Philosophers have recently argued that we should revise our understanding of character. An

individual’s behaviour is governed not by a set of ‘global’ traits, each elicited by a certain kind of situational

feature, but by a much larger array of ‘local’ traits, each elicited by a certain combination of situational features.

The data cited by these philosophers supports their theory only if we conceive of traits purely in terms of

stimulus and response, rather than in the more traditional terms of inner mental items such as inclinations. We

should not adopt the former conception, since doing so would impede pursuit of the ethical aims for which we

need a theory of character, whereas retaining the latter conception will facilitate this pursuit. So we should not

revise our understanding of character in this way

Goldie

JONATHAN WEBBER

Merritt

English

Philosophers have recently argued that we should revise our understanding of character. An individual's behaviour is governed not by a set of ‘global’ traits, each elicited by a certain kind of situational feature, they argue, but by a much larger array of ‘local’ traits, each elicited by a certain combination of situational features. But the data cited by these philosophers support their theory only if we conceive of traits purely in terms of stimulus and response, rather than in the more traditional terms of inner mental items such as inclinations. We should not adopt the former conception, moreover, since doing so would impede pursuit of the ethical aims for which we need a theory of character, whereas retaining the latter conception will facilitate this pursuit. So we should not revise our understanding of character in the way proposed

Webber, Jonathan

Online Research @ Cardiff

Character, global and local

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Character, Global and Local

Webber, J.

White Rose Research Online

This is a repository copy of Character, global and local.White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/1214/Article:Webber, J. (2007) Character, global and local. Utilitas, 19 (4). pp. 430-434. ISSN 1741-6183 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820807002725eprints@whiterose.ac.ukhttps://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/Reuse Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. CHARACTER, GLOBAL AND LOCALJonathan Webberforthcoming in Utilitas (2006 or 2007) – please cite publicationAbstract: Philosophers have recently argued that we should revise our understanding of character. Anindividual’s behaviour is governed not by a set of ‘global’ traits, each elicited by a certain kind of situationalfeature, but by a much larger array of ‘local’ traits, each elicited by a certain combination of situational features.The data cited by these philosophers supports their theory only if we conceive of traits purely in terms ofstimulus and response, rather than in the more traditional terms of inner mental items such as inclinations. Weshould not adopt the former conception, since doing so would impede pursuit of the ethical aims for which weneed a theory of character, whereas retaining the latter conception will facilitate this pursuit. So we should notrevise our understanding of character in this way.John Doris has recently argued that the conception of character employed in philosophicalethics should be revised. We must abandon the idea that behaviour is regulated by such‘global’ traits as honesty, generosity, compassion, and courage, and think instead in terms ofsuch ‘local’ traits as ‘sailing-in-rough-weather-with-one’s-friends-courageous’. Thespecification of each trait should refer to an array of situational features. This view isbecoming influential: Peter Goldie has endorsed it, and Maria Merritt has formulated a variantaccording to which the situational features relevant to the specification of a trait are alwayssocial features.1We must adopt this ‘fragmentary’ theory of character, its proponents argue, in order toexplain the data from certain experiments in social psychology. The subjects in each of theseexperiments were presented with opportunities for compassionate behaviour, but surprisinglyfew took these opportunities under such countervailing pressures as the presence of a passivebystander or of a polite experimenter in a technician’s coat asking them to deliver seeminglydangerous electric shocks to what appeared to be another volunteer. One kind of experimentshows that the likelihood of a given subject behaving compassionately decreases in inverseproportion to the degree of hurry that subject is in. This data, the argument runs, indicates thatbehaviour is not determined by such traits as compassion, but by such traits as in-a-hurry-compassion, on-time-compassion, time-to-spare-compassion, presence-of-a-passive-bystander-compassion, defying-authority-compassion, and so on.2White Rose Consortium ePrints Repository - http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/archive/1214/Jonathan Webberpage 2 of 4This has met with two kinds of response. One is that the experiments are notappropriate for drawing these kinds of conclusions.3 The other is that mainstream theories ofvirtue are anyway not committed to the claim that most people’s behaviour is regulated bysuch unified ‘global’ traits as compassion.4 Both of these claims are debatable, but this debatewould be unnecessary. For what both responses miss is that the data as it stands is perfectlycompatible with the idea that their subjects’ behaviour was regulated by ‘global’ traits so longas we understand these in the right way, and that understanding traits this way ispragmatically preferable to adopting the fragmentary theory.Explaining the data in terms of global traits is fairly straightforward. While eachexperimental situation presented an opportunity for compassionate behaviour, each alsocontained pressures that might elicit contrary behaviour manifesting a different trait, such aspunctuality, obedience to authority, or concern for peer approval. There is no reason to thinkthat one situation can invite the manifestation of only one trait, and philosophers have notnormally thought this to be the case. Situations are complex and issue conflicting invitations.One’s behaviour depends on which trait is strongest and which invitation most forceful.Proponents of the fragmentary theory fail to see this because they conceive of globaltraits in purely behaviouristic terms: Doris writes that such traits would be ‘reliablymanifested in trait-relevant behavior across a diversity of trait-relevant eliciting conditionsthat may vary widely in their conduciveness to the manifestation of the trait in question’;Merritt claims that they would ‘reliably give rise to the relevant kind of behavior, across thefull range of situations in which the behavior would be appropriate, including situations thatexert contrary pressures’; and Goldie writes that ‘honest people can be relied on to acthonestly wherever honesty is appropriate’.5These claims are far from perspicuous. If the terms ‘trait-relevant’ or ‘appropriate’ aremeant to indicate situations inviting the manifestation of that trait and in which there are nocountervailing pressures, then the data cited would present no evidence against the idea thatthe subjects possessed relatively stable levels of compassion, as we have seen. So the termsmust mean, as Merritt’s wording suggests, situations inviting the manifestation of that trait,regardless of whether there are countervailing pressures. Their argument therefore requiresthat traits be understood purely in terms of stimulus and response, and not in terms of anyinner mediating mental items such as inclinations that may be elicited yet not manifested inaction.We might argue at this stage that the proponents of the fragmentary theory are simplyemploying the wrong notion of traits. We might argue that classic discussions in the ethics ofvirtue, such as Aristotle’s discussion of strength and weakness of will, or the debates over theunities and conflicts among the virtues, involve the idea that a single situation can appeal tomore than one trait. We might even point out that global traits as defined by the proponents ofthe fragmentary theory are remarkably similar to Aristotle’s vices of excess, and that since heconsiders all virtues and vices to be character traits, he cannot understand traits in that way.Such a response would not, however, provide us with a positive reason to retain thisconstrual of global traits in terms of inner mediating items. But if we consider the practicalconsequences of adopting the behaviourist notion and therefore the fragmentary theory oftraits, we find such a reason: the behaviourist notion unnecessarily impedes pursuit of theethical aims for which we need a theory of character. There are broadly two such ethical aims:character-development and situation-management.The former can be grounded in any of a variety of meta-ethical theories. One mightwant to inculcate certain traits on the grounds that the most basic moral judgements areconcerned with character. If one holds this position, one might either take the Aristotelianview that these judgements do not depend on any non-moral judgements, or take the opposingview that a judgement of character depends on non-moral judgements about the likelyCharacter, Global and Localpage 3 of 4consequences of possessing those traits. Alternatively, one might argue that the most basicmoral judgements are concerned with right action, but hold that the possession of certain traitsis desirable because it makes right action more likely. This position is neutral between theKantian view that whether an action is right depends on the motivation behind it, and the act-utilitarian view that it depends on the action’s consequences. Whichever meta-ethicalgrounding it has, pursuit of the aim of character-development requires one to think of traitseither in the behaviourist or in the non-behaviourist way.Doris and Merritt present the aim of situation-management as an alternative tocharacter-development.6 One might, however, hold a hybrid position and claim that acombination of the two approaches will best promote either good consequences or one’sdoing one’s duty. Either way, avoiding morally dangerous circumstances and seeking outsituations in which we are likely to behave well involves the ability to predict how one islikely to behave in a given situation, which requires an understanding of one’s character,which must itself involve either the behaviourist or the non-behaviourist conception of traits.If we choose the behaviourist conception of traits, then the reflection involved in thepursuit of either of these ethical aims is extremely complicated, whereas if we retain the non-behaviourist conception it is relatively simple. The earlier list of local traits resulting from thebehaviourist interpretation of the experimental data is disingenuous, since each refers only totwo situational features where real situations can be far more complicated. Accepting the ideaof local traits should not lead to ascribing such traits as in-a-hurry-compassion and defying-authority-compassion, but to ascribing such traits as compassion-defying-authority-in-the-presence-of-a-passive-bystander-who-is-not-a-prior-acquaintance-when-not-in-a-hurry-and-where-the-person-in-need-of-help-is-not-an-acquaintance. Even this may be too simple: therange of situational features to be built into every trait may include many not yet considered.The behaviourist conception leads to a massive proliferation, a combinatorial explosion ofpossible traits. The ethical aims of character-development and situation-management wouldtherefore require one to maintain a vast database of detailed specifications of all the situationsone has faced and of one’s behaviour in those situations.The non-behaviourist conception, on the other hand, allows us to look for patterns inour behaviour, and reflect quite simply that we are overly obedient to authority, or toofastidious in our concern for punctuality, or insufficiently concerned about the impact of ouractions on the wellbeing of others. The ethical aims of character-development and situation-management are therefore far more manageable if we retain this conception than if we replaceit with the behaviourist one. Since the two conceptions are equally empirically respectable, itseems that we should opt for the one that best serves our ethical purposes in having a theoryof character, and therefore retain the non-behaviourist idea of global traits rather than replaceit with the behaviourist conception of traits and therefore the fragmentary theory of localtraits.7j.m.webber@sheffield.ac.ukJonathan Webberpage 4 of 4NOTES1  John Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge, 2002), chs 1-5, sailing example on p. 115; Peter Goldie, On Personality (London, 2004), chs 3-4; MariaMerritt, ‘Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology’, Ethical Theory and MoralPractice 2 (2000). (Merritt cites as influence an earlier, less detailed formulation by Doris.)2  See Doris, Lack of Character, pp. 32-51; Goldie, On Personality, pp. 61-3; Merritt, ‘VirtueEthics and Situationist Personality Psychology’, p. 366.3  Gopal Sreenivasan, ‘Errors About Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution’, Mind 111(2002); John Sabini and Maury Silver, ‘Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued’, Ethics115 (2005).4  Michael DePaul, ‘Character Traits, Virtues, and Vices: Are There None?’, Proceedings ofthe Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy volume 9: Philosophy of Mind, ed. BernardElevitch (Bowling Green OH, 2000); Christian Miller, ‘Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics’,The Journal of Ethics 7 (2003); Rachana Kamtekar, ‘Situationism and Virtue Ethics on theContent of Our Character’, Ethics 114 (2004).5  Doris, Lack of Character, p. 22; Merritt, ‘Virtue Ethics and Situationist PersonalityPsychology’, pp. 365-6; Goldie, On Personality, p. 50.6  See Doris, Lack of Character, pp. 146-7; Merritt, ‘Virtue Ethics and Situationist PersonalityPsychology’, throughout.7  This paper has benefited greatly from seminar discussions of earlier drafts at the Universityof Sheffield and the University of Birmingham.

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