Selection of noise level in strategy adoption for spatial social dilemmas

We studied spatial Prisoner's Dilemma and Stag Hunt games where both the strategy distribution and the players' individual noise level could evolve to reach higher individual payoff. Players are located on the sites of different two-dimensional lattices and gain their payoff from games with their neighbors by choosing unconditional cooperation or defection. The way of strategy adoption can be characterized by a single $K$ (temperature-like) parameter describing how strongly adoptions depend on the payoff-difference. If we start the system from a random strategy distribution with many different player specific $K$ parameters, the simultaneous evolution of strategies and $K$ parameters drives the system to a final stationary state where only one $K$ value remains. In the coexistence phase of cooperator and defector strategies the surviving $K$ parameter is in good agreement with the noise level that ensures the highest cooperation level if uniform $K$ is supposed for all players. In this paper we give a thorough overview about the properties of this evolutionary process.Comment: 10 two-column pages, 10 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

Selection of dynamical rules in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma games

We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income is collected from games with the neighbors. The players, located on the sites of a two-dimensional lattice, follow unconditional cooperation or defection and use individual strategy adoption rule described by a parameter. If the system is started from a random initial state then the present co-evolutionary rule drives the system towards a state where only one evolutionary rule remains alive even in the coexistence of cooperative and defective behaviors. The final rule is related to the optimum providing the highest level of cooperation and affected by the topology of the connectivity structure.Comment: 5 two-column pages, 3 figure

Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding

Our wellbeing depends as much on our personal success, as it does on the success of our society. The realization of this fact makes cooperation a very much needed trait. Experiments have shown that rewards can elevate our readiness to cooperate, but since giving a reward inevitably entails paying a cost for it, the emergence and stability of such behavior remain elusive. Here we show that allowing for the act of rewarding to self-organize in dependence on the success of cooperation creates several evolutionary advantages that instill new ways through which collaborative efforts are promoted. Ranging from indirect territorial battle to the spontaneous emergence and destruction of coexistence, phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal fascinatingly reach social dynamics that explains why this costly behavior has evolved and persevered. Comparisons with adaptive punishment, however, uncover an Achilles heel of adaptive rewarding that is due to over-aggression, which in turn hinders optimal utilization of network reciprocity. This may explain why, despite of its success, rewarding is not as firmly weaved into our societal organization as punishment.Comment: 14 pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of Physic

Wisdom of groups promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas

Whether or not to change strategy depends not only on the personal success of each individual, but also on the success of others. Using this as motivation, we study the evolution of cooperation in games that describe social dilemmas, where the propensity to adopt a different strategy depends both on individual fitness as well as on the strategies of neighbors. Regardless of whether the evolutionary process is governed by pairwise or group interactions, we show that plugging into the "wisdom of groups" strongly promotes cooperative behavior. The more the wider knowledge is taken into account the more the evolution of defectors is impaired. We explain this by revealing a dynamically decelerated invasion process, by means of which interfaces separating different domains remain smooth and defectors therefore become unable to efficiently invade cooperators. This in turn invigorates spatial reciprocity and establishes decentralized decision making as very beneficial for resolving social dilemmas.Comment: 8 two-column pages, 7 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Report

Postmetamorphic ontogenetic allometry and the evolution of skull shape in Nest-building frogs Leptodactylus (Anura: Leptodactylidae)

Allometry constitutes an important source of morphological variation. However, its influence in head development in anurans has been poorly explored. By using geometric morphometrics followed by statistical and comparative methods we analyzed patterns of allometric change during cranial postmetamorphic ontogeny in species of Nest-building frogs Leptodactylus (Leptodactylidae). We found that the anuran skull is not a static structure, and allometry plays an important role in defining its shape in this group. Similar to other groups with biphasic life-cycle, and following a general trend in vertebrates, ontogenetic changes mostly involve rearrangement in rostral, otoccipital, and suspensorium regions. Ontogenetic transformations are paralleled by shape changes associated with evolutionary change in size, such that the skulls of species of different intrageneric groups are scaled to each other, and small and large species show patterns of paedomorphic/peramorphic features, respectively. Allometric trajectories producing those phenotypes are highly evolvable though, with shape change direction and magnitude varying widely among clades, and irrespective of changes in absolute body size. These results reinforce the importance of large-scale comparisons of growth patterns to understand the plasticity, evolution, and polarity of morphological changes in different clades.Fil: Duport Bru, Ana Sofía. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico - Tucumán. Unidad Ejecutora Lillo; ArgentinaFil: Ponssa, María Laura. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico - Tucumán. Unidad Ejecutora Lillo; ArgentinaFil: Vera Candioti, María Florencia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico - Tucumán. Unidad Ejecutora Lillo; Argentin

Adaptive and Bounded Investment Returns Promote Cooperation in Spatial Public Goods Games

The public goods game is one of the most famous models for studying the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups. The multiplication factor in this game can characterize the investment return from the public good, which may be variable depending on the interactive environment in realistic situations. Instead of using the same universal value, here we consider that the multiplication factor in each group is updated based on the differences between the local and global interactive environments in the spatial public goods game, but meanwhile limited to within a certain range. We find that the adaptive and bounded investment returns can significantly promote cooperation. In particular, full cooperation can be achieved for high feedback strength when appropriate limitation is set for the investment return. Also, we show that the fraction of cooperators in the whole population can become larger if the lower and upper limits of the multiplication factor are increased. Furthermore, in comparison to the traditionally spatial public goods game where the multiplication factor in each group is identical and fixed, we find that cooperation can be better promoted if the multiplication factor is constrained to adjust between one and the group size in our model. Our results highlight the importance of the locally adaptive and bounded investment returns for the emergence and dominance of cooperative behavior in structured populations

Incipient Cognition Solves the Spatial Reciprocity Conundrum of Cooperation

Background: From the simplest living organisms to human societies, cooperation among individuals emerges as a paradox difficult to explain and describe mathematically, although very often observed in reality. Evolutionary game theory offers an excellent toolbar to investigate this issue. Spatial structure has been one of the first mechanisms promoting cooperation; however, alone it only opens a narrow window of viability. Methodology/Principal Findings: Here we equip individuals with incipient cognitive abilities, and investigate the evolution of cooperation in a spatial world where retaliation, forgiveness, treason and mutualism may coexist, as individuals engage in Prisoner’s Dilemma games. In the model, individuals are able to distinguish their partners and act towards them based on previous interactions. We show how the simplest level of cognition, alone, can lead to the emergence of cooperation. Conclusions/Significance: Despite the incipient nature of the individuals ’ cognitive abilities, cooperation emerges for unprecedented values of the temptation to cheat, being also robust to invasion by cheaters, errors in decision making an

Experimental and Kinetic Modeling Studies on the Conversion of Sucrose to Levulinic Acid and 5-Hydroxymethylfurfural Using Sulfuric Acid in Water

We here report experimental and kinetic modeling studies on the conversion of sucrose to levulinic acid (LA) and 5-hydroxymethylfurfural (HMF) in water using sulfuric acid as the catalyst. Both compounds are versatile building blocks for the synthesis of various biobased (bulk) chemicals. A total of 24 experiments were performed in a temperature window of 80–180 °C, a sulfuric acid concentration between 0.005 and 0.5 M, and an initial sucrose concentration between 0.05 and 0.5 M. Glucose, fructose, and HMF were detected as the intermediate products. The maximum LA yield was 61 mol %, obtained at 160 °C, an initial sucrose concentration of 0.05 M, and an acid concentration of 0.2 M. The maximum HMF yield (22 mol %) was found for an acid concentration of 0.05 M, an initial sucrose concentration of 0.05 M, and a temperature of 140 °C. The experimental data were modeled using a number of possible reaction networks. The best model was obtained when using a first order approach in substrates (except for the reversion of glucose) and agreement between experiment and model was satisfactorily. The implication of the model regarding batch optimization is also discussed

From Local to Global Dilemmas in Social Networks

Social networks affect in such a fundamental way the dynamics of the population they support that the global, population-wide behavior that one observes often bears no relation to the individual processes it stems from. Up to now, linking the global networked dynamics to such individual mechanisms has remained elusive. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in networked populations and let individuals interact via a 2-person Prisoner's Dilemma – a characteristic defection dominant social dilemma of cooperation. We show how homogeneous networks transform a Prisoner's Dilemma into a population-wide evolutionary dynamics that promotes the coexistence between cooperators and defectors, while heterogeneous networks promote their coordination. To this end, we define a dynamic variable that allows us to track the self-organization of cooperators when co-evolving with defectors in networked populations. Using the same variable, we show how the global dynamics — and effective dilemma — co-evolves with the motifs of cooperators in the population, the overall emergence of cooperation depending sensitively on this co-evolution