Marshall Space Flight Center's role in EASE/ACCESS mission management

The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Spacelab Payload Project Office was responsible for the mission management and development of several successful payloads. Two recent space construction experiments, the Experimental Assembly of Structures in Extravehicular Activity (EASE) and the Assembly Concept for Construction of Erectable Space Structures (ACCESS), were combined into a payload managed by the center. The Ease/ACCESS was flown aboard the Space Shuttle Mission 61-B. The EASE/ACCESS experiments were the first structures assembled in space, and the method used to manage this successful effort will be useful for future space construction missions. The MSFC mission management responsibilities for the EASE/ACCESS mission are addressed and how the lessons learned from the mission can be applied to future space construction projects are discussed

An 11-meter deployable truss for the SEASAT radar antenna

A folding three dimensional truss and tripod assembly which deploys the SEASAT Synthetic Aperture Radar Antenna is described. The folding structure with the antenna panels and rf components stows in an 8.5-inch-thick package. Upon deployment, the structure produced is a flat and rigid support for the antenna

Conference on Automated Decision-Making and Problem Solving, the Third Day: Issues Discussed

A conference held at Langley Research Center in May of 1980 brought together university experts from the fields of Control Theory, Operations Research, and Artificial Intelligence to explore current research in automation from both the perspective of their own particular disciplines and from that of interdisciplinary considerations. Informal discussions from the final day of the those day conference are summarized

Development and Certification of a New Stall Warning and Avoidance System

Several methods may be employed to improve natural stall characteristics. The method employed on all learjets to obtain improved stall characteristics is a stall warning and avoidance system that employs angle of attack vanes, an electronic computer, a control column shaker motor, and a torquer which drives the control column in a pusher mode to avoid unwanted further buildup of angle of attack. The new system was developed with changes that improve system response with no performance penalty or increase in turbulence sensitivity. The following changes were made included modified system time constants and (alpha) time rate of change of vane angle dead zone and the addition of an alpha signal limiter and an alpha cut out below a specified angle of attack

The solar gravitational figure: J2 and J4

The theory of the solar gravitational figure is derived including the effects of differential rotation. It is shown that J sub 4 is smaller than J sub 2 by a factor of about 10 rather than being of order J sub 2 squared as would be expected for rigid rotation. The dependence of both J sub 2 and J sub 4 on envelope mass is given. High order p-mode oscillation frequencies provide a constraint on solar structure which limits the range in envelope mass to the range 0.01 M sub E/solar mass 0.04. For an assumed rotation law in which the surface pattern of differential rotation extends uniformly throughout the convective envelope, this structural constraint limits the ranges of J sub 2 and J sub 4 in units of 10 to the -8th power to 10 J sub 2 15 and 0.6 -J sub 4 1.5. Deviations from these ranges would imply that the rotation law is not constant with depth and would provide a measure of this rotation law

Catalog of Lunar Craters I

This catalog gives the selenographic coordinates of all craters observable on a selected portion of the moon's surface. The diameter of the crater together with comments on shape are also given. Approximately 25 per cent of the craters have been measured previously by other observers. The catalog gives the position found in the present series of measurements and the name adopted by the International Astronomical Union

Compensation Representatives: a Prudent Solution to Excessive CEO Pay

Currently, CEO pay is determined by a company’s board of directors, subject to limited shareholder approval in certain circumstances. However, as Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have demonstrated, boards of directors and CEOs do not necessarily engage in real arms length bargaining over CEO pay. Instead, CEOs may exert managerial power to extract economic rents above and beyond what they could have obtained in an arms length negotiation. To address the problem, Bebchuk and Fried have proposed that large shareholders be allowed to nominate candidates for the board, and that companies be required to pay the expenses for any proxy fight if the shareholder’s nominee receives a designated minimum level of support. Some commentators have taken issue with their conclusion that CEOs are in fact overpaid, and others have objected to their proposed remedies. This article accepts the fundamental point that the CEO pay-setting process is flawed and that reforms are necessary. Nonetheless, it recognises that high CEO pay may be attributable to numerous factors other than managerial power, and it questions whether certain of Bebchuk and Fried’s proposed solutions might have unintended negative consequences for matters beyond CEO pay. Therefore, to remedy the problems in the pay-setting process, this article proposes that large shareholders be allowed to appoint non-executive “compensation representatives” to look after the interests of all shareholders on matters relating exclusively to CEO pay. Compensation representatives would have the right to attend all compensation-related meetings, to question board members, to make recommendations, and to report their views to shareholders. Shareholders in turn could use the representative’s report as a basis for rejecting unreasonable pay arrangements. This proposal would insert into the pay-setting process parties who are immune to CEO pressure and responsive to shareholder concerns. It would address compensation without fundamentally altering the relationship between the shareholders and the board. Its implementation is highly feasible, since it could be adopted by shareholder by-law, without changing existing law. Finally, it could be vindicated or discredited by the market itself. As such, it would constitute a prudent solution to excessive CEO pay