Institutions in comparative policy research

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The Asymmetry of European Integration - or why the EU cannot be a Social Market Economy

Judge-made law has played a crucial role in the process of European integration. In the vertical dimension, it has greatly reduced the range of autonomous policy choices in the member states, and it has helped to expand the reach of European competences. At the same time, however, Integration through Law does have a liberalizing and deregulatory impact on the socio-economic regimes of EU member states. This effect is generally compatible with the status quo in Liberal Market Economies, but it tends to undermine the institutions and policy legacies of Continental and Scandinavian Social Market Economies. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, this structural asymmetry cannot be corrected through political action at the European level.social policy; integration theory; law; competences; Europeanization; Europeanization

No exit from the joint decision trap? Can German federalism reform itself?

The unique institutions that make up Germany's unitary federal state, long considered part of the country's post-war success story, are now generally perceived as a joint-decision trap impeding effective policy responses to new economic and demographic challenges at both levels of government. Nevertheless, a high-powered bicameral Commission set up in the fall of 2003 failed to reach agreement on constitutional reforms. The paper analyzes the misguided procedural and substantive choices that led to this failure, and it discusses the possibility of asymmetric constitutional solutions that might enhance the capacity for autonomous action at both levels. -- Die im internationalen Vergleich einmaligen Institutionen des unitarischen Bundesstaats erschienen lange as Element der deutschen Erfolgsgeschichte in der Nachkriegszeit. Heute erscheinen sie jedoch als Politikverflechtungsfalle, welche die Politik in Bund und Ländern an der Bewältigung der neuen ökonomischen und demographischen Herausforderungen hindert. Trotzdem gelang es einer im Herbst 2003 eingesetzten und politisch potent besetzten gemeinsamen Kommission von Bundestag und Bundesrat nicht, sich auf eine Verfassungsreform zu einigen. Der Text analysiert die prozeduralen und sachlichen Fehlentscheidungen, die das Scheitern erklären, und er erörtert die Möglichkeit asymmetrischer Lösungen, die den Spielraum für autonomes politisches Handeln auf beiden staatlichen Ebenen erweitern könnten.

Abbau der Arbeitslosigkeit durch Lohnsubventionen? Gegen die Diskriminierung einfacher Arbeitsplätze

Der Vorschlag, mehr Arbeitsplätze im Niedriglohnbereich durch Entlastungen bei den Sozialabgaben zu schaffen, ist auf Kritik gestoßen. Welche Überlegungen liegen diesem Ansatz zugrunde? Kann hierdurch die Arbeitslosigkeit abgebaut werden

or why the EU cannot be a "Social Market Economy"

Judge-made law has played a crucial role in the process of European integration. In the vertical dimension, it has greatly reduced the range of autonomous policy choices in the member states, and it has helped to expand the reach of European competences. At the same time, however, “Integration through Law” does have a liberalizing and deregulatory impact on the socio- economic regimes of EU member states. This effect is generally compatible with the status quo in “Liberal Market Economies”, but it tends to undermine the institutions and policy legacies of Continental and Scandinavian “Social Market Economies”. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, this structural asymmetry cannot be corrected through political action at the European level

Positive und negative Koordination in Verhandlungssystemen

Eines der zentralen Probleme freiwilliger Kooperation ist der Konflikt um die Aufteilung des potentiellen Kooperationsgewinns. Solche Schwierigkeiten treten bei vertikaler Integration nicht auf. Horizontale Politikverflechtung könnte daher als zweitbeste Lösung gegenüber der Zuweisung grenzüberschreitender Probleme an eine nächsthöhere Ebene oder gegenüber der Bildung größerer Einheiten erscheinen. Ob dies so ist, hängt aber davon ab, welche Art von bargaining stattfindet. Je nach den einbettenden Normen kann es unmittelbar um Gewinnanteile stattfinden (klassisches "Aufteilungsspiel") oder es kann der Rechtfertigung von Ansprüchen dienen ("Anrechtsspiel"). Kriterium der Fairness im letzteren Fall ist nicht Verhandlungsmacht, sondern equity, der Konflikt findet nicht um die Aufteilungsnorm, sondern um Subsumptionen statt. Kontinuierliche Kollaboration ist eine Situation, in der eher Anrechtsspiele als pure Aufteilungsspiele gespielt werden. Da in der speziellen Konstellation "Föderalismus" überdies die Bedingungen der Bewältigung der hier zu erwartenden Subsumptionskonflikte günstig sind und auch institutionell unterstützt werden können, erscheint horizontale Politikverflechtung nicht notwendig als eine zweitbeste Alternative zu hierarchischer Integration: Letztere ist zwar nicht mit Aushandlungsproblemen behaftet, dafür aber auch nicht unmittelbar imstande, equity-Probleme zu bearbeiten. Je nach dem Gewicht des einen oder des anderen Kriteriums für die Akteure erscheint daher die eine oder die andere Institutionalisierung als plausibel.Bargaining about the distribution of potential gains is one of the main difficulties of voluntary cooperation. Vertical integration has no problems of this sort. Therefore, large-scale voluntary cooperation among the units of a federal system could seem to be a second-best institution compared to a redrawing of boundaries or to a transfer of competence to higher levels of government. Whether this conjecture is justified can only be decided, however, after a doser look into the features of the bargaining which takes place in this particular constellation. Depending the normative context, bargaining may focus directly on how to divide the pie ("distribution game") or it may focus on establishing entitlements C'entitlement game"). In the second case, the fairness of the division is not measured against bargaining power, but against equity criteria; conflicts do not center on criteria of division, but rather on questions of subsumption. If there is continuing collaboration, we have to expect entitlement games rather than distribution games. Since the conditions for the solution of subsumption problems are favorable or can be made favorable in the specific constellation studied here, voluntary cooperation among independent units in a federal system is not necessarily second best compared to hierarchical integration: Certainly the latter is less ridden with bargaining problems than the former; but at the same time it is much less weil equipped to deal explicitly with equity problems. Which form of decision making is more adequate depends on the relative importance of these two aspects

Political legitimacy in a non-optimal currency area

1\. Introduction 5 2\. Performance of the Original Euro Regime 6 2.1 Centralized Monetary Policy in a Non-optimal Currency Area 7 2.2 Euro Crisis and Euro-rescue Policies 10 3\. The New Regime of Euro Governance 12 3.1 Revised Problem Perceptions and their Implications 13 3.2 From Soft Recommendations to Hardened Requirements 13 3.3 What if the New Regime Had Been in Place? 15 4\. The Euro Regime: What is Gained and What Was Lost? 17 4.1 Limited Gains 18 4.2 Instead of Nominal Devaluation, Competitive Real Devaluation 18 4.3 Obstacles to the Management of Aggregate Demand 19 4.4 Global Capitalism and Self-inflicted Helplessness 20 4.5 But Could the Regime be Patched? 20 5\. Input Legitimacy of the Present Euro Regime? 24 6\. Could Political Union Provide the Solution? 26 6.1 The Risk of Politicization 26 6.2 Legitimate Majority Rule? 28 References 30On the basis of a brief reconstruction of the causes and impacts of the Euro crisis, this paper explores, counterfactually and hypothetically, whether the new Euro regime, insisting on fiscal austerity and supply-side reforms, could have prevented the rise of the crisis or is able to deal with its disastrous economic and social impact. A comparison with the likely impact of transfer- based Keynesian reflation suggests that, in both cases, economic success is uncertain, while both approaches are likely to produce severely negative sideeffects. In light of such dismal policy choices, attempts to politicize European election campaigns are more likely to provoke unmanageable policy conflict than to overcome the input-oriented, democratic deficit of European economic governance

No exit from the joint decision trap? Can German federalism reform itself?

"Die im internationalen Vergleich einmaligen Institutionen des "unitarischen Bundesstaats" erschienen lange as Element der deutschen Erfolgsgeschichte in der Nachkriegszeit. Heute erscheinen sie jedoch als "Politikverflechtungsfalle," welche die Politik in Bund und Ländern an der Bewältigung der neuen ökonomischen und demographischen Herausforderungen hindert. Trotzdem gelang es einer im Herbst 2003 eingesetzten und politisch potent besetzten gemeinsamen Kommission von Bundestag und Bundesrat nicht, sich auf eine Verfassungsreform zu einigen. Der Text analysiert die prozeduralen und sachlichen Fehlentscheidungen, die das Scheitern erklären, und er erörtert die Möglichkeit asymmetrischer Lösungen, die den Spielraum für autonomes politisches Handeln auf beiden staatlichen Ebenen erweitern könnten." [Autorenreferat]"The unique institutions that make up Germany's "unitary federal state," long considered part of the country's post-war success story, are now generally perceived as a "joint-decision trap" impeding effective policy responses to new economic and demographic challenges at both levels of government. Nevertheless, a high-powered bicameral Commission set up in the fall of 2003 failed to reach agreement on constitutional reforms. The paper analyzes the misguided procedural and substantive choices that led to this failure, and it discusses the possibility of asymmetric constitutional solutions that might enhance the capacity for autonomous action at both levels." [author's abstract