Hard Determinism, Remorse, and Virtue Ethics

When hard determinists reject the claim that people deserve particular kinds of treatment because of how they have acted, they are left with a problem about remorse. Remorse is often represented as a way we impose retribution on ourselves when we understand that we have acted badly. (This view of remorse appears in the work of Freud, and I think it fits our everyday, pretheoretical understanding of one kind of remorse.) Retribution of any kind cannot be appropriate if we do not deserve bad treatment because of how we have acted. But remorse seems to be essentially bound up with understanding that we have acted badly. If this is right, it is important for hard determinists to find a non-retributive account of remorse, so that they can accommodate remorse within their theories. My goal in this paper is to provide such an account. I describe a kind of remorse which I think is a common human experience, a kind which is based on suffering in sympathy with the person one has wronged. It is similar to suffering in sympathy with one's friends when they suffer. We suffer in sympathy with friends not because we think we deserve to, but because we care about them, and their suffering gives us pain. In the wake of a wrongful act, a "virtuous wrongdoer" comes to care about the person wronged, and suffers in sympathy with him. This kind of remorse can be accommodated by hard determinists

An Asymmetrical Approach to Kant's Theory of Freedom

Asymmetry theories about free will and moral responsibility are a recent development in the long history of the free will debate. To my knowledge, Kant commentators have not yet explored the possibility of an asymmetrical reconstruction of Kant's theory of freedom, and that will be my goal here. By "free will", I mean the sort of control we would need to be morally responsible for our actions. Kant's term for it is "transcendental freedom", and he refers to the attribution of moral responsibility as "imputation". By "Kant's theory of freedom", I mean not only his theory of transcendental freedom and imputation, but also the various ways in which he draws on these ideas in his moral theory

Taking Free Will Skepticism Seriously

An apparently increasing number of philosophers take free will skepticism to pose a serious challenge to some of our practices. This must seem odd to many—why should anyone think that free will skepticism is relevant for our practices, when nobody seems to think that other canonical forms of philosophical skepticism are relevant for our practices? Part of the explanation may be epistemic, but here I focus on a metaethical explanation. Free will skepticism is special because it is compatible with ‘basic moral reasons’—moral reasons acknowledged by all mainstream ethicists—and other minds and induction skepticism are not. One example is our reason not to intentionally harm others. Practical seriousness about other minds and induction skepticism undermines this reason, but practical seriousness about free will skepticism only undermines a potential overrider of this reason, that is, the reason of retribution

Kant's Mature Theory of Punishment, and a First Critique Ideal Abolitionist Alternative

This chapter has two goals. First, I will present an interpretation of Kant’s mature account of punishment, which includes a strong commitment to retributivism. Second, I will sketch a non-retributive, “ideal abolitionist” alternative, which appeals to a version of original position deliberation in which we choose the principles of punishment on the assumption that we are as likely to end up among the punished as we are to end up among those protected by the institution of punishment. This is radical relative to Kant’s mature theory of punishment, but arguably it conforms better to the spirit of Kant’s first Critique remarks on imputation and punishment than his mature theory does

An Investigation into Full Range Leadership and Leadership Development Methods in Public Parks and Recreation Organizations in California

As current public parks and recreation organizational leaders age and retire, it will become important for qualified professionals to be prepared to fill these positions. A study by Hurd and McLean (2004) examined the perceived competencies of CEOs in public park and recreation organizations. Leadership and management were rated as the most important competencies for CEOs. However, these perceived competencies are not only for the CEOs; all professionals employed in parks and recreation, from administrative leaders to direct service providers, must demonstrate leadership to succeed in their positions (Russell, 2005). Thus, it is crucial for parks and recreation organizations to understand the type of leadership needed in their field as well as appropriate leadership development methods. This survey study determined the self-perceived type of leadership used by professionals in the public parks and recreation field and examined the relationship between types of leadership development methods and transformational leadership. Focusing on public parks and recreation professionals in California the sample included the 4,063 members of California Parks and Recreation Society (CPRS) solicited through emails and direct contact at a conference. Data were collected through self-reported online surveys. A total of 372 surveys were completed over a two-month period in Winter 2018. Results of the study indicate that public parks and recreation professionals in California use transformational leadership more than they do transactional or laissez-faire leadership. Additionally, there is a moderate relationship between leadership development experiences and self-perceived use of transformational leadership. Findings indicate moderate, positive relationships between developmental assignments, self-development activities, and self-perceived use of transformational leadership. Weak, positive relationships were found between formal programs, feedback processes, and developmental relationships and self-perceived use of transformational leadership. Results from this study can support CPRS, public parks and recreation organizations, and universities in their efforts to provide leadership development to the profession. These organizations should consider continuing or adding purposeful developmental assignments as well as encouraging and supporting self-development leadership development methods

Assessing The Myth: A Study Of Eligible Athletes\u27 Grade Point Averages

There is a common notion that athletes are not highly intelligent. For instance, the label dumb jock is often applied to an athletic competitor, and the phrase big like-tractor, dumb like tractor has been used to describe linemen in football. There is little question about society\u27s view of athletes, however what is debatable is just how valid these stereotypes are. This research project is a study of athletes during a one-year period at Northern State University in Aberdeen, S.D. (hereafter referred to as NSU). The institution of higher learning is located in the upper midwest in an agricultural environment, with approximately 3,000 students. The study attempted to assess the accuracy of the public perception that athletes are poorer students, using NSU as a case study

Viewing developmental psychology through the lenses of feminist theories

Feminist theories provide a framework through which to explore interesting issues in developmental psychology, This article describes 10 feminist theories: liberal, socialist, African-American/ethnic, essentialist, existentialist, psychoanalytic, radical, postmodern, post-colonial, and cyberfeminist. Theimplications of each for developmental psychology are presented. Several of these theories argue for new accounts of development that take the experiences, values, and interests of women and girls as their starting point.Las teorías feministas proporcionan un marco general para explorar los resultados de la psicología del desarrollo. Este artículo presenta diez teorías feministas y comenta las implicaciones de cada una de ellas. Las teorías tratadas son: la liberal, étnica Africana-Americana, esencialista, existencialista, psicoanalítica, radical, post moderna, postcolonial y ciberfeminismo. Algunasde estas teorías abogan por nuevas explicaciones del desarrollo que tomen como punto de partida las experiencias, valores e intereses de las mujeres y niñas

Viewing developmental psychology through the lenses of feminist theories

Feminist theories provide a framework through which to explore interesting issues in developmental psychology, This article describes 10 feminist theories: liberal, socialist, African-American/ethnic, essentialist, existentialist, psychoanalytic, radical, postmodern, post-colonial, and cyberfeminist. Theimplications of each for developmental psychology are presented. Several of these theories argue for new accounts of development that take the experiences, values, and interests of women and girls as their starting point.Las teorías feministas proporcionan un marco general para explorar los resultados de la psicología del desarrollo. Este artículo presenta diez teorías feministas y comenta las implicaciones de cada una de ellas. Las teorías tratadas son: la liberal, étnica Africana-Americana, esencialista, existencialista, psicoanalítica, radical, post moderna, postcolonial y ciberfeminismo. Algunasde estas teorías abogan por nuevas explicaciones del desarrollo que tomen como punto de partida las experiencias, valores e intereses de las mujeres y niñas

Free will skepticism and personhood as a desert base

In contemporary free will theory, a significant number of philosophers are once again taking seriously the possibility that human beings do not have free will, and are therefore not morally responsible for their actions. (Free will is understood here as whatever satisfies the control condition of moral responsibility.) Free will theorists commonly assume that giving up the belief that human beings are morally responsible implies giving up all our beliefs about desert. But the consequences of giving up the belief that we are morally responsible are not quite this dramatic. Giving up the belief that we are morally responsible undermines many, and perhaps most, of the desert claims we are pretheoretically inclined to accept. But it does not undermine desert claims based on the sheer fact of personhood. Even in the absence of belief in moral responsibility, personhood-based desert claims require us to respect persons and their rights. So personhood-based desert claims can provide a substantial role for desert in free will skeptics' ethical theories