Wages in Las Vegas and Reno: How Much Difference Do Unions Make in the Hotel, Gaming, and Recreation Industry?

A significant union presence in the Las Vegas, Nevada Hotel, Gaming, and Recreation (HGR) industry juxtaposed to the near absence of unions in the Reno, Nevada segment of the same industry is used to study how unions affect wages both within the industry and in a much less unionized sector, the Wholesale and Retail Trade (WRT) industry. The results indicate that median wages of highly unionized occupations in the Las Vegas HGR industry are significantly higher than wages of identical occupations in Reno. Little difference in wages is observed in the WRT industries of the two regions. In light of recent government scrutiny of gaming in the United States, managers must become more sensitive to alleged negative socio-economic impacts of their operations. Higher wages as a result of unionization may mitigate one element of such alleged effects

Union Wage Effects in Australia: Evidence from Panel Data

Using data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, our research indicates that unobserved heterogeneity substantially biases cross-sectional estimates of union wage effects upward for both males and females. Estimates of the union wage premium for male workers between the ages of 25 and 64 fall from 8.7 percent to 5.2 percent after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. For females aged 25 to 63 the estimated 4.0 percent cross-sectional union wage premium falls to 1.9 once unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for. Our results also indicate positive sorting by unobserved skills into union membership, especially among low skilled male and female workers. There is also evidence of negative sorting into unions among the most highly skilled.union wage effects; fixed effects models; panel data

Altering Time: The Effect Of Feedback Frequency On Employee Behavior

Advances in technology have made it possible for employers to provide performance feedback to employees on a more frequent basis. This study investigates how different feedback frequencies can alter employees’ perceptions of time and subsequently how these altered perceptions influence employee productivity. I predict and find that feedback frequency alters the way employees break up or segment their work time—a process that I refer to as feedback-driven time segmenting. Ultimately I find that this process causes feedback frequency to have opposing effects on employee productivity. Specifically employees who receive more frequent feedback find fewer task efficiencies than employees who receive less frequent feedback. This finding represents an unintended cost of increasing feedback frequency—it can lead employees to be less likely to discover new and better ways of completing their work. However, I also find that employees who receive more frequent feedback work harder, if less efficiently, than employees who receive less frequent feedback. By examining both how hard employees work and how smart (i.e., efficiently) they work my study provides enhanced insight into the costs and benefits of increasing feedback frequency. As such, it helps managerial accountants fulfill one of their primary roles, understanding how performance information influences employee behavior

The inheritance of leaf rust resistance in two simple wheat crosses

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1950 W6Master of Scienc

Union wage effects in Australia: Evidence from panel data

Using data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, this research indicates that unobserved heterogeneity substantially biases cross-sectional estimates of union wage effects upward for both males and females. Estimates of the union wage premium for male workers between the ages of 25 and 64 fall from 8.7 percent to 5.2 percent after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. For females aged 25 to 63 the estimated 4.0 percent cross-sectional union wage premium falls to 1.9 once unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for. The results also indicate positive sorting by unobserved skills into union membership, especially among low skilled male and female workers. There is also evidence of negative sorting into unions among the most highly skilled