Modal Ω-Logic: Automata, Neo-Logicism, and Set-Theoretic Realism

This essay examines the philosophical significance of $\Omega$-logic in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC). The duality between coalgebra and algebra permits Boolean-valued algebraic models of ZFC to be interpreted as coalgebras. The modal profile of $\Omega$-logical validity can then be countenanced within a coalgebraic logic, and $\Omega$-logical validity can be defined via deterministic automata. I argue that the philosophical significance of the foregoing is two-fold. First, because the epistemic and modal profiles of $\Omega$-logical validity correspond to those of second-order logical consequence, $\Omega$-logical validity is genuinely logical, and thus vindicates a neo-logicist conception of mathematical truth in the set-theoretic multiverse. Second, the foregoing provides a modal-computational account of the interpretation of mathematical vocabulary, adducing in favor of a realist conception of the cumulative hierarchy of sets

On the consistency strength of the inner model hypothesis

The Inner Model Hypothesis (IMH) and the Strong Inner Model Hypothesis (SIMH) were introduced in [4]. In this article we establish some upper and lower bounds for their consistency strength. We repeat the statement of the IMH, as presented in [4]. A sentence in the language of set theory is internally consistent iff it holds in some (not necessarily proper) inner model. The meaning of internal consistency depends on what inner models exist: If we enlarge the universe, it is possible that more statements become internally consistent. The InnerModelHypothesis asserts that the universe has been maximised with respect to internal consistency:The Inner Model Hypothesis (IMH) and the Strong Inner Model Hypothesis (SIMH) were introduced in [4]. In this article we establish some upper and lower bounds for their consistency strength. We repeat the statement of the IMH, as presented in [4]. A sentence in the language of set theory is internally consistent iff it holds in some (not necessarily proper) inner model. The meaning of internal consistency depends on what inner models exist: If we enlarge the universe, it is possible that more statements become internally consistent. The InnerModelHypothesis asserts that the universe has been maximised with respect to internal consistency