Unguaranteed Money in the NFL: A Useful Tool for Risky Players

This study is investigating whether or not the percentage of non‐guaranteed money or length in NFL contracts reflects how risky players are as judged by past statistics. While sports economists have completed numerous studies on the motivational power of incentives, a study trying to identify the riskiness of players to lead to the strategic use of non‐guaranteed money and length of contract is a new idea. Contract details were gathered for running backs and wide receivers on NFL rosters for the 2012 season from rotoworld.com. Players who were still on rookie contracts and who were primarily special teams players were excluded. Career statistics were also compiled, including yards per attempt, touches per game, touchdowns per game, games missed, and age. These variables will be used to capture the inconsistency, susceptibility to injury, and other types of uncertainty that will identify how risky they are. Regressions were run testing both percent of money not guaranteed and contract length as dependent variables. Independent variables that were tested include the coefficient of variation of key statistics based on position, career average of the mentioned key statistics, games missed per year, age, and a dummy variable for signing with a new team

AUSSAT mobile satellite services

An overview of AUSSAT's planned mobile satellite system is given. The development program which is being undertaken to achieve the 1992 service date is described. Both business and technical aspects of the development program are addressed

Bayesian modeling and computation with latent variables

This dissertation contributes to Bayesian statistics and economics using latent variable methods. The first chapter explores interweaving methods for constructing Markov chains in dynamic linear models (DLMs). Here, several new data augmentations are defined for the DLM, and a negative result concerning the sort of augmentations that can be found for the model is proved. A simulation study using a specific DLM illuminates when each of several DA and interweaving algorithms performs well. The second chapter is an extention of the first, introducing a method to extend the results of the first chapter to DLMs where the observation level matrix is not square. Finally, the last chapter develops methods for Bayesian causal inference to compare two treatments using partial identification methods. Specifically, it develops priors that capture the intuition of standard partial identification methods in the Bayesian setting and extends those prior to a hierarchical setting. Then it illustrates how to use the model with these priors in an example evaluating the effectiveness of the National School Lunch Program

The Economics of Mileage Restrictions for Railway Workers in Western Canada

La convention collective conclue entre le Canadien Pacifique et le Syndicat des employés des transports dans l'Ouest du Canada contient un système de rémunération fondé sur un taux de salaire au parcours comportant un kilométrage maximal et minimal. Le présent article étudie les données économiques de ce système de rémunération au parcours de manière à identifier et à faire comprendre les problèmes de négociation collective qu'il engendre.La première partie décrit le système de rémunération au kilométrage et le replace dans son contexte économique. Bien qu'il soit plus probable que l'employeur veuille limiter les parcours effectués par l'employé à cause de coûts de travail à peu près fixes, le syndicat voudrait, par cette limitation, protéger les emplois ainsi que le temps consacré aux loisirs de ses membres. Pour sa part, l'employeur veut possiblement établir un kilométrage garanti de façon à réduire toutefois le roulement de la main-d'oeuvre lorsqu'il y a diminution du trafic. C'est pour ce motif que l'on a négocié un parcours maximal de 3 800 milles et un parcours minimal de 2 600 à 3 000 milles par mois. Du côté du syndicat, on a considéré le kilométrage maximal comme étant le résultat de la négociation et comme s'il représentait pour le membre du rang le choix entre le kilométrage effectué et le temps libre.La deuxième partie de l'article analyse les motifs économiques de la désaffection croissante du syndicat pour le système de rémunération au parcours. Les augmentations de la rémunération au parcours négociées ne sont pas équivalentes parce que les prix à la consommation sont plus élevés et, par conséquent, les gains réels plus bas à mesure que l'on se déplace vers l'Ouest à l'intérieur de l'unité de négociation. Face à une rémunération plus faible en gains réels, il était manifeste que les syndiqués del'Alberta et de la Colombie Britannique opteraient pour un parcours plus long afin de récupérer ce qu'ils perdaient en gains réels. En conséquence, beaucoup de syndiqués de ces deux provinces s'opposent aux limitations de parcours, et le Canadien Pacifique peut se montrer sympathique à leur cause, comme moyen de faciliter le recrutement des employés et de réduire le roulement de la main-d'oeuvre.Une des solutions pourrait consister dans l'établissement de taux différents de salaire selon les régions. L'application de taux différents de salaire semble improbable si les syndiqués du Manitoba et de la Saskatchewan ne veulent pas accepter une diminution de leurs gains réels et si le Canadien Pacifique ne veut pas absorber le coût total de taux de rémunération au parcours plus élevé en Alberta et en Colombie Britannique.La dernière partie de l'article traite des résultats probables des négociations sur les restrictions des parcours. De préférence à un système de rémunération fondé sur des taux différents de salaire, l'abandon des restrictions au kilométrage est ce qui est plus probable dans l'avenir. Cependant, si les écarts dans les prix à la consommation continuent de croître, cette solution deviendra moins satisfaisante et l'établissement de taux de salaire différents selon les régions deviendra plus attrayant.The purpose of this paper is to examine the economics of the mileage payment System, to understand the problems created for the union and C.P.R. management and to examine potential solutions to the problem

The Disability Tax Credit: Why it Fails and How to Fix It

When the government establishes a social program whose primary purpose is to help provide support to low-income people with disabilities, its success should be measured on how well it achieves that purpose. Unfortunately, there are reasons to seriously question the usefulness of Canada’s disability tax credit since it is helping so very few of the people it is intended to support. In fact, the credit is helping only a small number of Canadians with disability who qualify for it, and least of all those in the poorest families who receive an average of only $29 annually. The reason is not hard to see: Designing the support as a tax credit means that only those Canadians with disability who earn enough income to have them owing taxes can take advantage of it. Yet it is an unfortunate reality that people with disability are often at low incomes precisely because their disability leaves them unable to work in full-time, wellpaid jobs. Thus, the very people who need this support most are the ones least able to take advantage of it. In other words, the neediest disabled Canadians are receiving the least benefit. Far from being a successful policy, the results of the disability tax credit can only be described as disappointing. There is an uncomplicated way to begin rectifying this: By making the disability tax credit refundable. Along the same lines as a guaranteed minimum income, or negative income tax, those low-income Canadians with disabilities who qualify for the credit but lack sufficient income to benefit from the credit could simply be made eligible for a refund of the amount they cannot claim. Simply doing that, turning this non-refundable credit into a refundable credit, would increase the average benefit for Canada’s poorest families with a disabled person from$29 to $511, increasing their total income by a meaningful 4.1 per cent. Just as importantly, where a meagre 0.2 per cent of these families now get any benefit at all from the credit, a refundable credit would now see a majority, 56.4 per cent, receiving benefits. We estimate that this would mean added costs to the federal program of a modest$72 million, or a 17 per cent increase. A similar reform at the provincial level would cost an additional $31 million. An even more effective option for ensuring better outcomes for this policy, however, would be to both make the tax credit refundable and enhance it to triple its value. This would ensure that virtually every family with a disabled person below the low income cut-off, would benefit from the credit and this enhancement would raise their incomes a far more consequential 27 per cent. The costs of this enhanced refundable disability tax credit would be, of course, notably higher, estimated at$516 million federally and $240 million provincially, but it would actually achieve the outcomes that this policy ostensibly intends. The current program may be cheaper, but the value it delivers is trifling and the money, therefore, is arguably heavily wasted. For years there have been calls to make this tax credit work better through refundability. We now have evidence that an enhanced refundable disability tax credit would make the significant difference in the lives of lowincome Canadians with disabilities that the policy was designed to do, but has so far largely failed to do

An Alberta Guaranteed Basic Income: Issues and Options

Poverty remains a persistent problem even in advanced economies, and Alberta is no exception despite robust long-term economic growth.  Serious discussion of poverty reduction through a basic or guaranteed income has reemerged at the federal level and among the provinces, including Québec and Ontario, coinciding with renewed efforts to address child poverty through the Canada Child Benefit and the Alberta Child Benefit.  These relatively new income support programs provide federal and provincial tax credits that are refundable; that is, unlike many current nonrefundable tax credits, they provide a benefit to families that is larger the further their income lies below the level of the credit.  This paper analyzes the prospects for Alberta poverty reduction today through a basic guaranteed income achieved by tax reform that would make most of the current existing nonrefundable tax credits refundable. Our paper demonstrates that a guaranteed basic income achieved by transforming most existing nonrefundable tax credits into a single refundable credit can have substantial impact on poverty in Alberta because it more effectively transfers the income support provided by these credits to lower-income families.  Using version 26.0 of the Social Policy Simulation Database and Model (SPSD/M) from Statistics Canada, we are able to simulate the impact of various options for an Alberta Guaranteed Basic Income (AGBI) that might emerge from this tax change.  Our analysis sets a budget for the AGBI based on current expenditures for the Basic credit and five other nonrefundable tax credits that have a total value of $5.36 billion in Alberta.  For this budget, a wide variety of program options are available based on different combinations of an income guarantee that would be the maximum amount available to a family with no other income and a benefit reduction rate that reduces the income benefit as family income from other sources rises.  We consider the impact of a variety of these program options along multiple dimensions, including the poverty rate based on Statistics Canada’s Low Income Cutoffs poverty line, the depth of poverty calculated as the amount by which family incomes fall below the poverty line, income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, earnings from the labour market, and the distribution of beneficiaries.   We illustrate our approach by choosing an AGBI with a relatively low benefit reduction rate of 10$6,389 and $9,305 for families with one and two adults, respectively.  While our plan is illustrative, we argue that it is sensible in light of the inevitable trade-offs between changes in the degree of poverty reduction, labour earnings and the proportion of families that benefit from a program of this nature.  The plan provides benefits to 37.3$11.36 billion for Alberta.  We opt for a federal plan with a modest benefit reduction rate of 15% that provides income guarantees of $7,285 and$10,302 for families with one and two parents, respectively.  The combined federal and provincial guaranteed basic income plans provide income guarantees of $13,674 and$19,338 for single and two-parent families with no other income and reduce the income support benefits at a moderate rate.  Disposable income increases by 50.4% for the poorest 10% of families and by 6% for the next poorest 10% of families, and one-third of Albertans received benefits under the combined plan.  As was the case for the provincial AGBI, single parent families and non-elderly and elderly single adults experience an overall increase in their disposable income but the poorest families receive significant benefits on average for all family types.  The rate of poverty among all Albertans drops by 44% and is completely eliminated for single parents and non-elderly and elderly couples.  While poverty remains for two-parent families and the non-elderly single person, its rate declines substantially and its depth is cut by more than half.  The non-elderly single person, the family group that exhibits by far the most poverty, receives the most benefit from the combined plan, as the families with bottom 40% of incomes show gains on average in this group.  Overall inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, falls by 2.2% compared to 1.6% for the provincial AGBI alone.            Our plan relies on the filing of an income tax return to obtain benefits.  In this regard, it is worth noting that the rate of tax filing in Canada is very high, as about 95 per cent of persons 15 and over file a return.  Those who don’t file a return and those whose incomes fluctuate can rely on social assistance as a source of income, as our plan would supplement that existing basic support program.  In this regard, the provincial social assistance program could be used in concert with the AGBI to reach those who don’t file a tax return and those who require emergency funding within the taxation year because of a sharp decline in income.              Our analysis has attempted to illustrate the impact that a straightforward tax policy change toward refundable tax credits can have on poverty in Alberta, particularly with federal participation in a comparable plan.  As concerns about technological displacement of workers and rising inequality grow, discussion of the need for a guaranteed basic income is unlikely to abate, and we believe that tax reform to make existing tax credits refundable can be effective in delivering what amounts to a guaranteed basic income for families without serious economic disruption.  Most Canadians now file taxes, making such a guaranteed basic income plan a sensible consideration for the future

The Impact of Converting Federal Non-Refundable Tax Credits Into Refundable Credits

With economic inequality on the rise in Canada, the federal government needs to consider innovative solutions. One possibility for improving the tax-transfer system involves refundable tax credits (RTCs). Making all tax credits refundable wouldn’t require Ottawa to introduce new tax measures; the Canadian tax system already contains a mix of RTCs and NRTCs, so the government could simply continue its practice of designing tax credit programs to be refundable. Using Statistics Canada’s Social Policy Simulation Database and Model, this paper examines the impacts and cost of converting NRTCs to RTCs, with and without an income exemption equal to 25 percent of the before-tax lowincome standard for a census family, the Census Family Low-Income Line. Under the Option Without Exemption (OW/OE), RTC recipients are taxed at a single rate of 15 percent, regardless of family size, right up to the Line. Under the Option With Exemption (OWE), RTC recipients are taxed at zero percent up to 25 percent of the Line and at a single rate of 20 percent, regardless of family size, up to 100 percent of the Line. The incremental cost of switching NRTCs to RTCs under the OW/OE is $6.6 billion, as additional benefits are provided to 6.4 million families — slightly less than 37 percent of all families. The cost of the OWE is$7.2 billion, as benefits flow to slightly more families — 6.45 million. However, the percentage of benefits reaching low-income families is much higher under the OWE (69 percent vs. 49 percent). Additionally, the OWE provides an average of nine percent more RTC benefits to low-income tax filers, making it clearly the superior option for poverty reduction. Moreover, the paper shows that alternative conversion schemes that set benefit reduction rates to differ by family size can further increase the benefits to low-income families at a lower overall cost. Such changes would elicit a labour-supply response in terms of a reduction in hours worked, and while the effect is smaller under the less expensive OW/OE, the difference between the two options is slight. This paper simulates the conversion of NRTCs to RTCs in comprehensive detail, besides providing practical advice on how such a shift would be funded. It offers valuable food for thought on an issue that is increasingly critical to Canadian society

Vacuum-UV negative photoion spectroscopy of CH4

Using synchrotron radiation in the range 12-35 eV, negative ions are detected by mass spectrometry following vacuum-UV photoexcitation of methane. Ion yields for H$^-$, CH$^-$ and CH$_2^-$ are recorded, the spectra of CH$^-$ and CH$_2^-$ for the first time. All ions display a linear dependence of signal with pressure, showing that they arise from unimolecular ion-pair dissociation. Cross sections for ion-pair formation are put onto an absolute scale by calibrating the signal strengths with those of F$^-$ from SF$_6$ and CF$_4$. Following normalisation to total vacuum-UV absorption cross sections, quantum yields for anion production are reported. There is a major discrepancy in the H$^-$ cross section with an earlier measurement, which remains unresolved. The anions arise from both direct and indirect ion-pair mechanisms. For a generic polyatomic molecule AB, the former is defined as AB $\rightarrow$ A$^-$ + B$^+$ (+ neutrals), the latter as the predissociative crossing of an initially-excited Rydberg state of AB by an ion-pair state. In a separate experiment, the threshold photoelectron spectrum of the second valence band of CH$_4$, ionisation to CH$_4^+$ A $^2$A$_1$ at 22.4 eV, is recorded with an instrumental resolution of 0.004 eV; many of the Rydberg states observed in indirect ion-pair formation converge to this state. The widths of the peaks are lifetime limited, increasing with increasing $v$ in the $v_1$ (a$_1$) vibrational ladder. They are the first direct measurement of an upper value to the dissociation rate of these levels into fragment ions