Non-Separable, Quasiconcave Utilities are Easy -- in a Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model

Recent results, establishing evidence of intractability for such restrictive utility functions as additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave, under both Fisher and Arrow-Debreu market models, have prompted the question of whether we have failed to capture some essential elements of real markets, which seem to do a good job of finding prices that maintain parity between supply and demand. The main point of this paper is to show that even non-separable, quasiconcave utility functions can be handled efficiently in a suitably chosen, though natural, realistic and useful, market model; our model allows for perfect price discrimination. Our model supports unique equilibrium prices and, for the restriction to concave utilities, satisfies both welfare theorems

The planar algebra of a semisimple and cosemisimple Hopf algebra

To a semisimple and cosemisimple Hopf algebra over an algebraically closed field, we associate a planar algebra defined by generators and relations and show that it is a connected, irreducible, spherical, non-degenerate planar algebra with non-zero modulus and of depth two. This association is shown to yield a bijection between (the isomorphism classes, on both sides, of) such objects.Comment: 16 pages, 20 figures; content adde

Matching Is as Easy as the Decision Problem, in the NC Model

Is matching in NC, i.e., is there a deterministic fast parallel algorithm for it? This has been an outstanding open question in TCS for over three decades, ever since the discovery of randomized NC matching algorithms [KUW85, MVV87]. Over the last five years, the theoretical computer science community has launched a relentless attack on this question, leading to the discovery of several powerful ideas. We give what appears to be the culmination of this line of work: An NC algorithm for finding a minimum-weight perfect matching in a general graph with polynomially bounded edge weights, provided it is given an oracle for the decision problem. Consequently, for settling the main open problem, it suffices to obtain an NC algorithm for the decision problem. We believe this new fact has qualitatively changed the nature of this open problem. All known efficient matching algorithms for general graphs follow one of two approaches: given by Edmonds [Edm65] and Lov\'asz [Lov79]. Our oracle-based algorithm follows a new approach and uses many of the ideas discovered in the last five years. The difficulty of obtaining an NC perfect matching algorithm led researchers to study matching vis-a-vis clever relaxations of the class NC. In this vein, recently Goldwasser and Grossman [GG15] gave a pseudo-deterministic RNC algorithm for finding a perfect matching in a bipartite graph, i.e., an RNC algorithm with the additional requirement that on the same graph, it should return the same (i.e., unique) perfect matching for almost all choices of random bits. A corollary of our reduction is an analogous algorithm for general graphs.Comment: Appeared in ITCS 202

On Computability of Equilibria in Markets with Production

Although production is an integral part of the Arrow-Debreu market model, most of the work in theoretical computer science has so far concentrated on markets without production, i.e., the exchange economy. This paper takes a significant step towards understanding computational aspects of markets with production. We first define the notion of separable, piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) production by analogy with SPLC utility functions. We then obtain a linear complementarity problem (LCP) formulation that captures exactly the set of equilibria for Arrow-Debreu markets with SPLC utilities and SPLC production, and we give a complementary pivot algorithm for finding an equilibrium. This settles a question asked by Eaves in 1975 of extending his complementary pivot algorithm to markets with production. Since this is a path-following algorithm, we obtain a proof of membership of this problem in PPAD, using Todd, 1976. We also obtain an elementary proof of existence of equilibrium (i.e., without using a fixed point theorem), rationality, and oddness of the number of equilibria. We further give a proof of PPAD-hardness for this problem and also for its restriction to markets with linear utilities and SPLC production. Experiments show that our algorithm runs fast on randomly chosen examples, and unlike previous approaches, it does not suffer from issues of numerical instability. Additionally, it is strongly polynomial when the number of goods or the number of agents and firms is constant. This extends the result of Devanur and Kannan (2008) to markets with production. Finally, we show that an LCP-based approach cannot be extended to PLC (non-separable) production, by constructing an example which has only irrational equilibria.Comment: An extended abstract will appear in SODA 201

Guionnet-Jones-Shlyakhtenko subfactors associated to finite-dimensional Kac algebras

We analyse the Guionnet-Jones-Shlyakhtenko construction for the planar algebra associated to a finite-dimensional Kac algebra and identify the factors that arise as finite interpolated free group factors.Comment: 18 pages, 21 figures, corrected typo

An Incentive Compatible, Efficient Market for Air Traffic Flow Management

We present a market-based approach to the Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) problem. The goods in our market are delays and buyers are airline companies; the latter pay money to the FAA to buy away the desired amount of delay on a per flight basis. We give a notion of equilibrium for this market and an LP whose solution gives an equilibrium allocation of flights to landing slots as well as equilibrium prices for the landing slots. Via a reduction to matching, we show that this equilibrium can be computed combinatorially in strongly polynomial time. Moreover, there is a special set of equilibrium prices, which can be computed easily, that is identical to the VCG solution, and therefore the market is incentive compatible in dominant strategy.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1109.521