External Corrosion Analysis of Model 9975 Packaging Container

The Materials Consultation Group of SRTC has completed an external corrosion analysis of the Model 9975 packaging container for storage in K Reactor under ambient conditions for a period of 12 years. The 12-year storage period includes two years for shipping and ten years for storage. Based on review of existing literature and stated building storage conditions, corrosion degradation of the 304L Stainless Steel (SS) packaging container (drum and vessels) should be minimal during the 12 year time period. There may be visible corrosion on the galvanized carbon steel pallet due to initial drum handling. The visible corrosion will not be sufficient to cause significant degradation during the 12-year storage period. The Materials Consultation Group concludes that there are sufficient data to establish the technical basis for safe storage of the Model 9975 container in the 105-K building for up to 10 years following the 2-year shipping period. The data are sufficient to allow the 304L SS containers to be stored for a total period of 15 years

MATERIALS COMPATIBILITY OF SNAP FUEL COMPONENTS DURING SHIPMENT IN 9975 PACKAGING

Materials Science and Technology has evaluated materials compatibility for the SNAP (Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power) fuel for containment within a 9975 packaging assembly for a shipping period of one year. The evaluation included consideration for potential for water within the convenience can, corrosion from water, galvanic corrosion, tape degradation, and thermal expansion risk. Based on a review of existing literature and assumed conditions, corrosion and/or degradation of the 304 stainless steel (SS) Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) and the 304 stainless steel convenience cans containing the SNAP fuel is not significant to cause failure during the 1 year time shipping period in the 9975 packaging assembly. However, storage beyond the 1 year shipping period has not been validated

FAILURE ANALYSIS: WASTEWATER DRUM BULGING

A 55 gallon wastewater drum lid was found to be bulged during storage in a remote area. Drum samples were obtained for analysis. The interior surface of these samples revealed blistering and holes in the epoxy phenolic drum liner and corrosion of the carbon steel drum. It is suspected that osmotic pressure drove permeation of the water through the epoxy phenolic coating which was weakened from exposure to low pH water. The coating failed at locations throughout the drum interior. Subsequent corrosion of the carbon steel released hydrogen which pressurized the drum causing deformation of the drum lid. Additional samples from other wastewater drums on the same pallet were also evaluated and limited corrosion was visible on the interior surfaces. It is suspected that, with time, the corrosion would have advanced to cause pressurization of these sealed drums

BIOASSAY VESSEL FAILURE ANALYSIS

Two high-pressure bioassay vessels failed at the Savannah River Site during a microwave heating process for biosample testing. Improper installation of the thermal shield in the first failure caused the vessel to burst during microwave heating. The second vessel failure is attributed to overpressurization during a test run. Vessel failure appeared to initiate in the mold parting line, the thinnest cross-section of the octagonal vessel. No material flaws were found in the vessel that would impair its structural performance. Content weight should be minimized to reduce operating temperature and pressure. Outer vessel life is dependent on actual temperature exposure. Since thermal aging of the vessels can be detrimental to their performance, it was recommended that the vessels be used for a limited number of cycles to be determined by additional testing

SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

Spent nuclear fuels are received from reactor sites around the world and are being stored in the L-Basin at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in Aiken, South Carolina. The predominant fuel types are research reactor fuel with aluminum-alloy cladding and aluminum-based fuel. Other fuel materials include stainless steel and Zircaloy cladding with uranium oxide fuel. Chemistry control and corrosion surveillance programs have been established and upgraded since the early 1990's to minimize corrosion degradation of the aluminum cladding materials, so as to maintain fuel integrity and minimize personnel exposure from radioactivity in the basin water. Recent activities have been initiated to support additional decades of wet storage which include fuel inspection and corrosion testing to evaluate the effects of specific water impurity species on corrosion attack

L AREA WASTEWATER STORAGE DRUM EVALUATION

This report documents the determination of the cause of pressurization that led to bulging deformation of a 55 gallon wastewater drum stored in L-Area. Drum samples were sent to SRNL for evaluation. The interior surface of these samples revealed blistering and holes in the epoxy phenolic drum liner and corrosion of the carbon steel drum. It is suspected that osmotic pressure drove permeation of the water through the epoxy phenolic coating which was weakened from exposure to low pH water. The coating failed at locations throughout the drum interior. Subsequent corrosion of the carbon steel released hydrogen which pressurized the drum causing deformation of the drum lid. Additional samples from other wastewater drums on the same pallet were also evaluated and limited corrosion was visible on the interior surfaces. It is suspected that, with time, the corrosion would have advanced to cause pressurization of these sealed drums

Internal Corrosion Analysis of Model 9975 Packaging Containing Pu or PuO{sub 2} During Shipping and Storage

The Materials Consultation Group of SRTC has completed an internal corrosion analysis of the Model 9975 packaging assembly containing either Pu or PuO2 for storage in K Reactor under ambient conditions for a period of 12 years. The 12-year storage period includes two years for shipping and up to ten years for storage

Fiscal Year 2004

This report documents the results of the L-Basin Corrosion Surveillance Program for the fiscal year 2004. Test coupons were removed from the basin on February 12, 2004, shipped to Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), and visually examined in a contaminated laboratory hood. Selected coupons were metallurgically characterized to establish the extent of general corrosion and pitting. Pitting was observed on galvanically coupled and on intentionally creviced coupons, thus demonstrating that localized concentration cells were formed during the exposure period. In these cases, the susceptibility to pitting was not attributed to aggressive basin water chemistry but to localized conditions (intentional crevices and galvanic coupling) that allowed the development of oxygen and/or metal ion concentration cells that produced locally aggressive waters. General oxidation was also observed on all of the coupons with localized corrosion observed on some of the coupons. These coupons were not pretreated to produce a protective oxide layer prior to exposure in the basin water. Non-protected coupons are more susceptible to corrosion than fuel cladding which has developed a protective oxide layer from high temperature reactor operations. However, the oxide on spent nuclear fuel (SNF) stored in L-Basin is not necessarily in pristine condition. Some of the oxide may have spalled off or been mechanically damaged prior to arrival at SRS. These areas on the fuel cladding would have the same susceptibility to corrosion as the coupons. Current observations from the test coupons demonstrate that, even with rigorously controlled basin water chemistry, localized aggressive conditions can develop in intentional crevice and galvanic samples. These results do illustrate the potential for corrosion induced degradation and thus the importance of a routine surveillance program similar to that conducted on the Uruguay fuel and on the surveillance coupons stored in L-Basin and future in-service inspections proposed for additional SNF in L-Basin. The 2004 results are compared to previous results on coupons removed from SRS basins in fiscal years 2001, 2002 and 2003. The extent of corrosion is correlated with sample and storage conditions as well as the water chemistry during the storage period. Coupon weight gains from 2004 coupons are similar to those from 2003. Oxides were removed from furniture rack coupons from 2003 and 2004 and comparable pit depths were found in the filler metal. Corrosion induced-degradation of the spent nuclear fuels stored in L-Basin could potentially impact the storage process by causing cladding penetration, exposing fuel core material, and allowing release of radionuclides to the basin waters. Such releases could potentially lead to high water activity levels which could impact fuel integrity and present problems in future fuel handling and transfer operations. However, the collective results (to date) of the coupon and water chemistry evaluations and Uruguay spent fuel inspections indicate that the fuel in the SRS storage basins has not experienced corrosion-induced degradation that will limit the time for interim storage in the basin waters. Continued surveillance and inspection is essential due to the potential for corrosion induced degradation. The next withdrawal of surveillance coupons from L-Basin occurred on March 29, 2005

DEGRADATION EVALUATION OF HEAVY WATER DRUMS AND TANKS

Heavy water with varying chemistries is currently being stored in over 6700 drums in L- and K-areas and in seven tanks in L-, K-, and C-areas. A detailed evaluation of the potential degradation of the drums and tanks, specific to their design and service conditions, has been performed to support the demonstration of their integrity throughout the desired storage period. The 55-gallon drums are of several designs with Type 304 stainless steel as the material of construction. The tanks have capacities ranging from 8000 to 45600 gallons and are made of Type 304 stainless steel. The drums and tanks were designed and fabricated to national regulations, codes and standards per procurement specifications for the Savannah River Site. The drums have had approximately 25 leakage failures over their 50+ years of use with the last drum failure occurring in 2003. The tanks have experienced no leaks to date. The failures in the drums have occurred principally near the bottom weld, which attaches the bottom to the drum sidewall. Failures have occurred by pitting, crevice and stress corrosion cracking and are attributable, in part, to the presence of chloride ions in the heavy water. Probable degradation mechanisms for the continued storage of heavy water were evaluated that could lead to future failures in the drum or tanks. This evaluation will be used to support establishment of an inspection plan which will include susceptible locations, methods, and frequencies for the drums and tanks to avoid future leakage failures