of masculinities and this study demonstrates that gay men are becoming increasingly visible and accepted within once unreceptive locales, such as sport and rural communities. However, this more tolerant attitude is purchased at the expense of a subordinated feminine Other, perpetuating the dominance of men within competitive sport. © The Author(s) 2012

Epistemic Schmagency?

Constructivist approaches in epistemology and ethics offer a promising account of normativity. But constructivism faces a powerful Schmagency Objection, raised by David Enoch. While Enoch’s objection has been widely discussed in the context of practical norms, no one has yet explored how the Schmagency Objection might undermine epistemic constructivism. In this paper, I rectify that gap. First, I develop the objection against a prominent form of epistemic constructivism, Belief Constitutivism. Belief Constitutivism is susceptible to a Schmagency Objection, I argue, because it locates the source of normativity in the belief rather than the agent. In the final section, I propose a version of epistemic constructivism that locates epistemic normativity as constitutive of agency. I argue that this version has the resources to respond to the Schmagency Objection

Intestinal Dysbiosis and the Developing Lung: The Role of Toll-Like Receptor 4 in the Gut-Lung Axis.

BackgroundIn extremely premature infants, postnatal growth restriction (PNGR) is common and increases the risk of developing bronchopulmonary dysplasia (BPD) and pulmonary hypertension (PH). Mechanisms by which poor nutrition impacts lung development are unknown, but alterations in the gut microbiota appear to play a role. In a rodent model, PNGR plus hyperoxia causes BPD and PH and increases intestinal Enterobacteriaceae, Gram-negative organisms that stimulate Toll-like receptor 4 (TLR4). We hypothesized that intestinal dysbiosis activates intestinal TLR4 triggering systemic inflammation which impacts lung development.MethodsRat pups were assigned to litters of 17 (PNGR) or 10 (normal growth) at birth and exposed to room air or 75% oxygen for 14 days. Half of the pups were treated with the TLR4 inhibitor TAK-242 from birth or beginning at day 3. After 14 days, pulmonary arterial pressure was evaluated by echocardiography and hearts were examined for right ventricular hypertrophy (RVH). Lungs and serum samples were analyzed by western blotting and immunohistochemistry.ResultsPostnatal growth restriction + hyperoxia increased pulmonary arterial pressure and RVH with trends toward increased plasma IL1β and decreased IκBα, the inhibitor of NFκB, in lung tissue. Treatment with the TLR4 inhibitor attenuated PH and inflammation.ConclusionPostnatal growth restriction induces an increase in intestinal Enterobacteriaceae leading to PH. Activation of the TLR4 pathway is a promising mechanism by which intestinal dysbiosis impacts the developing lung

Rational Moral Ignorance

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView

Rationality as the Rule of Reason

The demands of rationality are linked both to our subjective normative perspective (given that rationality is a person-level concept) and to objective reasons or favoring relations (given that rationality is non-contingently authoritative for us). In this paper, I propose a new way of reconciling the tension between these two aspects: roughly, what rationality requires of us is having the attitudes that correspond to our take on reasons in the light of our evidence, but only if it is competent. I show how this view can account for structural rationality on the assumption that intentions and beliefs as such involve competent perceptions of downstream reasons, and explore various implications of the account

Normative Alethic Pluralism

Some philosophers have argued that truth is a norm of judgement and have provided a variety of formulations of this general thesis. In this paper, I shall side with these philosophers and assume that truth is a norm of judgement. What I am primarily interested in here are two core questions concerning the judgement-truth norm: (i) what are the normative relationships between truth and judgement? And (ii) do these relationships vary or are they constant? I argue for a pluralist picture—what I call Normative Alethic Pluralism (NAP)—according to which (i) there is more than one correct judgement-truth norm and (ii) the normative relationships between truth and judgement vary in relation to the subject matter of the judgement. By means of a comparative analysis of disagreement in three areas of the evaluative domain—refined aesthetics, basic taste and morality—I show that there is an important variability in the normative significance of disagreement—I call this the variability conjecture. By presenting a variation of Lynch’s scope problem for alethic monism, I argue that a monistic approach to the normative function of truth is unable to vindicate the conjecture. I then argue that normative alethic pluralism provides us with a promising model to account for it

"The Bayesian Objection" - Ch 4 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification

In this chapter I analyse an objection to phenomenal conservatism to the effect that phenomenal conservatism is unacceptable because it is incompatible with Bayesianism. I consider a few responses to it and dismiss them as misled or problematic. Then, I argue that this objection doesn’t go through because it rests on an implausible formalization of the notion of seeming-based justification. In the final part of the chapter, I investigate how seeming-based justification and justification based on one’s reflective belief that one has a seeming interact with one another

Philosophy of Hope

The philosophy of hope centers on two interlocking sets of questions. The first concerns the nature of hope. Specific questions here include how to analyze hope, how hope motivates us, and whether there is only one type of hope. The second set concerns the value of hope. Key questions here include whether and when it is good to hope and whether there is a virtue of hope. Philosophers of hope tend to proceed from the first set of questions to the second. This is a natural approach, for one might expect that you must develop a basic understanding of what hope is before you can determine its value. The structure of this chapter thus follows this approach. But readers should not be misled: there is in fact a good deal of feedback between the two sets of questions. A theory of hope is more plausible to the extent that it fits well with plausible ideas about the value of hope. So the movement from hope’s nature to its value is one of emphasis rather than a strict, step-wise process