494 research outputs found
Character, global and local
Philosophers have recently argued that we should revise our understanding of character. An
individual’s behaviour is governed not by a set of ‘global’ traits, each elicited by a certain kind of situational
feature, but by a much larger array of ‘local’ traits, each elicited by a certain combination of situational features.
The data cited by these philosophers supports their theory only if we conceive of traits purely in terms of
stimulus and response, rather than in the more traditional terms of inner mental items such as inclinations. We
should not adopt the former conception, since doing so would impede pursuit of the ethical aims for which we
need a theory of character, whereas retaining the latter conception will facilitate this pursuit. So we should not
revise our understanding of character in this way
Instilling virtue
Two debates in contemporary philosophical moral psychology have so far been conducted almost entirely in isolation from one another despite their structural similarity. One is the debate over the importance for virtue ethics of the results of situational manipulation experiments in social psychology. The other is the debate over the ethical implications of experiments that reveal gender and race biases in social cognition. In both cases, the ethical problem posed cannot be identified without first clarifying the cognitive structures underlying the problematic phenomena. In this chapter, I argue that the two kinds of phenomena share a basic cognitive structure, which is well articulated by the findings of the empirical psychology of attitudes, especially if these findings are understood in the context of the cognitive-affective system theory of personality. On the basis of this joint construal of situationism and implicit bias, I argue that the negative programme of ethical improvement that many philosophers recommend in response to one or other problem is unrealistic. Instead, we should consider more seriously the prospects of the positive programme of ethical improvement recommended by Aristotle, the direct aim of which is to instil deeply in ourselves the values at the heart of each of the virtues
Knowing one's own desires
Do you know your own desires in some way that other people cannot know them? Richard Moran claims that his influential theory of first-person authority over beliefs and intentions can also cover desires. However, his deliberative model can apply to desire only if one already has some other way of knowing one’s own desires. Jean-Paul Sartre’s conception of pure reflection, on the other hand, portrays a direct epistemic access to one’s own desires that can ground fundamental first-person authority over desires and intentions
Habituation and first-person authority
Richard Moran’s theory of first-person authority as the agential authority to make up one’s own mind rests on a form of mind-body dualism that does not allow for habituation as part of normal psychological functioning. We have good intuitive and empirical reason to accept that habituation is central to the normal functioning of desire. There is some empirical support for the idea that habituation plays a parallel role in belief. In particular, at least one form of implicit bias seems better understood as a case of habituated belief than as a mere association or an example of what Tamar Gendler calls ‘alief’. If there is to be genuine first-person epistemic authority over persisting mental states, therefore, an alternative account to Moran’s is required in the case of desire and perhaps in the case of belief. More generally, the neglect of habituation in recent philosophy of mind is a symptom of the need for philosophers to take the temporal structure of rational agency more seriously
Randomly sparsified Richardson iteration is really fast
Recently, a class of algorithms combining classical fixed point iterations
with repeated random sparsification of approximate solution vectors has been
successfully applied to eigenproblems with matrices as large as . So far, a complete mathematical explanation for their success
has proven elusive. Additionally, the methods have not been extended to linear
system solves.
In this paper we propose a new scheme based on repeated random sparsification
that is capable of solving linear systems in extremely high dimensions. We
provide a complete mathematical analysis of this new algorithm. Our analysis
establishes a faster-than-Monte Carlo convergence rate and justifies use of the
scheme even when the solution vector itself is too large to store.Comment: 27 pages, 2 figure
Knowing one's own desires
Do you know your own desires in some way that other people cannot know them? Richard Moran claims that his influential theory of first-person authority over beliefs and intentions can also cover desires. However, his deliberative model can apply to desire only if one already has some other way of knowing one’s own desires. Jean-Paul Sartre’s conception of pure reflection, on the other hand, portrays a direct epistemic access to one’s own desires that can ground fundamental first-person authority over desires and intentions
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