Erratum to "Confirmation as partial entailment" [Journal of Applied Logic 11 (2013) 364–372]

Abstract We provide a correction to the proof of the main result in Crupi and Tentori (2013)

Three ways of being non-material

This paper presents a novel unified account of three distinct non-material interpretations of "if... then...": the suppositional interpretation, the evidential interpretation, and the strict interpretation. We will spell out and compare these three interpretations within a single formal framework which rests on fairly uncontroversial assumptions, in that it requires nothing but propositional logic and the probability calculus. As we will show, each of the three intrerpretations exhibits specific logical features that deserve separate consideration. In particular, the evidential interpretation as we understand it — a precise and well defined version of it which has never been explored before — significantly differs both from the suppositional interpretation and from the strict interpretation

The evidential conditional

This paper outlines an account of conditionals, the evidential account, which rests on the idea that a conditional is true just in case its antecedent supports its consequent. As we will show, the evidential account exhibits some distinctive logical features that deserve careful consideration. On the one hand, it departs from the material reading of "if... then..." exactly in the way we would like it to depart from that reading. On the other, it significantly differs from the non-material reading of "if... then..." implied by the suppositional theories advocated by Adams, Stalnaker, Lewis, and others

The evidential conditional

This paper outlines an account of conditionals, the evidential account, which rests on the idea that a conditional is true just in case its antecedent supports its consequent. As we will show, the evidential account exhibits some distinctive logical features that deserve careful consideration. On the one hand, it departs from the material reading of "if... then..." exactly in the way we would like it to depart from that reading. On the other, it significantly differs from the non-material reading of "if... then..." implied by the suppositional theories advocated by Adams, Stalnaker, Lewis, and others

The evidential conditional

This paper outlines an account of conditionals, the evidential account, which rests on the idea that a conditional is true just in case its antecedent supports its consequent. As we will show, the evidential account exhibits some distinctive logical features that deserve careful consideration. On the one hand, it departs from the material reading of "if... then..." exactly in the way we would like it to depart from that reading. On the other, it significantly differs from the non-material reading of "if... then..." implied by the suppositional theories advocated by Adams, Stalnaker, Lewis, and others