Cooperation and mistrust in relational contracts

Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. In this paper, we study how reductions in clarity about the financial consequences of actions, induced by incomplete information about the costs of providing quality, affect relational contracts in buyer-seller relationships. Under incomplete information, payoffs to actions become private information. This can impede the joint understanding of what constitutes cooperative behavior, and may thus inject mistrust into relationships, even if credibility is held constant. Comparing seller-buyer relationships with and without complete information about seller costs in the laboratory, we find that such a lack of clarity has effects on the terms of relational contracts. However, these effects only concern the distribution of rents, and not efficiency

Cooperation and Mistrust in Relational Contracts

Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. In this paper, we study how reductions in clarity about the financial consequences of actions, induced by incomplete information about the costs of providing quality, affect relational contracts in buyer-seller relationships. Under incomplete information, payoffs to actions become private information. This can impede the joint understanding of what constitutes cooperative behavior, and may thus inject mistrust into relationships, even if credibility is held constant. Comparing seller-buyer relationships with and without complete information about seller costs in the laboratory, we find that such a lack of clarity has effects on the terms of relational contracts. However, these effects only concern the distribution of rents, and not efficiency

Honesty and Relational Contracts

We study the economic consequences of opportunities for dishonesty in an environment where efficiency relevant behaviour is not contractible, but rather incentivized by informal agreements in an ongoing relationship. We document the repeated interaction between a principal and an agent who, within our main treatment, was privately informed about the costs of effort provision being either high or low. At the beginning of the interaction, an agent could either truthfully report the cost type to the principal or choose to lie about it. We find that a substantial fraction of low cost agents decided to signal high costs. Dishonest low cost and honest high cost agents pool on the complete information outcome with high costs, as measured in our control treatment. The outcome of such pooling is less efficient than for honest low cost agents. Moreover, principals who face dishonest agents earn substantially less profits than those facing honest agents. Our evidence therefore suggests that informal agreements in a repeated interaction generate less efficient outcomes if dishonesty is possible but, at the same time, are robust to substantial degrees of deception. We furthermore show that our experimental findings can be organized using the logic of repeated games

Probing relaxation times in graphene quantum dots

Graphene quantum dots are attractive candidates for solid-state quantum bits. In fact, the predicted weak spin-orbit and hyperfine interaction promise spin qubits with long coherence times. Graphene quantum dot devices have been extensively investigated with respect to their excitation spectrum, spin-filling sequence, and electron-hole crossover. However their relaxation dynamics remain largely unexplored. This is mainly due to challenges in device fabrication, in particular regarding the control of carrier confinement and the tunability of the tunnelling barriers, both crucial to experimentally investigate decoherence times. Here, we report on pulsed-gate transient spectroscopy and relaxation time measurements of excited states in graphene quantum dots. This is achieved by an advanced device design, allowing to tune the tunnelling barriers individually down to the low MHz regime and to monitor their asymmetry with integrated charge sensors. Measuring the transient currents through electronic excited states, we estimate lower limit of charge relaxation times on the order of 60-100 ns.Comment: To be published in Nature Communications. The first two authors contributed equally to this work. Main article: 10 pages, 4 figures. Supplementary information: 4 pages, 4 figure

Safety assessment of the process ‘PEGRA-V’, based on Starlinger IV+® technology, used to recycle post-consumer PET into food contact materials

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Safety assessment of the process ‘Plastienvase’, based on EREMA Basic technology, used to recycle post-consumer PET into food contact materials

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Safety assessment of the process ‘Veroniki Ecogrup SRL’, based on Starlinger Decon technology, used to recycle post-consumer PET into food contact materials

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Safety assessment of the process ‘Coexpan Deutschland’, based on EREMA Basic technology, used to recycle post-consumer PET into food contact materials

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Safety assessment of the process ‘4PET’, based on EREMA Basic technology, used to recycle post-consumer PET into food contact materials

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