Collusion through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment

This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting where firms enter in research joint ventures (RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product market. We show that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of RJV-participating firms, which is also necessary and sufficient for a decrease in consumer welfare. Using information from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D expenditures. We find robust evidence that large networks between direct competitors – created through firms being members in several RJVs at the same time – are conducive to collusive outcomes in the product market which reduce consumer welfare. By contrast, RJVs among non-competitors are efficiency enhancing

Estimating economies of scale and scope with flexible technology

The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11123-016-0467-1Economies of scope are typically modelled and estimated using a cost function that is common to all firms in an industry irrespective of their type, e.g. whether they specialize in a single output or produce multiple outputs. Instead, we estimate a flexible technology model that allows for type-specific technologies and show how it can be estimated using linear parametric forms including the translog. A common technology remains a special case of our model and is testable econometrically. Our sample, of publicly owned US electric utilities, does not support a common technology for integrated and specialized firms. Our empirical results therefore suggest that assuming a common technology might bias estimates of economies of scale and scope. Thus, how we model the production technology clearly influences the policy conclusions we draw from its characteristics

Wettbewerb und Regulierung

Wettbewerb und Regulierung werfen sowohl aus einer wirtschafts- als auch aus einer politikwissenschaftlichen Perspektive interessante Fragestellungen auf und haben daher in beiden Disziplinen umfangreiche Beachtung gefunden. Der vorliegende Beitrag gibt eine Übersicht über beide Herangehensweisen. Dabei wer-den zunächst die grundlegenden Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten offengelegt (Abschnitt 2), bevor die disziplinären Schwerpunkte in der Analyse vorgestellt, und aus Sicht der jeweils anderen Disziplin kommentiert werden (Abschnitte 3 und 4). Wir kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass beide Sichtweisen in erster Linie komplementär sind und sich gegenseitig befruchten können